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Think about the first time you read Peter Pan as a child. The words 
probably came to life as you imagined Peter and his friends flying past a huge 
wooden pirate ship, and you could almost hear the ticking from the crocodile in 
the bay, just as if the story was part of the real world. At the same time, it is 
unlikely you considered how the series of words on a page came together into a 
rich and meaningful story. This very question regarding the nature of cognition, 
and specifically that of language comprehension and how we understand words 
on a page has been debated for years. Researchers have argued that the format 
of mental representations is either inherently linguistic (i.e., amodal symbols; 
Fodor, 1975) or inherently perceptual (i.e., modal embodied states; Barsalou, 
1999; Glenberg, 1997) in nature. This debate has recently been infused with a 
new perspective that examines mental representations from a combined point of 
view (Barsalou, 2008). This new perspective endorses neither linguistic nor 
perceptual accounts of representation but rather suggests that both types of 
representations work together to facilitate language comprehension. Instead of 
spending time and resources exploring whether mental representations are 
linguistic or perceptual it is now more productive to explore the question of 
when mental representations are more linguistic or more perceptual. This 
distinction is significant, as it asks an informative question that leads to exciting 
new research questions that contribute to a range of disciplines in the cognitive 
sciences, including linguistics, psychology, and computer science. This 
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dissertation focuses on some of those questions by asking how language 
processing is facilitated by both symbolic and embodied accounts working in 
concert.  
Embodied Theories of Cognition 
Proponents of embodied or perceptual representations have offered a 
modal view of cognition, stating that comprehension is driven by perceptual 
experiences so much so that words and concepts are grounded in the physical 
world through action and perception (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Zwaan, 
2004). In essence, the mind is embodied and word meaning must be grounded 
in bodily experiences and situations. The activation of word and concept 
meaning in memory is derived from modality-specific re-enactments or 
simulations of the external experiences associated with those concepts. For 
example, when you read the word thimble on a page, it is understood by 
simulating the same patterns of neural activation that are active when seeing the 
size, shape, material, and color of a thimble, touching the hard and pitted metal 
surface of a thimble, and using granny’s favorite thimble to protect your finger 
while sewing. All of these perceptual experiences come together to represent the 
many facets of a thimble and contribute to word meaning, allowing us to 
understand just what exactly Wendy handed to Peter in lieu of a kiss. According 
to this embodied perspective, mental representations are simply mental 
reenactments or simulations of external percepts.  
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Theorists have hypothesized that embodied representations are 
fundamental to language processing (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Pecher & 
Zwaan, 2005; Semin & Smith, 2008). Indeed, these claims are backed by ample 
empirical support. For example, language processing is facilitated when 
experimental tasks allude to perceptual features related to stimuli. These 
perceptual features are numerous, with location, perspective, orientation, shape, 
color, direction, and even the modality of stimuli impacting language 
processing. 
According to this modal view of cognition, simulated location is critical 
during language comprehension. For example, spatially relevant word pairs 
presented in their expected physical locations are processed faster than when 
they are presented in an unexpected location. This occurs because a word is 
easier to process when the anticipated and actual perceptual properties of the 
word match. Zwaan and Yaxley (2003) demonstrated this in an experiment in 
which they showed word pairs such as attic and basement in a vertical 
configuration. Response times (RTs) were faster when attic appeared above 
basement than vice versa. In similar studies, Šetić and Domijan (2007) and 
Pecher, van Dantzig, Boot, Zanolie, and Huber (2010) presented ‘up’ and 
‘down’ words (e.g., a flying animal like an eagle or an animal that cannot fly 
like a dolphin) one at a time either in an expected physical location or in an 
unexpected physical location. Participants were faster to process concept and 
location matches than mismatches. Likewise, Estes, Verges, and Barsalou 
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(2008) found the same effects with an object word (e.g., cowboy) followed by a 
high or low location cue (e.g., hat versus boot). As predicted, participants were 
faster to identify a target letter appearing in a location that matched the cue. 
Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock, and Narayanan (2007) found similar effects when 
participants listened to sentences implying ‘up’ or ‘down’ motions. When 
sentences matched the position of a visual shape cue, processing was facilitated. 
Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, and McRae (2003) found that even abstract verbs 
like argue and respect are related to specific orientations (horizontal for argue 
and vertical for respect) and expectedly RTs are influenced accordingly when 
visual stimuli are oriented horizontally or vertically.  
The same is true for perspective, Borghi, Glenberg and Kaschak (2004) 
showed that when participants read sentences implying a perspective (e.g., “You 
are eating in a restaurant” or “You are waiting outside a restaurant”) RTs to a 
concept verification task were faster if the perspective of the concept and 
sentence matched (e.g., table would be a match with “You are eating in a 
restaurant” whereas it would be a mismatch with “You are waiting outside a 
restaurant”). This effect is also explained in terms of embodied representations 
whereby perceptual simulations of the words presented are automatically 
generated and relied upon by participants during the experimental task. 
Embodied effects extend past linguistic stimuli to also include pictorial 
stimuli, with pictures that appear in their expected spatial positions similarly 
being processed faster than mismatched picture-location pairs (Crawford, 
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Margolies, Drake, & Murphy, 2006; Dijkstra, Yaxley, Madden, & Zwaan, 2004; 
Meier et al., 2007). For instance, RTs decrease when the orientation of an image 
matches implied physical characteristics within a related sentence. Stanfield and 
Zwaan (2001) demonstrated this when they presented participants with an 
image of an item followed by a sentence describing the item in an orientation 
consistent or inconsistent with the previously presented image. Participants read 
“John put the pencil in the cup,” versus “John put the pencil in the drawer,” and 
then made an item recognition judgment after seeing a picture of a vertically 
oriented pencil. The results showed that participants exhibited faster RTs when 
reading sentences describing objects in the same orientations as the pictures 
depicting those objects.  
Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley (2002) used a similar paradigm where 
participants read about objects in scenarios that implied a particular object 
shape, and RTs were faster when a presented picture matched the implied shape 
in the sentence. Not only can the same effect also be found for item shape but 
even color is perceptually simulated. Connell and Lynott (2009) showed that 
when a presented color word matched a particular color implied by the previous 
sentence, color naming was easier.  
Myung, Blumstein, and Sedivy (2006) found that when a words that 
implied particular manipulation features were presented auditorily, participants 
made faster decisions about the another prime that shared manipulation features 
(e.g., typewriter and piano) than an unrelated prime (e.g., blanket). Glenberg 
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and Kaschak (2002), Borreggine and Kaschak (2006), and Bergen and Wheeler 
(2005), comparably showed that sentences that implied directional movements 
were processed faster when the response required a congruent motion instead of 
an incongruent motion. For instance, when participants read, “Open the drawer” 
and were asked to respond by making a motion towards their body, RTs were 
faster than when reading a sentence like “Close the drawer.” In essence, 
understanding “Open the drawer” is thought to generate simulations of actions 
toward the body, thereby facilitating a response motion in the same direction. 
Similarly, Zwaan and Taylor (2006) also asked participants to read sentences 
implying motion, such as “He turned down the volume," and they found that 
when response actions, such as rotating a knob to the left versus rotating a knob 
to the right, were congruent with what was described in the sentence, responses 
were facilitated.  
This paradigm has been replicated and extended to less concrete words, 
with researchers finding similar effects for verbs (Meteyard, Zokaei, Bahrami, 
& Vigliocco, 2008), positive/negative metaphors (Meier & Robinson, 2004), 
abstract concepts (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007), and 
powerful/powerless metaphors (Schubert, 2005) to name just a few. For 
example, Meteyard, Zokaei, Bahrami, and Vigliocco (2008) found that motion 
verbs (e.g., rise, fall) were processed faster when the motion implied from the 
word matched the direction of a simultaneously presented visual motion pattern. 
On the other hand, Kaschak, Madden, Therriault, Yaxley, Aveyard, Blanchard, 
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and Zwaan (2005) found a mismatch advantage when participants were 
processing sentences implying motion (e.g., “The dog was running towards 
you” or “You backed away from the fire”) while simultaneously perceiving 
motion in the opposite direction, presumably because the neural network 
required for simulation was occupied with a perceptual task.  
Even metaphorically high and low words such as God and devil, good 
and bad, or strong and weak, were processed faster when presented in a 
congruent vertical position on the screen (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & 
Schjeldahl, 2007; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Schubert, 2005). Santana and de 
Vega (2011) found that conceptual metaphors are processed through embodied 
mechanisms and Wilson and Gibbs (2007) found that action specifically 
impacted metaphor comprehension. They found when asked to perform 
particular actions, participants were faster to comprehend metaphors when the 
metaphor-action pair was matched. Findings like these provide overwhelming 
evidence for theories that endorse embodied representations in both literal as 
well as figurative language (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Lakoff, 1987; van 
Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg & Barsalou, 2008).  
Such behavioral RT evidence for embodied cognition dovetails with 
neuropsychological studies that show sensory and motor activation during 
language processing (Buccino et al., 2005; Kan et al., 2003; Rueschemeyer et 
al., 2010). Researchers have identified neural activation in the motor cortex 
when individuals read words conveying relevant motor-driven actions. 
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Participants read sentences that included action words related to the legs (e.g., 
kick), the face (e.g., lick), or the arms (e.g., pick). When those action words were 
read, neural activity in the corresponding motor cortex area for actual 
movement of those body parts increased, suggesting that action verbs are 
understood through embodied mechanisms (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermuller, 
2004). In a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study, Buccino et al. (2005) 
showed that when participants listen to hand-related or foot-related action 
sentences (e.g., “he sewed the skirt” versus “he kicked the ball”) the relevant 
portion of the motor system was activated. Chao and Martin (2000) even found 
that motor cortex activity increased significantly when participants were 
presented with pictures of highly manipulable objects compared to un-
manipulable objects. 
Based on this evidence, embodied representations are thought to be 
modality specific with visual information activating visual cortex, tactile 
information activating motor/somatosensory cortex, and emotion information 
activating emotional centers, leading to faster processing times within the same 
modality than across different modalities (e.g., Marques, 2006; Spence, 
Nicholls, & Driver, 2001). Indeed, processing within specific modalities is 
faster than processing between modalities (Van Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & 
Barsalou, 2008). For instance, Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Barsalou (2003) found 
that when verifying facts (e.g., leaves can rustle, or cranberries are tart) 
switching between perceptual modalities took longer than when both facts 
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involved the same sensory modality. These findings suggest when we mentally 
simulate a sentence, we are activating a neural pattern of activation that is 
modality specific.  
Studies like these (see Barsalou, 2008; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Semin & 
Smith, 2008 for more complete overviews) demonstrate that individuals rely on 
perceptual representations in everyday language comprehension. The results 
from these experiments, as well as other studies like them (Glenberg, & 
Kaschak, 2002; Pecher, van Dantzig, Zwaan, & Zeelenberg, 2009; Spivey & 
Geng, 2001; Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003), show that participants’ processing appears 
to benefit from experimental tasks and activities that invoke the consideration of 
perceptual information. Such findings support the idea that embodiment and 
perceptual simulation is central to cognition and provide evidence that language 
processing is facilitated by the use of embodied mental representations. 
Symbolic Theories of Cognition 
The embodied cognition models of human thought gained popularity in 
response to classical amodal symbolic cognition accounts that dominated in the 
1950s — 1970s. Symbols are non-iconic representations of their referents. 
Although there are several interpretations of a symbolic cognition account, the 
typical account proposed in contrast to grounded cognition suggests that we 
make amodal symbolic connections between a concept and its meaning in 
memory (Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984; Tulving, 1983). Meaning can then be 
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derived from the symbolic linguistic connections that exist between symbols in 
a network (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). In other words, concepts are represented 
in our minds in a propositional way through amodal lists and semantic 
networks, and word meaning is established from relationships between symbols 
without requiring any perceptual simulations to garner meaning (Kintsch, 1998; 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Pylyshyn, 1984).  
In essence, words need not activate modality specific sensorimotor 
simulations in order to be understood. For example, computer systems are 
amodal; keystrokes and mouse movements are translated into ones and zeroes 
that do not directly represent the commands being provided. In a simplified 
conceptualization of this account, the word thimble can be thought of as being 
translated into 01110100 01101000 01101001 01101101 01100010 01101100 
01100101 by our mind. This abstract symbolic representation is a sort of mental 
translation from a concept in the external world to a mental representation. 
Unlike an embodied account, thimble is not directly related to an actual thimble, 
or a perceptual re-enactment of a thimble. It isn’t necessary to imagine what a 
thimble feels or looks like, symbolically, humans and computers alike can 
determine the meaning of a given word, e.g., thimble, through assessing the 
strength of statistical relationships between that word (i.e., thimble) and what is 
related to that word (e.g., sewing, finger, metal, cap, thread, needle, protection). 
Symbolic systems function by calculating covariation between words, 
features, and concepts from which meaning emerges. Because strictly symbolic 
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representations do not correspond to perceptual states they instead rely on 
mathematical and computational algorithms for symbol manipulation to 
generate meaning. This makes it easy to represent abstract concepts in a 
symbol-type system. In fact, it is easy to imagine how situations that are 
impossible to ever experience can be represented symbolically (Pylyshyn, 
2002). Consider again Peter Pan; while it is not possible to stop aging, and 
especially not possible for a human to fly, we have little trouble imagining 
either of these scenarios. Scenarios like these, and abstract concepts (e.g., 
infinity) are not based on previous perceptual or bodily experiences but they can 
easily be represented as a node or symbol in a network of connections. In line 
with this example, language comprehension theorists suggest that this is how 
text is understood. Mental representations are thought of as arbitrary and 
abstract symbols, with sentences being understood as a network of related but 
amodal propositional units (Kintsch, 1998; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). As such, 
symbolic representations lend themselves to computational and statistical 
processing to represent knowledge, a process that is more efficient than taking 
the time to mentally re-enact perceptual experiences, as modal experience is all 
more or less encoded in the same abstract fashion.  
Working computer programs and computational language models and 
algorithms are often used as examples of symbolic systems (e.g., ACT; 
Anderson, 1996; or LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1997). For instance, Latent 
Semantic Analysis (LSA) uses large corpora to compute word meaning by 
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mapping words and their neighbors in a high dimensional semantic space. 
Words or texts in this semantic space are then compared in terms of whether 
they appear in the same and similar contexts and the similarity between them is 
calculated and represented by a cosine value. LSA has shown to approximate 
human performance in a number of ways. Despite LSA being unable to 
understand what words mean in the same way humans seem to, LSA is still 
quite successfully able to algorithmically compute word meaning. For example, 
LSA has shown, on the basis of symbolic algorithms alone, to be able to pass 
the Test of English as a foreign language (TOEFL) test (Landauer & Dumais, 
1997). LSA has also been able to grade essays just as well as expert graders 
(Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998).  
Although some of the best examples of symbolic systems seem to be 
computational models, evidence suggests that humans also use statistical 
regularities in language to establish word meaning. Symbolic representations 
are often framed as being contrary to embodied cognition research (de Vega et 
al., 2008; Glenberg, 2010; Lakens, 2011; Louwerse, 2011a). Yet, there is 
evidence that symbolic representations (i.e., language statistics) actually encode 
perceptual information about the world around us (Louwerse, 2008). 
Experiments and computer simulations demonstrate that individuals rely on 
symbolic linguistic representations in everyday language comprehension. For 
instance, pairs of words, such as up–down or top–bottom occur more frequently 
when a concept in a high location precedes a concept word in a low location 
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(Louwerse, 2008) and the same holds for a variety of paired words, with word 
frequency patterns matching their perceptual relations in the real world. For 
example, concepts like body parts are processed in the same way. Co-
occurrence frequencies of name pairs can predict the vertical position of body 
parts, so head appears before shoulder in language, just as heads appears above 
the shoulders in real life (Tillman, Hutchinson, & Louwerse, 2013).  
Statistical regularities are not only used when processing perceptually 
related words. Hutchinson and Louwerse (2012) showed that language statistics 
also explain metaphor processing, with positive words (e.g., achievement, 
beautiful) appearing before negative words (e.g., failure, ugly). Further, the 
linguistic frequencies of how often the word pairs occur in each order (i.e., 
beautiful appearing before ugly, or ugly appearing before beautiful) predicted 
participant RTs in a semantic judgment task. This pattern for metaphor word 
pairs was further extended to concepts related to temperature, authority, and 
gender (Hutchinson & Louwerse, 2013). Tillman, Hutchinson, Jordan, and 
Louwerse (2013) extended this effect to emotional information as well, with 
linguistic frequencies of emotional nouns and adjectives (e.g., birthdays can be 
happy, insults can be devastating) predicting whether the two words shared the 
same emotional valence. Therefore even though pairs like eagle — dolphin are 
processed faster than the reverse, it might just be the case that we are processing 
these words symbolically. 
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Louwerse, Cai, Hu, Ventura, and Jeuniaux (2006) and Louwerse and 
Zwaan (2009) provide further evidence that humans rely on word frequencies 
by showing that language encodes geographical information. Louwerse and 
Zwaan (2009) showed that statistical linguistic frequencies between cities in the 
USA correlate with the actual physical distance between them. Even more, the 
geographical location of cities can be predicted based on whether city names 
tended to appear in similar linguistic contexts. Louwerse and Zwaan (2009) also 
showed that the latitude and longitude of the 50 largest cities in the USA could 
be calculated by their co-occurrence frequencies in the English language. 
Louwerse, Hutchinson, and Cai (2012) found the same for cities in China and 
the Middle East and Davies (2013) extended the finding to the UK. Louwerse 
and Benesh (2012) even demonstrated that fictional city locations in the Lord of 
the Rings trilogy could be predicted based on the computational semantic 
associations between cities in the text. Tillman, Hutchinson, and Louwerse 
(2013) also showed that language users rely on statistical regularities when 
considering geographical information, with northern and western city names 
appearing above/before southern and eastern city names not only in the real 
world, but also in language.  
Just like geographical information, Hutchinson, Datla, and Louwerse 
(2012) show that social information is also inherent computationally in 
language. Social proximity and relationships between characters found in the 
Harry Potter novels can be computed via statistical algorithms. In fact, these 
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computations can approximate human performance when generating a social 
network. These findings that language users rely on statistical information are 
not conclusive, but at least they do indicate that symbolic representations play a 
role in language processing. In sum, participants’ processing benefits not only 
from the consideration of perceptual embodied features as previously presented 
but also from statistical regularities in language.  
Integrated Theories of Cognition 
The aforementioned evidence traditionally suggests two contrary 
conclusions: a) that language processing is embodied or b) that language 
processing is symbolic. Each approach is informative because each highlights 
the roles that embodied and statistical factors play during language processing, 
but these accounts are often presented as mutually exclusive (see de Vega, 
Glenberg, & Graesser, 2008 for an overview of this debate). It is clear many 
researchers consider these two explanations to be dichotomous, with hundreds 
of journal articles devoted to the question of whether or not perceptual 
simulations plays a role in language comprehension. In the literature, this 
sentiment is made explicit, with researchers stating that “[symbolic] notations 
[…] constitute a problem for the question how symbols are given 
meaning” (van Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg & Barsalou, 2008, p. 580).  
Despite the fact that symbolic and embodied accounts of cognition are so 
often framed as being divergent from one another (De Vega, Glenberg & 
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Robertson, 2008; Fodor, 2008; Glenberg, 2010; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; 
Van Dantzig et al. 2008), there need not be such a division. A unified account 
offers resolutions for discrepancies in each account while still being mutually 
reinforcing (Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009; Dove, 2009). In fact there is 
increasing evidence that both linguistic processes and simulation processes both 
play a role during language processing, and that symbolic and embodied 
cognition accounts can be integrated (Louwerse, 2008; Louwerse, 2011b). That 
is, statistical linguistic factors and perceptual simulations interact with one 
another such that linguistic representations are used as external symbols to 
facilitate processing. Several researchers have already proposed that it is 
important to consider the interplay between symbolic and embodied factors in 
cognition (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008; Louwerse, 2008, 2010; 
Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008, 2010; Zwaan 2014). 
One such theory is Paivio’s (1971; 1986) Dual Coding Theory where 
cognitive processes include both visual and verbal information. In this theory, 
pictorial stimuli allow for pictorial representations, and verbal stimuli allow for 
linguistic representations. Paivio proposed three levels of meaning. The first 
level is representational, where verbal stimuli are represented as words and 
pictorial stimuli are represented as images. The second level is referential 
whereby linguistic and perceptual representations refer to one another and form 
connections. The third level is associative, involving intraverbal and 
interimaginal representations. In essence, each representation is processed along 
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distinct channels, but relationships exist between channels such that different 
types of representations might be employed in different situations. For instance, 
this theory implies that verbal stimuli are first are foremost represented 
linguistically whereas pictorial stimuli are first and foremost represented 
perceptually. This theory also implies that neither explanation (embodied or 
symbolic) should be dismissed but instead both amodal linguistic information 
and modal perceptual information refers to one another to work together to 
represent meaning.  
Like Paivio, Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson’s (2008) Language 
and Situated Simulation (LASS) theory also suggest that representations are not 
solely perceptual. According to LASS, there are also both linguistic and 
simulation systems. During processing, both systems are engaged immediately, 
but linguistic activation is more important immediately and embodied 
simulation becomes important later. In a nutshell, perceptual symbols can 
function symbolically, being used as modal representations during linguistic 
computations; upon seeing a word, both linguistic and perceptual 
representational systems become immediately active but linguistic 
representations are more important immediately whereas the more relevant 
perceptual simulations become more important later in processing.  
A similar theory, the Symbol Interdependency Theory (Louwerse 2007) 
proposes that mental representations are linguistic, through statistical 
relationships between words within language, and embodied, through the 
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references language makes to external perceptions (Louwerse, 2007, 2008; 
Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008, 2010). According to this theory, language encodes 
perceptual information and we use language as a shortcut during processing. 
Like the LASS theory, linguistic information is important for shallow and quick 
mental representations, but perceptual simulations are more relevant for deeper 
mental representations (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). So even with limited 
grounding, meaning is garnered through language statistics alone. To 
summarize, linguistic forms depend on one another while still referring to 
perceptual representations, such that language encodes perceptual information. 
The Symbol Interdependency Theory also suggests that not every word has to 
be grounded in perceptual experience, as words can make reference to other 
related words to establish meaning.  
Evidence has started to accumulate in favor of theories that consider both 
symbolic and embodied factors in cognition. For example, Louwerse (2008) and 
Tse, Kurby, and Du (2010) found that RTs to semantic judgments for words like 
attic–basement can be explained by both language statistics and perceptual 
simulation. Louwerse (2008) calculated statistical linguistic frequencies for 
each set of word pairs as well as participants’ iconicity ratings of each word 
pair. Both of these factors explained participant RTs during a semantic judgment 
task, however, the statistical linguistic factor explained more variance. Results 
like these suggest that both symbolic (linguistic frequencies) and perceptual 
(iconicity ratings) play a role in language processing. 
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Furthering this finding, in four experiments Louwerse and Jeuniaux 
(2010) found that for shallow tasks, like semantic judgment tasks, linguistic 
relationships between word pairs explain RTs better than an iconic factor. 
Cognitive processing in the iconicity judgement task were deeper than in the 
semantic judgement task, because a prerequisite for the iconicity judgement was 
a semantic judgement. In the deeper iconicity judgment task, the perceptual 
relationship between stimuli (an iconic factor) better explained RTs. Not only 
was the task relevant but processing was also modified based on the type of 
stimuli presented, with linguistic frequencies better explaining RTs to words and 
iconic ratings better explaining RTs to pictures. It is important to note that in all 
experiments, both linguistic and perceptual factors played a role, simply the 
relative importance of each factor varied due to task and stimuli conditions. Put 
simply, for shallow mental representations, linguistic factors were more 
important than embodiment factors, but for deeper mental representations this 
was reversed (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). 
Louwerse and Connell (2011) also demonstrated that symbolic 
representations better explained very early fast RTs, meaning that linguistic 
relationships provide a good enough incomplete mental representation. On the 
other hand, perceptual factors explained slower RTs, suggesting that a full and 
complete mental reenactment is most likely generated. These results indicate 
that participants garner just enough information from word co-occurrences to 
understand a general sense of word meaning but perceptual simulates are 
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necessary to fill in the rest of the picture. Louwerse and Hutchinson (2012) 
confirmed these findings, also showing that that fast RTs were best explained by 
linguistic information, and slow RTs were best explained by perceptual 
information. Furthermore, they found that EEG results also showed linguistic 
cortical areas to be more active during a semantic task. Similarly, perceptual 
cortical areas were relatively more active during an iconic task where 
participants relied more on perceptual information. Regardless of task, neural 
activation began in language processing cortical areas relatively more than 
perceptual processing areas and later dispersed towards perceptual processing 
areas relatively more than language processing areas. These findings together 
indicate that both linguistic and perceptual representations are important parts of 
language processing, but that their relative importance is impacted by the 
constraints of the task at hand. 
Such findings show that the prominence of less-precise linguistic 
processes (i.e., symbolic representations) precedes the prominence of more 
precise simulation processes (i.e., embodied representations).  
So far, the question was discussed how symbolic and embodied accounts 
of cognition explain how linguistic symbols attain meaning. To strive towards 
resolving the question of the nature of mental representations we must move 
past presenting perceptual and symbolic accounts as mutually exclusive 
explanations. The specific focus of this manuscript investigates how language 
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processing is facilitated by both symbolic and embodied accounts working in 
concert. 
This dissertation tests how different modulators affect the activation of 
linguistic and embodied representations. Instead of asking if processing relies 
upon symbolic or embodied representations, the question is posed when 
linguistic and perceptual representations are more or less relevant during 
language processing, and under what conditions it is likely that participants will 
rely more on one type of representation than another. This question is explored 
by investigating how symbolic and embodied cognitive processes are modulated 
by different factors. More specifically, the question will be addressed to what 
extent linguistic and perceptual representations are impacted by 1) the time 
course of processing 2) the spatial presentation of stimuli 3) individual 
differences or 4) the orientation of stimuli.  
Chapter 2 demonstrates that experimental results can be explained by 
both linguistic and embodied factors. In three experiments, I replicate the 
spatial–numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect whereby 
responses made with participants’ left hands yield faster response times (RTs) 
for smaller numbers than for larger numbers. This effect is traditionally 
explained in terms of embodied cognition with participants perceptually 
simulating number magnitude on a mental number line. In essence, when 
processing numbers, participants mentally see the numbers arranged from small 
to large. However, this is not the only explanation; I also show that the SNARC 
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effect can be explained by language statistics, with the linguistic frequencies 
numbers mirroring the SNARC effect. These results demonstrate that those 
effects explained solely in terms of perceptual simulation can also be explained 
by language statistics.  
In Chapter 3 this finding was extended by exploring the factors of time 
and space in two experiments. Then, in a third experiment I demonstrate 
symbolic and embodied processes are indeed independent. Experiment 1 
investigated how the use of linguistic and perceptual representations was 
impacted when the time course of an experimental trial was constrained. Under 
time constraints, linguistic frequencies best accounted for participant RTs, but 
both linguistic and perceptual explanations account for slower RTs. Experiment 
2 explores how the spatial presentation of stimuli on the screen might also 
impact how and when participants are more or less likely to rely on linguistic 
versus perceptual representations. In a RT experiment participants view 
physical-location words at various locations on the screen. For words presented 
at the top or bottom of the screen, word meaning influences RTs. But for words 
appearing in the center of the screen, word frequency plays a more important 
role. In other words, judgments about words are made relative to other words on 
the screen and not relative to their absolute location on the screen. Relying on 
the finding that linguistic processing is more important in the early stages of 
language processing and perceptual processing is more important later, in a third 
Experiment I demonstrate that both linguistic and perceptual representations, 
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although intertwined, are relied upon to differing extents based on the nature of 
the relationship shared between word pairs. In a single RT experiment where 
participants determine whether linguistically and/or perceptually similar or 
dissimilar word pairs are semantically related, linguistically related pairs are 
processed faster than pairs lacking a linguistic relationship whereas perceptually 
related and unrelated word pairs take longer to process, implying perceptual 
representation. Furthermore, word frequency predicts RTs for semantically 
related pairs, whereas both word frequency and perceptual factors are necessary 
to predict performance for perceptually related pairs. Importantly, for unrelated 
word pairs, perceptual factors alone predict RT performance, suggesting that a 
full perceptual representation is independently utilized when generating a 
relationship for unrelated word pairs. Together these findings show that 
language processing is both linguistic and embodied, but to different extents in 
different situations.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss how the degree to which linguistic and perceptual 
information contribute to mental representations varies based on the orientation 
of the stimuli and on individual differences. Even though previous research has 
argued that primary metaphor processing can best be explained by an embodied 
cognition account, in four experiments I show that language statistics can 
explain the processing of primary metaphors that share an embodied vertical 
relationship (e.g., X above Y or Y above X). Furthermore, these linguistic effects 
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were modified by participant gender, with female participants being more 
sensitive to statistical linguistic context than male participants.  
Chapter 5 examines effect sizes computed from 126 experiments in 51 
previously published embodied cognition studies to clarify the conditions under 
which perceptual simulations are most important. That effects of language 
statistics tend to be as large or larger than those of perceptual stimulation and 
factors associated with immediate processing (button press, word processing) 
reduced the effect size of perceptual simulation. These findings are considered 
in respect to the Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis, which argues that 
language encodes perceptual information, with language statistics explaining 
quick, good-enough representations and perceptual simulation explaining more 
effortful, detailed representations. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 I present a brief discussion where I present several 
mathematical simulations to justify my methodological analyses by arguing that 
linear mixed models provide the most suitable analytical approach to provide 
answers to the questions posed in this manuscript. I focus on presenting several 
statistical simulations and explore conditions under which results that are 
obviously significant for a linear mixed model might beget insignificant results 
for F1 and F2 analyses, and vice versa, by manipulating the effect of treatment 
in a variety of simulated datasets. Finally, I argue that the analyses used in this 
manuscript provide more accurate and reliable results than the standard 
statistical analyses used in the literature. 
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These chapters demonstrate that research on mental representations can 
benefit from an integrated viewpoint. I conclude in Chapter 7 by suggesting that 
it is less relevant for the cognitive sciences to consider whether conceptual 
processing is symbolic or embodied and it is instead important to determine 
when, why, and to what extent linguistic and perceptual representations are 
employed during language processing.  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Chapter Two 
Language statistics explain 
the spatial–numerical 
association of response codes 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Abstract 
The spatial–numerical association of response codes (SNARC) has shown that 
parity judgments with participants’ left hands yield faster response times (RTs) for 
smaller numbers than for larger numbers, with the opposite result for right-hand 
responses. Participants perceptually simulating magnitude on a mental number line 
have explained these findings. In three RT experiments, the SNARC effect was also 
explained by language statistics. Participants made parity judgments of number words 
(Exp. 1) and Arabic numerals (Exp. 2). Linguistic frequencies of the number words 
and numbers mirrored the SNARC effect, explaining aspects of processing that a 
perceptual simulation account could not. Experiment 3 investigated whether high- and 
low-frequency nonnumeric words would also elicit a SNARC-like effect. Again, RTs 
were faster for high-frequency words for left-hand responses, with the opposite result 
for right-hand responses. These results demonstrate that what has only been attributed 
to perceptual simulation should also be attributed to language statistics.  
This chapter is based on: 
Hutchinson, S., & Louwerse, M. M. (2014). Language statistics explains spatial-numerical  
 association of response codes. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21, 470-478.  
Hutchinson, S., Johnson, S., & Louwerse, M. M. (2011). A linguistic remark on SNARC:  
 Language and perceptual processes in Spatial-Numerical Association. In L. Carlson, 
 C. Hoelscher, & T. Shipley (Eds.), Proceedings of the 33rd annual meeting of the  
 Cognitive Science Society (pp. 3437-3442). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society. 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Introduction 
In the previous chapter I provided an overview of the evidence supporting 
both embodied and symbolic representations. I also discussed the more recent 
emergence of integrated theories of cognition. Several psycholinguistic theories 
have found that experimental findings that have been attributed to perceptual 
simulation can alternatively be explained by language statistics (Louwerse, 
2008; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). In the following chapter I will attempt to 
portray how linguistic theories of cognition can explain results for effects that 
are commonly attributed to embodied cognition. Just as cognitive scientists 
have argued that cognition is fundamentally embodied and that concepts are 
understood through perceptual simulation (Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Semin & 
Smith, 2008), the same is argued for numerical information. Although 
intuitively number manipulation might seem more symbolic than perceptual in 
nature, as the computing of numbers does not require references to the symbols 
being manipulated or a visual representation of the manipulation process, a 
spatial representation of numbers is often thought to facilitate our understanding 
(Semenza, 2008). Evidence for this claim is plentiful, with participants 
processing small numbers faster with their left hand and large numbers faster 
with their right, akin to perceptually simulating numbers on a mental number 
line. This finding is known as the spatial–numerical association of response 
codes (SNARC; Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; Fischer & Brugger, 2011; 
Restle, 1970).  
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The SNARC effect is robust, with physical manipulations (e.g., crossing 
hands, grasping) and handedness failing to influence its direction (Andres, 
Ostry, Nicol, & Paus, 2008; Dehaene et al., 1993). SNARC holds for two-digit 
numbers (Dehaene et al., 1993; Reynvoet & Brysbaert, 1999) and number 
words (Fias, 2001), and extends to other ordinal-sequence-based organizational 
systems, such as alphabets, and large/small object words (Gevers, Reynvoet, & 
Fias, 2003; Ren, Nicholls, Ma, & Chen, 2011; Shaki & Gevers, 2011). 
Several theories have been proposed to explain SNARC in terms of 
embodied cognition. Dehaene et al. (1993) suggested that numbers are spatially 
organized on a mental number line according to magnitude. Alternatively, 
SNARC might be an embodied association between numbers and actions (e.g., 
common patterns of motor activation are based on the left side of a keyboard 
having small numbers and the right side having large numbers (Gevers, 
Caessens, & Fias, 2005). Fischer and Brugger (2011) suggested that finger 
counting might be the origin of the effect. These theories share the idea that the 
SNARC effect is the consequence of embodied mechanisms. 
Apart from simply expanding upon instances in which the SNARC effect 
occurs and does not occur, various theories explaining the effect have been 
offered. As number representation is thought to be somewhat independent of 
other language processes (Semenza, 2008), many researchers have proposed a 
spatial representation explanation of the SNARC effect. In other words, the 
SNARC effect occurs because the mental representations of numbers are 
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spatially organized according to number magnitude (i.e., numbers are placed on 
a mental number line with small numbers on the left and large numbers on the 
right; Zorzi, Priftis, & Umilta, 2002). Although such an explanation is succinct 
and even empirically supported through neurological research (Zorzi et al., 
2006), it fails to account for how numbers are represented for language users of 
specific groups that show reverse SNARC effects (Maass & Russo, 2003) or fail 
to show any SNARC effects (e.g., Israelis and illiterate Arabic speakers). 
Bächtold, Baumüller, and Brugger (1998) have posited that the SNARC effect 
might be due to a learned embodied association between numbers and actions 
(i.e., common patterns of motor activation make use of the knowledge that the 
left side of a keyboard possesses only small numbers whereas the right 
possesses large numbers). While Proctor and Cho (2006) claimed that the 
SNARC effect occurs through the consideration of stimuli polarity. According 
to a theory of number representation, small numbers have a negative polarity 
whereas large numbers have a positive polarity. Thus words and numbers are 
represented along a positive-negative dimension in space. In the instance of 
SNARC, the right side and large numbers are associated with a positive polarity 
and the opposite is true for the left side and small numbers. Even others suggest 
that two different processing routes (a top-down conditional route and an 
automatic unconditional route) work together simultaneously to help us 
understand the stimuli being presented, therefore accounting for RT differences 
among various numbers (Gevers, Cassens, & Fias, 2005; Gevers, Lammertyn, 
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Notebaert, Verguts, & Fias, 2005). It is important to note that despite differences 
between theories, most agree the SNARC effect is, at least in some way, further 
evidence for perceptual simulation during cognition. 
However, some findings have questioned a solely embodied account. For 
instance, the original task demonstrated vertical (Ito & Hatta, 2004) and 
horizontal (Shaki, Fischer, & Petrusic, 2009; Zebian, 2005) effects, indicating 
that the mental number line is not canonical. In addition, Arabic speakers show 
reverse SNARC effects reverse SNARC effects (Maass & Russo, 2003) and 
illiterate participants fail to show a SNARC effect at all (Zebian, 2005). 
Moreover, Fischer, Shaki, and Cruise (2009) found that spatial representation is 
not inherent in numbers, but caused by directional reading conventions. These 
findings suggest that embodied mechanisms might not be the only explanation 
for SNARC and hint at a linguistic explanation. 
In line with Louwerse (2008), who argued that language is organized so 
that it reflects embodied relations, in this chapter I argue that numerical 
cognition can also be explained through both linguistic and embodied 
mechanisms. That is, the prelinguistic conceptual knowledge (e.g., number 
magnitude) used when speakers formulate utterances gets translated into 
linguistic conceptualizations (language statistics) so that, as a function of 
language use, embodied relations are encoded in language. The fact that 
findings originally attributed to embodied cognition can also be attributed to 
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language statistics begets the question of whether SNARC might be attributed 
to statistical linguistic factors. 
To test for this possibility, three experiments compared embodied and 
linguistic accounts as possible additional explanations for SNARC. Two 
experiments replicated the SNARC experiments with both number words 
(Dehaene et al., 1993; Fias, 2001; Nuerk, Iversen, & Willmes, 2004) and Arabic 
numbers (Dehaene et al., 1993). It was expected that there would be a strong 
negative correlation between number magnitude and number (word) frequency, 
as more frequent numbers are also smaller (e.g., 1 is more frequent than 2), with 
both accounts explaining response times (RTs). Furthermore, because language 
encodes embodied representations, a strong correlation between the perceptual 
ordering of the numbers and their frequencies was expected. A third experiment 
was conducted to investigate whether the collocation frequency of trial pairs 
could explain RTs, as this effect cannot readily be accounted for by embodied 
cognition. In general, evidence that word frequency elicits a SNARC effect 
would suggest that in addition to embodied representations, SNARC can also be 
explained by language statistics. In other words, if linguistic factors also explain 
the SNARC effect, the collocation frequencies of paired number words (e.g., 
one preceding two, one following two) should impact processing time. 
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Experiment 1: Number Words 
In Experiment 1 I ask whether SNARC can be explained by number 
magnitude or by language statistics. As in most SNARC studies, participants 
were asked to evaluate whether numbers were even or odd, by responding using 
their left or right index finger. However, instead of presenting Arabic numerals, 
number words were presented instead. If the SNARC effect has a linguistic 
basis, it should at least be found with number words (cf. Fias, 2001). 
Participants 
A group of 57 right-handed native English-speaking undergraduate 
students participated for extra credit. Following Dehaene et al. (1993), in 
randomly assigned conditions participants were instructed to first respond to 
even numbers with their left hand and odd numbers with their right hand (n = 
27), or to use the reverse mappings (n = 30).  
Materials 
Each experiment consisted of 65 trials, with each trial including two 
number words, ranging from one to nine (excluding five; Tzelgov, Meyer, & 
Henik, 1992). The rationale for using number words was that a) if the SNARC 
effect could have a linguistic basis, it should first and foremost be found in 
words and b) although making parity judgments regarding number words may 
seem to be more difficult than making parity judgments about Arabic numerals, 
still number words have shown to yield a SNARC effect (Fias, 2001). 
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Admittedly, there is evidence that number words and Arabic numerals are 
processed in different ways (Damian, 2004; Fias, 2001). However, past research 
has suggested that number word presentation shows few differences from 
traditional Arabic numeral presentation in a SNARC experiment (Nuerk, 
Iversen, & Willmes, 2004). Furthermore, as number words were exclusively 
presented, any variations in RTs should be systematic across all parity 
judgments, and are thus of little consequence.  
Procedure 
Number words were presented in the center of an 800 × 600 screen in 36-
pt. font and subtended at most 2.5o of vertical visual angle from 60 cm. Two 
words were presented in each trial, but the words appeared on the screen one at 
a time. Participants were asked to determine number parity. After a participant 
responded to the first word, the second was presented. Although participants 
responded to all of the words, only RTs to the second word in each trial were 
analyzed. The stimuli within each trial were paired so that participants saw each 
number paired with every other number, in both orders (e.g., participants saw 
trials of both one followed by three and three followed by one). This allowed for 
all word pair frequencies to be accounted for. Once a participant had responded 
to both words in a trial, the next trial would commence after a short beep and 
after the “+” symbol had appeared for 1,000 ms. Every trial was so separated as 
to provide space between the trials. Trial pairs were randomly presented, and 
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participants saw every combination of pairs. Six practice trials preceded the 
experiment.  
Results and Discussion 
Five participants were removed because >14% of their answers were 
incorrect. This threshold was selected as the natural cut-off after visual 
inspection of error rates. After removing those five participants, the average 
error rate was 5%. Outliers were identified as responses faster than 200 ms or 
slower than 1,500 ms, following the criteria of Shaki et al. (2009). Errors and 
outliers were removed, affecting 6.5% of the data. 
As in Dehaene et al. (1993) and Fias (2001), the median RT per number 
word per response side was separately computed per participant.1 Median left-
hand responses were subtracted from median right-hand responses. A mixed-
effects regression was conducted on RTs, with response side and magnitude as 
fixed predictors and participant and item as random predictors (Baayen et al., 
2008; Hutchinson, Wei, & Louwerse, 2014) to predict whether a SNARC effect 
was replicated. The model was fitted using restricted maximum likelihood 
estimation (REML) for the continuous variable (RT). The F-test denominator 
degrees of freedom were estimated using Kenward–Roger’s degrees-of-freedom 
adjustment, in order to reduce the chance of Type I error (Littel, Stroup, & 
Freund, 2002). Evidence supporting an embodiment account stems from the 
interaction between faster left-hand responses for smaller numbers and faster 
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right-hand responses for larger numbers, as this interaction links space (right/
left hand) and magnitude. A main effect emerged for response side, with faster 
RTs for right-hand responses, F (1, 5815.85) = 6.57, p = .01, R2= .10. This result 
is not surprising, as all participants were right-handed. More interestingly, there 
was an interaction between response side and magnitude, F (1, 5816.93) = 3.26, 
p = .04, R2= .04 (Figure 1), replicating the SNARC effect and providing support 
for an embodied explanation of the effect. 
A second regression with response side and linguistic frequency as fixed 
predictors was also performed to determine if linguistic factors could also 
explain the effect. The linguistic factor was operationalized as the log frequency 
of the number word (see Table 2). This value indicates how frequently each 
number appears in a large corpus. Specifically, word frequencies were obtained 
from the Web IT one-trillion-word 5-gram corpus (one trillion word tokens, 
with 13,588,391 word types from 95,119,665,584 sentences; Brants & Franz, 
2006). Log frequency is typically preferred over raw frequency because the 
distribution of word frequency is right-skewed (i.e., L-shape; Baayen, 2001).  
As predicted, there was a strong negative correlation between magnitude 
and word frequency, r = −.98, p < .001 (cf. Dehaene & Mehler, 1992). In other 
words, the more frequent a number word, the lower its magnitude (i.e., one is 
more frequent than nine). This allows for the possibility that SNARC can also 
be explained by word frequencies. The SNARC effect traditionally predicts 
small numbers to be processed faster with the left hand; if word frequency alone 
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affected RTs, then faster processing of frequent words would be expected 
regardless of response side. Therefore, if linguistic frequency plays a role during 
numerical processing, frequency should then not affect RTs, but an interaction 
should exist between response side and frequency. As expected, frequency did 
not explain the RTs, F (1, 5587.95) = .01, p = .93, R2= .0003, but, analogous to 
the SNARC effect, an interaction was apparent between response side and 
frequency, F (1, 5586.16) = 3.23, p = .04, R2= .04 (Figure 2) meaning frequent 
words were processed faster with the left hand, and less frequent words were 
processed faster with the right hand.  
Whether the linguistic system simply provides redundant information 
derived from the perceptual system is still unanswered, because what is 
Figure 1. Linear fitting of the SNARC effect for Experiment 1
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explained by word frequency is also explained by number magnitude. To test 
whether linguistic frequencies independently explain the findings, the 
collocation frequencies of paired number words in each trial were analyzed (see 
Table 2). If statistical linguistic frequencies of the word pairs explain RTs, this 
finding would be difficult to attribute to embodied mechanisms because 
collocation frequencies cannot be explained by the magnitude of the second 
word. No correlation emerged between collocation frequencies and the second 
number’s magnitude, r = −.15, p = .20. In a mixed-effects model, bigram 
frequency significantly explained RTs of the second word in each pair, F (1, 
3072.72) = 4.12, p = .04, R2= .14, with higher frequencies yielding lower RTs. A 
significant interaction was found between response side and frequency, F (2, 
3082.32) = 3.54, p = .03, R2= .12. These collocation results thus mirror the 
Figure 2. Linear fitting of the statistical linguistic frequencies for Experiment 1
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traditional SNARC findings, but they are difficult to explain with an embodied 
account, because the magnitude of the second word does not correlate with the 
frequency with which the two words appear together, providing evidence for an 
independent linguistic account. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that language statistics explain RTs as well as 
an embodied cognition account, suggesting that indeed those effects attributed 
to embodied perceptual representations might also be explained through 
linguistic representations. However, the argument could be made that 
Experiment 1 used number words and therefore was biased toward a linguistic 
account. Furthermore, these significant effects resulted in low effect sizes, 
therefore two additional experiments were conducted to verify and expand the 
results.  
Table 1  
Results from all three experiments 
Exp. 1 Exp.2 Exp. 3
df F df F df F
Magnitude 5817 1.01 4973 0.10
Frequency 5588 0.18 4973 2.37 1856 3.24
Response Side x Magnitude 5817 12.52** 4973 13.88**
Frequency x Magnitude 5586 8.67** 4973 14.60** 1856 7.33**
Bigram Frequency x Response Side 3082 13.77** 2098 18.34**
** p < .01
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Experiment 2: Arabic Numerals 
In Experiment 2, Arabic numerals were used instead of number words, as 
Arabic numerals may be processed differently from number words (Damian, 
2004). The number 0 was also included, whose low magnitude, yet lower 
frequency than other low-magnitude digits, allowed for comparing an embodied 
account (that magnitude explains SNARC) and a frequency account (that 
frequency explains SNARC) (cf. Pinhas & Tzelgov, 2012). In other words, the 
number 0 appears less frequently than the number 1, yet its magnitude is less 
than 1.  
Unigram Bigram
one two three four six seven eight nine
one 20.72 16.54 15.36 14.29 13.38 12.90 12.12 11.80 11.66
two 19.91 16.45 14.73 13.80 13.25 12.37 11.58 11.48 11.02
three 19.22 15.41 15.91 13.87 12.91 12.28 11.87 11.18 11.20
four 18.68 14.73 14.45 15.28 13.58 11.99 11.26 11.49 10.71
six 18.08 13.80 13.02 13.53 13.75 12.91 11.44 11.25 10.77
seven 17.61 13.41 12.25 12.45 12.45 13.61 13.09 11.09 10.75
eight 17.30 13.23 12.09 11.88 12.86 13.45 13.22 11.72 10.80
nine 17.10 12.78 11.43 12.24 11.37 12.46 12.40 12.81 12.76
Table 2  
Bigram and unigram log frequencies
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Participants 
A group of 44 right-handed native English-speaking undergraduates 
participated for extra credit. The participants were evenly split between 
response conditions.  
Materials 
Each experiment had 81 trials, including two Arabic numerals presented 
one at a time, ranging from 0 to 9 (excluding 5).  
Procedure 
The procedure, font size, and viewing angle were identical to those in 
Experiment 1. Participants were again asked to determine number parity, with 
instructions that specified that 0 was an even number.  
Results and Discussion 
Eight participants were removed because >14% of their answers were 
incorrect. A software error led to the loss of 2.2% of the data. Outlier removal 
resulted in data loss of 2.43%. 
The analysis was the same as in Experiment 1, in which median RTs per 
number word per response side were separately computed for each participant. 
Response side explained RTs, F(1, 4973) = 1.20, p < .001, R2= .02, and the 
interaction between response side and magnitude was significant, F(1, 4973) = 
13.88, p < .001, R2= .23 (Figure 3), replicating the SNARC effect. 
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Similar to the negative correlation between number words and magnitude 
in Experiment 1, there was a negative correlation between Arabic numerals and 
their frequencies, r = −.60, p < .001. Note that the correlation was weaker than 
before, because of the inclusion of 0. Without 0, the correlation was stronger, r 
= −.98, p < .001. Frequency did not affect RTs, F(1, 4973) = 0.05, p = .81, R2= .
001, but the Response Side × Frequency interaction was significant, F(1, 4973) 
= 14.60, p < .001, R2= .24 (Figure 4). This finding replicated the SNARC effect 
and is similar to the results of Experiment 1, except that it was now obtained 
with numbers rather than number words. 
As before, frequency collocations for pairs were assessed to determine 
whether bigram frequency alone impacted RTs. Bigram frequencies did not 
Figure 3. Linear fitting of the SNARC effect for Experiment 2
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correlate with the magnitude of the second word in the pair, r = .08. A main 
effect of response side was found, F(1, 2098) = 9.29, p < .01, R2= .12, and 
bigram frequency did not significantly explain RTs, F(1, 2098) = .03, p = .88, 
R2= .001. Importantly, the Response Side × Frequency interaction was 
significant, F(1, 2098) = 42.22, p < .001, R2= .53, a finding that cannot be 
explained by an embodied account. See Table 3 for the bigram and unigram log 
frequencies of the Arabic numerals. 
Including 0 allowed for a comparison of the two accounts, because 0 has 
the lowest mathematical and psychological magnitude (Pinhas & Tzelgov, 
2012), yet it has a lower frequency than the other low-magnitude numbers. Left-
hand responses for 0 were slower (M = 670 ms) than right-hand responses (M = 
Figure 4. Linear fitting of the statistical linguistic frequencies for Experiment 2
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641 ms), albeit not significantly, t(555.65) = −1.5, p = .13. To determine 
whether the RT findings for 0 provided support for a frequency or embodied 
account, RTs for the items 0 and 1 were compared. If magnitude explained 
responses, because both numbers shared low magnitudes, no significant 
difference was expected between them. But if word frequency explained the 
responses, because 1 is quite frequent and 0 is less frequent, the RTs for these 
two items were predicted to be divergent, which was what was found, t(10.75) = 
−4.5, p < .001. However, the differences between 0 and 1 might be explained by 
a learned embodied relationship, with the “0” key on a keyboard being on the 
right. To support such an explanation, it would be necessary for RTs to 0 to be 
faster with the right hand, but they were not, t(555.65) = −1.5, p = .13. 
Unigram Bigram
0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
0 21.34 21.06 19.24 18.15 17.64 17.30 16.77 16.61 16.66 16.24
1 21.33 18.89 19.68 18.21 17.71 17.22 16.72 16.60 16.46 16.09
2 21.66 17.97 19.72 18.38 17.53 17.18 16.49 16.36 16.16 15.88
3 20.99 17.47 19.29 18.97 17.91 17.03 16.30 16.06 15.86 15.64
4 20.77 17.23 18.68 18.66 18.81 17.50 16.43 15.99 16.03 15.57
6 20.22 16.73 17.12 17.88 17.93 18.24 17.02 16.21 16.48 15.73
7 20.19 16.27 16.91 16.10 17.75 17.80 18.20 17.26 16.14 15.82
8 19.97 16.53 17.02 16.15 16.25 17.71 17.95 18.05 16.95 16.03
9 17.08 16.10 16.49 15.81 15.82 15.65 17.63 17.82 17.94 17.06
Table 3 
Bigram and unigram log frequencies
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Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that a language statistics account 
could also offer an explanation for the SNARC effect. This evidence does not 
replace the embodied SNARC effect, because there was an effect of magnitude 
in both experiments. In fact, in Experiments 1 and 2, participants seemed to use 
frequency information when making parity judgments about either number 
words (Exp. 1) or Arabic numerals (Exp. 2), as was evidenced by the significant 
Magnitude × Response Side and Frequency × Response Side interactions. 
Although Damian (2004) claimed that number words and Arabic numerals are 
processed differently, such that when processing Arabic numerals information 
about magnitude is more readily available, and when processing number words, 
lexical information is more readily available, participants in Experiments 1 and 
2 were asked to make parity judgments, calling explicit attention to neither 
magnitude nor frequency. 
With the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, at least two arguments 
bolster a complimentary linguistic frequency explanation for the effect. First, 
when 0 was included—a number with both low magnitude and lower frequency
—no SNARC effect was found, even though a frequency effect was obtained. 
Second, bigram frequencies explained the RTs, whereas such an explanation is 
lacking for an embodied account. However, a problem with a language statistics 
account concerns direction. Whereas number-line representations explain why 
left-hand responses are faster for low-magnitude items, the rationale is not so 
obvious for high-frequency numbers eliciting faster left-hand responses. 
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Markedness can explain this pattern. Greenberg (1966) argued that for 
any word pair, the one that is more frequent is the unmarked (i.e., most natural, 
simplest, first learned), and the one that is less frequent is the marked member 
of the pair, with unmarked members preceding marked members (Louwerse, 
2008). Although this explanation seems similar to Proctor and Cho’s (2006) 
polarity correspondence principle, a markedness explanation suggests that for 
any given pair, items will be processed faster when frequent items appear before 
infrequent items, not when items are matched (to their response sides) on 
polarity. This general linguistic theory of markedness ranges over phonological, 
grammatical, and semantic elements (Chomsky & Halle, 1968) and can be 
applied to number words, with frequent items being processed faster with the 
left hand. The bigram frequencies for pairs of number words in the Web IT one-
trillion-word 5-gram corpus (Brants & Franz, 2006) show that frequent number 
words precede infrequent number words more often than vice versa, F(1, 70) = 
31.25, p < .001. If the frequency asymmetry is an explanation for the direction 
of the language statistics effect found in Experiments 1 and 2, then a “SNARC” 
effect is expected, with high-frequency (non-magnitude) words being processed 
faster with the left hand, and vice versa for the right. This hypothesis was tested 
in Experiment 3.  
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Experiment 3: High and low Frequency Words 
Participants 
A group of 49 students participated for extra credit. Of these participants, 
22 were randomly assigned to first respond to animate words with their left 
hand and inanimate words with their right hand, and 27 to the opposite 
mapping.  
Materials 
In all, 30 two-word trials were presented one word at a time. The words 
extracted from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database were frequent or infrequent 
and were matched on word length (see Table 3). The word frequencies of 
frequent and infrequent words differed significantly, t(69) = −17.10, p < .001. 
Half of the words described animate concepts, whereas the rest described 
inanimate concepts.  
Procedure 
The procedure, size, and viewing angle were identical to those in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Participants were asked to indicate whether a word that 
appeared on the screen represented something animate or inanimate.  
Results and Discussion 
Seven participants were removed because >14% of their answers were 
incorrect. Outlier removal resulted in the loss of 2.1% of the data. Median RTs 
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Table 4 
Unigram log frequencies of the experimental stimuli for Experiment 3
Inanimate Words Log Frequency Animate Words Log Frequency
bank 18.36 ant 15.77
bin 18.75 bat 16.07
carpet 16.43 bear 17.56
chilly 14.70 boy 18.26
cord 16.78 bunny 15.45
cut 18.60 camel 16.92
gold 18.19 child 19.18
groan 13.94 deer 16.25
gun 17.39 dog 18.51
happy 18.45 dove 14.84
ivory 15.21 fish 18.20
law 19.49 flower 17.41
marry 16.13 girl 18.89
near 1.03 hog 14.90
numb 14.66 horse 18.37
number 20.37 human 19.31
ocean 17.10 insect 15.77
plane 17.45 lynx 15.00
pump 17.17 man 19.62
rake 14.86 moose 14.65
rim 15.63 person 19.69
ship 18.55 pigeon 14.60
shoe 16.87 plant 18.30
sleep 17.82 puppy 16.07
stove 15.70 rose 17.41
summer 18.34 seal 16.65
text 19.74 sheep 16.53
under 20.40 tree 18.34
vigil 14.20 woman 18.75
zoo 16.40 worm 16.11
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per word per response side were separately computed for each participant (see 
also note 1). The same mixed-effects regression was conducted on RTs as in the 
previous experiments. Response side significantly predicted RTs, F(1, 1856) = 
3.73, p = .05, R2= .14, with right-side responses being faster. Frequency 
approached significance, F(1, 1856) = 3.24, p = .07, R2= .12. Importantly, the 
Response Side × Frequency interaction was significant, F(1, 1856) = 7.23, p < .
01, R2= .27, indicating that high-frequency words were indeed processed faster 
with the left hand, whereas low-frequency words were processed faster with the 
right (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Linear fitting of the statistical linguistic frequencies for Experiment 3
56
Conclusion 
In the previous pages, I have empirically demonstrated in three 
experiments that both linguistic and perceptual information is relevant during 
conceptual processing. The first and second experiments focus on numerical 
stimuli, replicating the well-known embodied effect known as the SNARC 
effect and offering a complimentary linguistic explanation for this effect. The 
third and final experiment demonstrates that responses to linguistic stimuli also 
generate results that can be explained by both perceptual and linguistic 
accounts. The SNARC effect has traditionally added to the large body of 
literature introduced earlier that suggests that cognition is fundamentally 
embodied. Yet several studies have demonstrated that language statistics can 
explain the experimental findings equally well (Louwerse, 2008; Louwerse & 
Jeuniaux, 2010). After an examination of the use of linguistic and perceptual 
mental representations for numerical and linguistic stimuli, I provided evidence 
that both types of representations work together to establish meaning, since both 
embodied and linguistic factors explain participant response times from three 
experiments, two of which the effects were traditionally accounted for by 
perceptual representations. Furthermore, linguistic collocation frequencies were 
able to explain response times to experimental tasks where an embodiment 
account could not. In addition, response times from the number 0, a number 
with both low magnitude and frequency, supported a linguistic account and not 
an embodiment account, suggesting that linguistic representations certainly play 
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a role when processing numeric stimuli. Finally, a SNARC-like effect was 
found for low-frequency and high-frequency words, for which embodiment 
could not be the explanation.  
The finding that linguistic frequencies explain the SNARC does not 
dismiss an embodiment account. After all, the interaction of response side and 
word frequency is considered and accounted for by embodied representations. 
However, the source of SNARC is not necessarily magnitude on a perceptually 
simulated mental number line. Perhaps language has encoded such perceptual 
number line information, so that language users rely on language statistics in 
during their cognitive processes (Louwerse, 2011). Consequently, frequency 
would then be likely to explain SNARC-like effects obtained with a variety of 
stimuli, whether magnitude information was present or not, such as with ordinal 
information or even large/small object words (Gevers et al., 2003; Ren et al., 
2011; Shaki & Gevers, 2011).  
The notion of frequencies playing a role in numerical cognition is not 
new. Dehaene et al. (1993) evaluated the interactions between number and word 
representations and showed that treating them as eliciting separate processes is 
not an accurate description of number processing. This conclusion is 
reminiscent of the conclusion drawn by Louwerse (2008) that the nature of 
conceptual processing is symbolic and embodied. Language statistics facilitate 
cognitive processes because language encodes magnitude. Such findings 
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demonstrate that indeed, integrated theories can more easily account for effects 
together than each theory can independently. 
Having established that both linguistic and perceptual representations are 
important during conceptual processing, I will next address how different 
factors can impact how much participants rely on each of these types of 
representations, by breaking down the sequence of an experiment to consider 
whether the time course and spatial presentation of stimuli might impact the 
results.  
Footnotes 
1 The same analysis, but using the mean RT per number word (or 
numeral) per response side per participant, so that mean (rather than median) 
left-hand responses were subtracted from the mean right-hand responses, 








In three Experiments, the factors of time and space, as well as the 
independence of symbolic and embodied representations were more thoroughly 
explored. Experiment 1 investigated whether time constraints impacted the use of 
perceptual and linguistic factors during language processing. Participants made fast or 
slow semantic judgments about pairs of words. A linguistic factor best explained fast 
RTs but when given more time to respond, both linguistic and perceptual 
representations were used. Experiment 2 explored absolute or relative location of 
concept-location words and whether semantic judgments were made with respect to an 
absolute location on the screen (an embodied explanation) or with respect to a relative 
location in comparison to other words included in the experimental session (a 
statistical linguistic explanation). In a response time experiment, there was a concept 
location facilitation effect for words presented at various locations on the screen, 
supporting the view that language processing is both linguistic and embodied. In 
Experiment 3, I demonstrated symbolic and embodied processes are indeed 
independent. Relying on the finding that linguistic processing is more important in the 
early stages of language processing and perceptual processing is more important later, 
participants were asked to determine whether linguistically and/or perceptually similar 
or dissimilar word pairs are semantically related. For unrelated word pairs, perceptual 
factors alone predict RT performance, suggesting that a full perceptual representation 
is independently utilized when generating a relationship for unrelated word pairs. 
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Together these findings show that language processing is both linguistic and 
embodied, but to different extents in different situations.  
This chapter is based on: 
Hutchinson, S., Tillman, R., & Louwerse, M. M. (2015). Relating the unrelated. Manuscript 
 in preparation.  
Hutchinson, S., & Louwerse, M. M. (2013). What’s up can be explained by language  
 statistics. In M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, & I. Washsmuth (Eds.), Proceedings of 
 the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2596-2601). Austin, 
 TX: Cognitive Science Society.  
Hutchinson, S., Tillman, R., & Louwerse, M. M. (2014). Quick linguistic representations and 
 precise perceptual representations: Language statistics and perceptual simulations  
 under time constraints. In P. Bello, M. Guarini, M. McShane, & B. Scassellati (Eds.), 
 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 
 2399-2404). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.  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Introduction 
Both linguistic and perceptual properties are relied upon during 
processing – a finding that I referred to in the previous two chapters. I further 
confirmed and replicated this finding in the current chapter. Furthermore, I 
asked what kind of conditions encourage participants to rely more or less on 
embodied or linguistic representations, and how we know these processes are 
independent. Specifically, I explored the potential that temporal and spatial 
constraints on stimuli presentation might influence linguistic and embodied 
mechanisms. Both of these aspects are important because a) language 
processing is time constrained and b) much of the evidence for embodied 
representations comes from word on words sharing spatial relationships. First I 
examined how the use of linguistic and perceptual representations were 
impacted when the time course of an experimental trial was constrained. I then 
explored how the spatial presentation of stimuli on the screen also impacted 
how and when participants were more or less likely to rely on linguistic versus 
perceptual representations. Finally, in a third and final experiment, relying on 
the findings from the first experiment, I demonstrated that both linguistic and 
perceptual representations, although intertwined are still independent processes. 
Embodied cognition studies have demonstrated that when words that are 
typically associated with higher physical locations (e.g., bird) are positioned at 
the top of a screen they are processed faster than when they are positioned at the 
bottom of the screen. The reverse effect is obtained for words typically 
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associated with lower physical locations (e.g., fish). This concept-location 
facilitation effect has been argued to demonstrate that cognitive processing is 
fundamentally perceptual in nature. As demonstrated in the prior chapters, there 
is increasing evidence in the past several decades from experiments that 
language statistics and perceptual simulations both play a role in conceptual 
processing. These studies demonstrate that both language statistics and 
perceptual simulation must be taken into consideration together. For instance, 
the relative importance of language statistics and perceptual simulation in 
conceptual processing depends on several variables, including factors like the 
type of stimulus presented to a participant, or the cognitive task the participant 
is asked to perform (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). In the following two 
experiments, I demonstrate that constraints on time and concept location also 
impact the relevance of each type of representation. 
Evidence supporting only an embodied cognition account comes from 
single words, presented in different locations on a computer screen. For 
example, Šetić and Domijan (2007) presented ‘up’ and ‘down’ words one at a 
time either in a perceptually expected location (e.g., butterfly appeared at the 
top of the screen) or an unexpected location (e.g., butterfly appeared at the 
bottom of the screen). Participants were asked to determine if the word they saw 
was something animate (living animal) or something inanimate (non-living 
entity). As expected, participants were faster to process concept-location 
matches (e.g., the butterfly presented at the top of the screen) than concept-
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location mismatches (e.g., the butterfly presented at the bottom of the screen). 
Šetić and Domijan argued that this effect occurred because each word was 
associated with perceptual properties relevant to that object, like its location in 
space relative to an observer. In fact, Šetić and Domijan summarize that the 
spatial registration hypothesis (Coslett, 1999) should apply to all spatial 
directions, such that the absolute spatial location of a word on a screen should 
result in faster processing when the position of the word matches the real world 
position of the object described (e.g., left, right, top, bottom). Zwaan and Yaxley 
(2003) provide support for such a claim, by demonstrating that ‘up’ and ‘down’ 
words show no processing advantages when presented to the left and right of 
one another. 
Unlike experiments comparing word pairs, findings for words in 
isolation, such as those in Šetić and Domijan (2007), are more difficult to also 
explain with a statistical linguistic account. That is, unigram word frequency 
does not explain congruency effects, as the set of ‘up words’ are not all more or 
less frequent than the set of ‘down words’. In fact, when comparing how 
frequently the ‘up words’ and ‘down words’ occurred in a massive corpus of the 
English language (the Web 1T 5-gram corpus; Brants & Franz, 2006), no 
difference was obtained between the frequencies of ‘up words’ and ‘down 
words’ , t(153.37) = 0.64, p = .52. Consequently, the concept-location word 
results only seem to support an embodied cognition account and are argued to 
be due to the congruency of the presentation location and the perceptual features 
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of the word: Butterfly is processed quickly at the top of the screen because a 
mental simulation of a butterfly involves perceptual and spatial information 
about where a butterfly is found in the actual world (above the ground/at the 
top). This poses a challenge to an account that argues for both linguistic and 
perceptual simulations factors in conceptual processing, such as proposed by the 
Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis (Louwerse 2007). 
Although it seems straightforward to conclude that these effects must be 
due to the mental simulation of words, there are alternative explanations. 
Lakens (2011a; 2011b) argues that such effects might instead be due to polarity 
correspondence. Proctor and Cho (2006) found that in binary classification 
tasks, concepts could be processed faster when their polarity matches the 
response polarity. In other words, when a stimulus and a response are coded as 
either both positive or both negative, processing is facilitated, e.g., butterfly is 
processed quickly at the top of the screen because its location is positive (up), as 
is the response to whether or not it is found in the sky (yes). In order to rule out 
a polarity correspondence explanation for the results, in a similar experiment, 
Pecher, van Dantzig, Boot, Zanzolie, and Huber (2010) asked participants to 
respond to the question Is it usually found in the ocean? or to the question Is it 
usually found in the sky? They argued that for a polarity correspondence 
explanation to be valid, yes responses should be processed faster at the top of 
the screen, regardless of the question being asked, and regardless of word 
meaning. For instance, when being asked if an animal is found in the ocean, one 
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would expect butterfly to be processed faster at the bottom of the screen because 
it is not found in the ocean, a hypothesis contrary to an embodied cognition 
explanation and a hypothesis that was not supported. Instead, the results showed 
just the opposite, i.e., when being asked if the animal is found in the ocean, 
butterfly was still processed faster at the top of the screen. In a response, Lakens 
(2011b) still suggested that perhaps butterfly is processed faster at the top of the 
screen, even when participants are making an ocean judgment because the 
judgment becomes a relative assessment with down as the default response (as 
all comparisons are made with reference to the ocean, which is down). 
Lakens (2011b) goes further to point out that alternative explanations for 
data explained solely by perceptual simulations should not be overlooked. In 
addition, Lakens (2011b) and Louwerse (2011b) both suggest that results from 
Pecher et al. (2010) might likely also be explained by a statistical linguistic 
account. That is, although Pecher et al. (2010) concludes that mental simulation 
accounts for responses in the sky/ocean task, linguistic frequencies do 
contribute to word meaning and should also be considered. To illustrate, 
Louwerse (2011a) found that ocean animal names paired with the word ocean 
occur more frequently than ocean animal names paired with the word sky (and 
vice versa for sky animal names) and that these frequencies account for 
participant RTs. These findings illustrate that task instructions might influence 
response times because ocean and sky are more or less linguistically associated 
with the stimuli. In other words, linguistic information also contributes to our 
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processing of these words, making it clear that perceptual simulations are more 
or less relevant in different scenarios.  
For example, Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) found that both task and 
stimulus influenced whether participants were more likely to rely on linguistic 
or perceptual information. When participants were asked to make a judgment 
about word pairs, the statistical linguistic frequency of the word pair best 
predicted RTs whereas when participants were asked to make a judgment about 
image pairs, perceptual ratings about the pair better accounted for RTs 
(Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). The cognitive task is also a particularly relevant 
factor when determining the dominance of linguistic or embodied 
representations, as one could imagine that for different scenarios, the relative 
salience of a representation may become more or less important. For example, 
Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) found that participants depended more on visual 
perceptual information when making iconicity judgments and more on linguistic 
information when making semantic judgments. Although both the linguistic and 
perceptual information about the word pair showed to be relevant in both 
cognitive tasks, with both verbal and non-verbal stimuli, different types of 
information were more, or less, important across different conditions. Because 
the iconicity judgments imply semantic judgments, Louwerse and Jeuniaux 
argued that language statistics best explain shallow, good-enough 
representations, and perceptual simulation best explain detailed full-fledged 
representations. This hypothesis does not reject either account but rather 
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suggests that both perceptual and linguistic representations are used during 
processing and that their prevalence is relative depending on the cognitive task 
at hand. 
Other factors impact linguistic and embodied representations as well. 
Borghi et al. (2004) found that when participants used their entire arm to 
respond to stimuli, an embodied effect is stronger than when only pressing 
buttons with their fingers. Individual differences in skill (Madden & Zwaan, 
2006) and age (Dijkstra, Yaxley, Madden & Zwaan, 2004) have also shown to 
impact the strength of embodied effects. 
We also know from previous research that in adults the relative 
prominence of linguistic representations precedes that of perceptual 
representations. Importantly, these studies do not deny or reject the importance 
of perceptual processes. After all, the Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis 
argues that language encodes perceptual information, making it difficult to 
disentangle the two variables. That is, effects attributed to statistical linguistic 
frequencies could also be attributed to perceptual simulation and vice versa. In 
fact, Louwerse and Connell (2011) found evidence for individual effects for 
perceptual simulations being seen early on in a trial when comparing the effect 
sizes of language statistics and perceptual simulations. Louwerse and Connell 
(2011) found that when comparing the effect of language statistics and 
perceptual information on response times, language statistics best explained 
quick response times, whereas perceptual information best explained slow 
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response times (with both language statistics and perceptual simulation equally 
contributing to medium response times), with fuzzy regularities in linguistic 
context being used for quick decisions and precise perceptual simulations being 
used for slower decisions. Louwerse and Hutchinson (2012) extended the 
Louwerse and Connell (2011) study in an EEG experiment, demonstrating that 
linguistic cortical regions were relatively more active early in a trial and 
perceptual cortical regions were relatively more active later in a trial. And 
although processing is both symbolic and embodied throughout the trial, 
processes related to symbolic cognition (i.e., linguistic frequency) are relatively 
more prominent in the early stages of comprehension whereas processes related 
to grounded cognition are relatively more prominent later in processing. As 
participants glean just enough information from word co-occurrences to 
understand the relationship between word pairs immediately, while perceptual 
representations then take over to fill in the rest of the picture.  
These studies demonstrate that both language statistics and perceptual 
simulation must be taken into consideration together, as both factors contribute 
to language processing. After all, the Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis 
argues that language encodes perceptual information, making it difficult to 
disentangle the two variables. That is, effects attributed to statistical linguistic 
frequencies could also be attributed to perceptual simulation and vice versa. If a 
more detailed representation is required, perceptual simulations allow for a 
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precise mental representation. In essence, language acts as a sort of shortcut for 
language users by encoding symbolic and embodied relations in the world. 
 In this chapter, I will explore how linguistic and perceptual 
representations are employed differently under different conditions. In order to 
do so I will focus on two aspects: time and space. That is, I first focus on an 
experiment in which participants made fast or slow speeded judgments about 
whether pairs of words were semantically related. Subjects were also instructed 
to either respond as quickly as possible to the words they were presented, or 
respond as accurately as possible. In a second experiment, semantic judgments 
about individually presented words were made with respect to an absolute 
location on the screen (embodied explanation) or with respect to a relative 
location in comparison to other words included in the experimental session 
(statistical linguistic explanation). In other words, this chapter is not focused on 
exhaustively pinpointing how and when different types of mental 
representations are used. Rather, the question I explore is how and when 
temporal and spatial constraints in specific influence linguistic and perceptual 
representations. In particular, to explore these factors, two experiments 
compared embodied and linguistic accounts as possible explanations for RTs 
during two different semantic judgment tasks.  
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Experiment 1: Time 
Although it is quite clear that linguistic representations are more 
prominent early in processing, and perceptual representations are more 
prominent later, studies that demonstrate that the relative prominence of 
linguistic representations precede that of perceptual representations, leave the 
question open whether RTs actually decrease because perceptual representations 
are facilitating processing or rather because the task duration biases participants 
to employ embodied representations. In most, if not all, embodied cognition 
experiments, participants have no pressing time constraints on their responses 
during a semantic judgment task, other than perhaps several seconds in order to 
force a decision. It is therefore possible that such a strong effect of perceptual 
simulation occurs during word processing because participants are allotted a 
longer time to process the words they are seeing. Put simply, is it because we 
are making a slower decision that we rely upon perceptual processes, or is it 
because we are relying upon perceptual processes do we then make a slower 
decision? Likewise, is it because we are making a faster decision that we rely 
upon linguistic processes, or is it because we are relying upon linguistic 
processes do we then make a faster decision? The first relevant question in this 
chapter is whether the RT effects of perceptually related pairs are due to timing 
constraints in the experiment or if they are indeed due to the perceptual or 
linguistic relationships between word pairs.  
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Subjects were predicted to be even more influenced to rely on quick 
linguistic representations, if the instructions asked them to make responses as 
quickly as possible, and would be more likely to rely on perceptual 
representations if they were asked to respond as accurately as possible. 
Importantly, responses that take longer would then be more likely to encourage 
the use of perceptual representations, which is consistent with prior research. 
Therefore, the prediction was that if participants were under a speed time 
constraint and instructed to be as fast as possible, then they would rely on 
linguistic information, such as statistical linguistic frequencies but if the 
participants were given more time or instructed to be more accurate they would 
access perceptual representations.  
Method 
The experiment was a 2x2 design where response speed (fast or slow) and 
instructions (accuracy-focus or speed-focus) varied.  
Participants 
Ninety-four native English speakers in the United States were recruited 
through Mechanical Turk (Mean Age = 34.68, SD = 12.12). Forty-five 
participants were randomly assigned to the fast response condition, 49 to the 
slow response condition, 43 (25 fast and 18 slow) to the accuracy-focus 














airplane runway 0.77 belt shoe 0.23
antenna radio 0.74 billboard highway 0.09
attic basement 0.55 boat trailer 0.06
car road 0.43 bouquet vase 0.28
ceiling floor 0.72 branch root 0.23
fender tire 0.45 bridge river 0.28
flame candle 0.59 charcoal grill 0.19
hat scarf 0.47 cork bottle 0.3
head foot 0.46 cup saucer 0.4
jockey horse 0.43 faucet drain 0.38
kite string 0.45 flower stem 0.27
knee ankle 0.71 fountain pool 0.31
lid box 0.57 glass coaster 0.07
mailbox post 0.44 handle bucket 0.2
mane hoof 0.51 headlight bumper 0.41
monitor keyboard 0.51 hiker trail 0.04
moustache beard 0.61 hood engine 0.23
nose mouth 0.56 lamp table 0.2
pan stove 0.51 lighthouse beach 0.37
pedestrian sidewalk 0.45 mantle fireplace 0.06
rocket launchpad 0.68 penthouse lobby 0.09
seat pedal 0.44 pitcher mound 0.16
smoke chimney 0.51 plant pot 0.18
steeple church 0.52 sheet mattress 0.12
stirrup saddle 0.54 sky ground 0.34
sweater pants 0.61 sprinkler lawn 0.11
track runner 0.63 stoplight street 0.01
train railroad 0.66 tractor field 0.2
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Materials 
The experiment consisted of 56 pairs of words that shared an iconic 
relationship (e.g., cup — saucer) where one item is found either above or below 
another (see Table 1). These word pairs were extracted from prior research 
(Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). To reduce the likelihood of participants 
developing expectations about the experiment, 56 filler items consisted of word 
pairs without an iconic relation, with half of the pairs having a high semantic 
association and half having a low semantic association as determined by latent 
semantic analysis (LSA) (Landauer, McNamara, Dennis, & Kintsch, 2007). 
LSA is a computational linguistic technique that allows for estimating the 
relationship between words in a corpus while ignoring word order. Each 
participant saw half of the critical items in their iconic ordering (e.g., cup — 
saucer), and the other half in a reverse iconic order (e.g., saucer — cup), this 
was counterbalanced throughout the experiment. 
Procedure 
As in prior studies, participants were asked to judge the semantic 
relatedness of word pairs presented on a computer screen. Words were presented 
one above another in a vertical configuration, with the first word appearing at 
the top of the screen, and the second at the bottom. Upon presentation of a word 
pair, participants indicated whether the pair was related in meaning by pressing 
designated counterbalanced yes or no keys. All word pairs were randomly 
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ordered for each participant to negate any order effects and each trial was 
separated by a ‘+’ fixation symbol. 
Subjects were also instructed to either respond as quickly as possible to 
the words they saw, or respond as accurately as possible to the words they saw. 
In the fast response condition, participants were allotted 1000 ms to respond to 
the stimuli before a message reading ‘TOO SLOW’ would appear in the center 
of the screen. In the slow response condition, participants were allotted 2500 ms 
to respond to the stimuli before a message reading ‘TOO SLOW’ would appear. 
In the accuracy-focus condition, participants were asked to try to be as accurate 
as possible in their responses, whereas in the speed-focus condition, participants 
were asked to try to be as quick as possible in their responses. Subjects were 
asked to describe the directions in a few sentences before beginning the task to 
ensure understanding. They were also asked to write a few sentences describing 
what they thought the purpose of the experiment was after they completed the 
session. There were no participants who misunderstood the directions, nor did 
any participants guess the true purpose of the experiment. 
Results and Discussion 
Four participants were removed from the analysis because more than 30% 
of their responses were incorrect, as measured by incorrect responses to lexical 
items. The linguistic and perceptual factors were operationalized as in Louwerse 
and Jeuniaux (2010), with the linguistic factor being calculated as the log 
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frequency of each word pair, in both orders. The order frequency of all word 
pairs within 3–5 word grams was obtained using the large Web 1T 5-gram 
corpus (Brants & Franz, 2006). The perceptual factor was operationalized as an 
iconicity rating of the stimulus pairs whereby a set of different participants from 
the University of Memphis were asked to estimate the likelihood that the word 
pairs appeared above one another in in the real world. Ratings were made on a 
scale of 1–6, with 1 being extremely unlikely and 6 being extremely likely.  
All analyses were mixed models that specified participants and items as 
random factors and RT as the dependent variable. To ensure participants 
correctly performed their task speed was tested for and a main effect was found, 
F(1, 9378) = 38.43, p < .01, η² = .004 with faster RTs in the fast time constraint. 
A main effect of task was also found, F(1, 9378) = 20.95, p < .01, with faster 
RTs in condition where participants were asked to respond as quickly as 
possible. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between time 
constraint speed and task, F(1, 22.45) = 26.96, p < .01, η² = .55 (see Table 2). 
Accuracy Speed
Fast M = 806.27 
SD = 252.22
M = 787.12 
SD = 258.81
Slow M = 1328.47 
SD = 473.27
M = 1247.89 
SD = 454.96
Table 2 
Mean and SD values of RTs for accuracy, speed, fast, and slow conditions. 
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These findings suggest that participants were faster to respond to word pairs 
during a semantic judgment task when a 1000 ms time constraint was imposed 
than when they were allotted 2500 ms to respond. In addition, participants were 
faster to respond to word pairs when they were asked to focus on responding 
quickly than when they were asked to focus on responding accurately. 
To determine if linguistic and/or perceptual factors impacted processing 
during a semantic judgment task, for all correct critical trials, a linear mixed 
effect model with word frequency and perceptual ratings as fixed factors and 
participant and item as random factors was run. Word frequency best explained 
resulting RTs, F(1, 2349) = 26.96, p < .01, η² = .01, although the perceptual 
factor also contributed (albeit not significantly), F(1, 2349) = 2.93, p = .08, η² 
Figure 1. Strength of the effect in absolute t values of perceptual and linguistic factors for 
accuracy and speed conditions. * denotes p < .05 
*
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= .001. These findings suggest that the linguistic factor accounts for processing 
during a semantic judgment task. However, past research found that both 
linguistic and perceptual factors explained RTs (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). 
Perhaps the perceptual factor here failed to reach significance for all 
participants due to the fact that many of the participants were under time 
constraints.  
In fact, when participants were asked to focus on accuracy, word 
frequency did not explain RTs F(1, 1177) = 1.75, p = .19, η² = .001, while the 
perceptual factor did, F(1, 1177) = 8.08, p < .01, η² = .001 (see Figure 1). This is 
in line with the idea that perceptual simulations are more relevant later during 
processing. However, when participants were asked to focus on speed, word 
frequency explained RTs, F(1, 1169) = 97.42, p < .01, η² = .08, but the 
perceptual factor did not, F(1, 1169) = 2.36, p = .12, η² = .002. These results 
suggest that linguistic factors might play a more important role early, and 
perceptual information becomes important later in processing.  
To determine if this is the case, a linear mixed effect regression was run 
where word frequency and a perceptual factor were fixed factors and 
participants and items were random factors for analyses of both the short and 
long periods of time. When participants were only given a short time period to 
respond, word frequency accounted for RTs, F(1, 1125) = 7.01, p < .01, η² = .
006, whereas the perceptual factor remained irrelevant F(1, 1125) = 0.31, p = .
57, η² < .001. In contrast, when participants were given a longer time period to 
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respond, both factors explained RTs, with word frequency F(1, 1221) = 5.92, p 
= .02, η² = .005, and the perceptual ratings F(1, 1221) = 3.67, p = .05, η² = .003, 
both reaching significance (see Figure 2). These results are in line with prior 
research that suggest that when participants are given enough time to respond to 
word pairs in a semantic judgment task, linguistic factors and perceptual factors 
are relevant for processing, with linguistic representations preceding perceptual 
representations (as the linguistic factor was significant for the short time period, 
whereas the perceptual factor only became significant for the longer time 
period). 
So it might be the case that RT effects are simply influenced by the 
amount of time a participant used to respond to a word pair, as time constraints 
Figure 2. Strength of the effect absolute t values of perceptual and linguistic factors for 
accuracy and speed conditions. * denotes p < .05 
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influenced a participant’s reliance on perceptual or linguistic factors. Put 
differently, it seems as if we are using perceptual simulations when we make 
slower decisions and likewise for linguistic representations and fast decisions. 
In this chapter, RT effects of perceptually related pairs were indeed influenced 
by the timing constraints in the experiment and not simply from the perceptual 
or linguistic relationships between word pairs. Specifically, participants were 
more likely to utilize perceptual information when they had more time to 
process word pairs on a screen. Conversely, participants relied more on 
linguistic information (and less on perceptual information) when they had more 
stringent timing constraints. In comparison, if it was instead the case that 
embodied (or linguistic) effects are found only because of an embodied (or 
linguistic) relationship between word pairs, timing constraints are not expected 
to impact the effect of either perceptual or linguistic representations. 
Importantly, both factors are relevant throughout the time course of processing 
word pairs, with the linguistic factor being relatively more important early 
during processing and perceptual information being relatively more important 
later. In fact, the linguistic factor significantly explains RTs in both the slow and 
fast conditions. Since the linguistic representations precede perceptual 
simulation during processing (Louwerse & Hutchinson, 2012), it is logical that 
the linguistic factor would still remain relevant in later processing, with the 
perceptual factor becoming relatively more relevant. 
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Experiment 2: Space 
Although it is evident from Experiment 1 that linguistic representations 
are more prominent early in processing of word pairs, and perceptual 
representations are more prominent later, it remains difficult to offer a linguistic 
explanation for results when words are presented in isolation. In Experiment 1, 
words were presented in pairs but embodied cognition studies have 
demonstrated that when individual words found in high physical locations (e.g., 
bird) are positioned at the top of a screen they are processed faster than when 
they are positioned at the bottom of the screen. The reverse effect is obtained for 
words found in low physical locations (e.g., fish). This concept-location 
facilitation effect has been argued to demonstrate that cognitive processing is 
fundamentally perceptual in nature. Although task instructions might influence 
the speeded responses, the frequency of butterfly — sky is only able to account 
for faster RTs for congruent word categories and tasks while still leaving mental 
simulations to offer the only explanation for the facilitative effect of the 
congruency of the presentation location and the perceptual features of the word 
(as unigram word frequency cannot account for these RTs). However, questions 
can be raised with regard to the absolute or relative location of these concept-
location words. Perhaps linguistic information might play a role explaining 
these concept-location effects for isolated words after all. 
Even though words are presented in isolation on the screen (i.e., one word 
is presented at a time), it is possible that decisions might be made relative to the 
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other words presented in the other trials of the experiment. Such an explanation 
would suggest that instead of making judgments relative to the congruency 
between the concept and the absolute position of the word on the screen (i.e., 
top of the screen or the bottom of the screen), participants are making 
judgments relative to the other words in the experiment. That is, participants 
might show a concept-location facilitation effect not because the words are 
presented on the top and bottom of the screen, but rather because words are 
asynchronously presented relatively above and below one another throughout 
the duration of the experiment. Although this may seem to be a straw man 
argument, a number of embodied cognition researchers indeed claim that it is 
important that the facilitative effect between the spatial location of the word is 
influenced by its absolute location, “without relying on the relative position of 
[the] word” (Šetić and Domijan, 2007, p. 300). 
To explore this possibility, participants were presented with isolated 
words at either the top or bottom (to replicate the original results), top or center, 
or center or bottom of the screen. According to an embodied cognition account, 
if responses are faster because word meaning and world location are congruent, 
the same high and low words, presented in the center of the screen should show 
no concept-location facilitation effect because the presentation location is not 
congruent with the physical and spatial properties of the simulated word. In 
other words, when butterfly is presented in the center of the screen, processing 
should not be facilitated. Alternatively, if decisions are based on the relationship 
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between one word relative to the other words in the experiment (as opposed to 
being relative to the presentation location of the word; a linguistic explanation), 
then high words presented in the center of the screen (concept-location 
mismatch) should still show a concept-location facilitation effect if low words 
are presented at the bottom of the screen. That is, when butterfly is presented in 
the center of the screen, processing will be facilitated if other words in the 
experiment are ‘below’ a butterfly. Similarly, low words presented at the center 
of the screen would show a concept-location facilitation effect if high words are 
presented at the top of the screen.  
In essence, if concept-location facilitation is found when words are 
presented in relative positions on the screen (i.e., above/below one another) as 
opposed to absolute positions on the screen (i.e., at the top/bottom of the 
screen), it might be the case that perceptual simulation (concept-location 
facilitation effect) is not entirely accounting for RTs but rather, participants are 
making decisions about words presented in isolation by comparing those words 
to the group of words included in the experiment. The following experiment 
explores whether semantic judgments are made with respect to an absolute 
location on the screen (embodied explanation) or with respect to a relative 
location in comparison to other words included in the experimental session 
(statistical linguistic explanation) in order to determine if spatial location of the 
stimuli, like temporal constraints, can also impact how likely participants are to 
rely on linguistic or embodied mental representations. In a response time 
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experiment, participants were presented with physical-location words from 
existing studies at the top or bottom, top or center, and center or bottom of the 
screen. 
Participants 
Eighty-seven undergraduate native English speakers at the University of 
Memphis participated for extra credit in a Psychology course. Participants were 
randomly assigned to each of the three conditions (words presented at either a) 
the top of the screen and the center of the screen, b) the center of the screen and 
the bottom of the screen, or c) the top of the screen and the bottom of the 
screen). 
Materials 
The experiment consisted of 48 living animal words that could be found 
in a low spatial location, (such as the ground or ocean, n=24) or found in the sky 
(a high spatial location, n=24). The remaining 48 words consisted of non-living 
objects that could also be found in either high (n=24) or low (n=24) physical 
locations. Words were extracted from both Pecher et al. (2010) and Šetić and 
Domijan (2007).  
Procedure 
The procedure was almost identical to Pecher et al. (2010) and Šetić and 
Domijan (2007). Participants were asked if words presented on a 1280x1024 
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computer screen were either living or nonliving. This task has the advantage 
that it does not bias participants to consciously judge the physical location of a 
word. The center of the screen was positioned at eye level. Similar to Pecher et 
al. (2010) and Šetić and Domijan (2007), each trial began with the presentation 
of three fixation crosses appearing on the screen for 300 ms. Fixation crosses 
were presented either at the top, center, or bottom of the screen, depending on 
where the proceeding word would appear on the screen. This occurred in order 
to notify participants where the next word would appear. 
Words were presented at either the top and the center of the screen, the 
center and bottom of the screen, or — as in the original Šetić and Domijan 
(2007) study the top and bottom of the screen, depending upon the between 
participants condition. Upon presentation of a word, participants indicated 
whether the word was living or not living by pressing designed counterbalanced 
keys on the keyboard (f and j keys). All words were seen once and were 
counterbalanced for each participant where half the high spatial location words 
were presented in the upper position (relative to the other presentation location, 
i.e., top relative to center/bottom or center relative to bottom) and half in the 
lower position (i.e., bottom relative to center/top or center relative to top), 
likewise for the low spatial location words. 
If responses were slower than 2,500 ms a message reading ‘TOO SLOW’ 
would appear. Participants were asked to try to be as quick and as accurate as 
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possible in their responses. The next trial began immediately after the 
participant’s response or after the feedback message. 
Results and Discussion 
Eleven participants were removed from the analysis because >40% of 
their answers were incorrect. All remaining participants were split evenly 
between conditions. In all analyses, the parameters found in Pecher et al. (2010) 
were used for outlier identification and removal. Outliers were identified as 
those correct responses greater than three standard deviations from the mean per 
participant per item. Outlier removal (as described above) resulted in a loss of 
2.8% of the data. All error trials were removed, resulting in a loss of an 
additional 8.7% of the data. 
A mixed-effect regression analysis was conducted on RTs with match/
mismatch (match or mismatch between word category (low or high spatial 
location word) and relative presentation location (relatively high location of top 
or center or relatively low location of center or bottom) as a fixed factor and 
participants and items as random factors. The model was fitted using the 
restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML) for the continuous variable 
(RT). F-test denominator degrees of freedom were estimated using the 
Kenward-Roger’s degrees of freedom adjustment to reduce the chances of Type 
I error (Littell, Stroup, & Freund, 2002). 
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In addition to the location presentation manipulation, the source of the RT 
differences in this task was also investigated, linguistic or embodied. An 
embodied account would predict a concept-location facilitation effect, whereas 
a linguistic account would suggest these same effects are driven by language 
statistics. To further explore if participants were relying on language statistics, 
analyses using word frequency as a fixed factor were used to determine if a 
possible additional explanation for any concept-location facilitation effects 
might exist. The word frequency factor was calculated as the log frequency of 
each word being presented obtained using the Web 1T 5-gram corpus (Brants & 
Franz, 2006). 
Unlike Šetić and Domijan (2007), no significant concept-location 
facilitation effect was found for words appearing at the top of the screen, F(1, 
2330) =1.46, p= .23, η² < .001, at the center of the screen, F(1, 1599) = .10, p= .
75, η² < .001, nor at the bottom of the screen, F(1, 2395) =1.76, p= .19, η² < .
001. Just as in Pecher et al., (2010) these findings also fail to replicate the 
concept-location facilitation effect found in Šetić and Domijan (2007). In fact, 
there was no interaction between location and word category for any of the 
three word presentation locations and experimental conditions. Pecher et al. 
(2010) offered the explanation that the concept location facilitation effect is not 
well understood, with some factors causing facilitation and others causing 
interference. The linguistic frequency factor did not explain the results either, 
with no significant main effects for words appearing at the top of the screen, 
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F(1, 2330) = .0001, p= .99, η² < .001, the center of the screen, F(1, 1599) = .19, 
p= .66, η² < .001, nor the bottom of the screen, F(1, 2395) = .11, p= .74, η² < .
001. These current results seem to support neither an embodied cognition 
account (as there was no concept-location facilitation for the top-bottom 
condition) nor an alternative linguistic account (as there was no concept-
location facilitation for either condition including the center location nor was 
linguistic frequency significant). In the absence of a replication in both the 
current study and in Pecher et al. (2010), perhaps the effects reported in Šetić 
and Domijan (2007) might be attributed to linguistic differences in the 
Hungarian stimuli. Alternatively, such concept-location facilitation effects might 
simply be relevant for certain groups of words and not others. 
To further explore the results of the current experiment, and the 
possibility that words are processed relative to the words around them, results 
were analyzed for animate versus inanimate words. Words that were inanimate 
again showed no interactions for words appearing at the top of the screen, F(1, 
1172) = .003, p= .96, η² < .001 (see Figure 3), the center of the screen, F(1, 787) 
= .07, p= .80, η² < .001 (see Figure 4), or the bottom of the screen, F(1, 1072) 
= .92, p= .34, η² < .001 (see Figure 5). Linguistic frequency was also not 
significant for words appearing at the top of the screen, F(1, 1172) =1.53, p= .
22, η² = .001, the center of the screen, F(1, 787) = .62, p= .43, η² < .001, nor the 
bottom of the screen, F(1, 1072) = .002, p= .96, η² < .001. 
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However, words that were animate did show significant interactions. 
Words appearing in any given location (top, center, and bottom) were processed 
faster when that location was relatively the same as the word category. ‘Up 
words’ presented in the center were processed faster in the center-bottom 
condition, whereas ‘down words’ presented in the center were processed faster 
in the top-center condition, F(1, 789) =6.10, p<.02, η² = .008. Figure 4 shows 
RTs for matched and mismatched up and down words presented in the center of 
the screen, showing that words with a concept-location match are processed 
faster than words with a concept-location mismatch. Similarly, ‘up words’ 
presented in the top of the screen were processed faster in both the top-bottom 
and top-center conditions, F (1, 1134) =6.80, p<.01, η² = .006 (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Average RTs in ms for the words appearing at the top of the screen. 
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Finally, ‘down words’ presented in the bottom of the screen were processed 
faster in both the top-bottom and center-bottom conditions, F(1, 1067) =10.97, 
p= .001, η² = .01 (see Figure 5). 
In addition, to further explore the impact of linguistic frequency also 
significantly explained RTs to words presented at the bottom of the screen, F(1, 
1067) =5.08, p= .02, η² = .004, but only marginally for words presented in the 
center of the screen, F(1, 789) =3.22, p= .07, η² = .004, with no effects for 
words presented at the top of the screen, F(1, 1134) =2.58, p= .10, η² = .002. 
These findings seem to be consistent with the idea that decisions are based on 
the relationship between one word relative to the other words in the experiment, 
as ‘up words’ presented relatively above ‘down words’ still showed a concept-
Figure 4. Average RTs in ms for the words appearing at the center of the screen. 
92
location facilitation effect despite these words being presented in the center of 
the screen. 
In addition, in all conditions, words appearing relatively below other 
words (M= 767.45, SD=267.40) were processed significantly slower than words 
appearing relatively above other words (M= 889.36, SD=421.41), t(4926) = 
15.36, p <.001. That is, regardless of the absolute location of the word on the 
screen, where ever the bottom position was (i.e., center of the screen or bottom 
of the screen), words presented in that location were processed slower than the 
same words presented in a relatively higher location. Consider the case of the 
center presentation location: when words were presented in either the center of 
the screen or the bottom of the screen, words took longer to process at the 
Figure 5. Average RTs in ms for the words appearing at the bottom of the screen. 
Bottom Words
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bottom and less time to process at the center. However, when those same words 
were presented in the center or the top, they took longer to process in the center 
and less time to process at the top. This means that the same words presented in 
the same location are processed faster or slower simply due to whether other 
words are appearing above or below them. This at least suggests that 
comparisons between high and low positions are biased given that the center 
represents both the relative top and bottom in different conditions. 
Finally, to explore whether participants indeed made comparative 
judgments for words, bigram frequencies were assessed and were able to 
account for the response times of center words. As in previous studies 
(Louwerse, 2008) bigram linguistic frequencies were operationalized as the log 
frequency of a-b (e.g., owl-lizard) or b-a (e.g., lizard-owl) order of word pairs. 
Because words were presented individually on the screen, pairs were 
determined by the randomized presentation order. The bigram frequency of each 
pair was assigned to the second word in the randomly presented pair. The order 
frequency of all word pairs within 3-5 word grams was obtained using the large 
Web 1T 5-gram corpus (Brants & Franz, 2006). A mixed-effect regression 
analysis was conducted on RTs to center words with the bigram frequency as a 
fixed factor and participants and items as random factors (Baayen, Davidson, & 
Bates, 2008). Bigram frequency was a significant predictor of RTs for center 
words only, F(1,906) =3.99, p= .05, η² = .004. This was true for all center words 
regardless of experimental condition, implying that participants consider past 
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trials while making judgments about the current word in question, and implying 
that a linguistic frequencies explain RTs during a concept-location facilitation 
task. 
The absolute location of a word on a screen does not seem to impact the 
concept-location facilitation effect, but rather the relative location appears to be 
what is important. This finding suggests that decisions are based on the 
relationship between one word relative to the other words in the experiment, not 
only based on the relationship between one word and the embodied physical and 
spatial properties of that simulated word. In addition, across all three conditions, 
there was a main effect of location, such that words presented below other 
words were processed slower. This finding suggested that participants made 
judgments relative to other words, not only relative to their location on the 
screen. To further determine whether participants made comparative judgments 
between words presented asynchronously over the duration of an experiment 
bigram frequencies were shown to predict participant RTs. These findings 
together indicate that it might be the case that participants are making decisions 
about words presented in isolation by comparing those words to the group of 
words included in the experiment, suggesting that findings that are easily 
attributed to embodied cognition (Pecher et al., 2010; Šetić & Domijan, 2007) 
can also be attributed to language statistics.  
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Experiment 3: Relating the unrelated 
The central research question at the start of this dissertation concerned the 
extent to which perceptual or linguistic representations are relied upon during 
processing. In the previous two experiments, I demonstrated that this is indeed 
the case, with time and space influencing when and how participants rely more 
or less on linguistic versus perceptual representations during processing. This 
finding is crucial for Experiment 3 in which, relying on the assumption from 
Experiment 1, that linguistic processing is more important in the early stages of 
language processing, and perceptual processing is more important later, I 
demonstrated that both linguistic and perceptual representations, although 
intertwined are still independent processes. I began by examining why these two 
processes might be mistaken for being wholly dependent upon one another, then 
moved on to seeing how these processes are indeed independent while still 
remaining highly related. 
Such a strong relationship between linguistic and perceptual 
representations has lead embodied cognition theorists to argue that perhaps 
linguistic representations are not independent at all, but rather artifacts of the 
perceptual system. Despite evidence pointing in favor of complimentary but 
also independent linguistic processing, the question of whether linguistic 
representations simply emerge from the use of perceptual representations is still 
unanswered. Logically, when processing the word strawberry both related 
words like pie, shortcake, blonde, and perceptual simulations of the color, size, 
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and taste of a strawberry are related. It is difficult to disentangle the boundaries 
between linguistic representations and perceptual representations, for this very 
fact, because they refer to each other. 
In fact, for many concept words used in embodied cognition experiments, 
the frequency pattern matches the perceptual relation (Louwerse, 2008), 
suggesting that perceptual and linguistic systems do indeed activate 
simultaneously to give meaning to words, with linguistic representations being 
more prominent during early processing and perceptual representations reaching 
dominance later (Hutchinson, Tillman, & Louwerse, 2014; Louwerse & 
Hutchinson, 2012; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). However, both types of 
relationships are active throughout language processing, only their importance 
modulates over time. The following experiment is designed to show that the 
linguistic system acts independently of the perceptual system. 
In order to determine if both linguistic and perceptual representations are 
activated when generating relationships between word pairs, a RT experiment 
was designed whereby participants were asked either to determine whether 
linguistically and/or perceptually similar or dissimilar word pairs were 
semantically related. Following the aforementioned research and prior work, I 
relied on the assumption that linguistic processing would occur relatively more 
early during language processing and perceptual processing would occur 
relatively later during processing. 
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It was hypothesized that if linguistic features dominate early processing 
and perceptual features become salient later, as shown in Experiment 1, then it 
follows to expect participants to respond to linguistically related pairs with 
lower RTs than to pairs lacking such a relationship because if word pairs only 
share a linguistic relation, then a linguistic representation should suffice to 
garner meaning. It was therefore predicted that perceptually and linguistically 
similar word pairs should be just as easy to process as pairs that are only 
linguistically similar. 
Further, it was predicted that any word pair that shares a linguistic 
relationship should be processed with lower RTs than word pairs that share only 
perceptual similarities. In other words, if word pairs only share a perceptual 
relation, then a linguistic representation would not be sufficient in order to 
determine the relationship between the word pair because such a representation 
might lack modality-specific perceptual information. Instead, a complete 
perceptual representation would be necessary to compare the perceptual features 
of both words and in turn determine their perceptual relationship. 
An interesting question arises in how participants will tend to relate 
dissimilar pairs, i.e., when attempting to associate two unrelated items, will 
participants tend to rely upon the linguistic features or the perceptual features of 
those items to generate a relation between them? For seemingly unrelated word 
pairs, a linguistic representation might be expected to be insufficient to generate 
a relation between the pair, although the linguistic context still remains 
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important. Instead consideration of all features of the word would be necessary 
to extrapolate a relationship for the pair. If associating dissimilar pairs does 
indeed take longer than processing pairs that are related, then one might predict 
that, in line with the notion that perceptual features are more salient in later 
processing, that participants generate a full perceptual representation when 
trying to relate dissimilar words. Due to this fact, one would expect perceptual 
factors to better predict RTs for unrelated pairs, and for those RTs to be longer 
than those of semantically related pairs. If words as unrelated as strawberry and 
pony are processed in a similar fashion to words with a semantic or perceptual 
relationship, then are perceptual representations fundamental for language 
processing, or rather simply beneficial for language understanding? 
If words as unrelated as strawberry and pony are processed in a similar 
fashion to words with a linguistic or perceptual relationship, then are perceptual 
representations fundamental for language processing, or rather simply beneficial 
for language understanding? Note that all of the experiments prior hinge on the 
symbolic factor being mostly independent from the embodied factor. This 
chapter thereby attempts to disentangle whether linguistic and perceptual 
representation are dependent on one another by demonstrating that in some 
cases (i.e., with highly related word pairs), linguistic representations might just 
be good enough for meaning and in other cases (i.e., with highly unrelated word 
pairs), both linguistic and perceptual representations are necessary for 
comprehension. 
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In the following experiment, participants were asked either to determine 
whether the words presented were semantically related. Because linguistic 
features dominate early processing and perceptual features become salient later 
(Louwerse & Connell; 2011), participants would be expected to respond to 
semantically related pairs with lower RTs than to pairs lacking such a 
relationship. If word pairs only share a semantic relation, then a linguistic 
representation would suffice to gather meaning and assess the relationship 
between the words. Perceptually and semantically similar word pairs were 
predicted to be just as easy to process as pairs that were only semantically 
similar. Further, any pair with a linguistic relationship is predicted to be 
processed with lower RTs than pairs with only perceptual relationships. If the 
word pairs only shared a perceptual relation, then a linguistic representation 
would not be sufficient in order to determine the relationship between the word 
pair because such a representation might lack modality-specific perceptual 
information. Instead, a complete perceptual representation would be necessary 
to compare the perceptual features of both words and in turn determine their 
perceptual relationship. Furthermore, linguistic factors are expected to best 
predict performance for semantically related pairs, whereas both linguistic 
factors and perceptual would be expected to best predict performance on related 
pairs. Finally, following the hypothesis that a full perceptual simulation is 
required to generate a relationship between unrelated pairs, perceptual factors 
would be expected to best predict performance on unrelated pairs. 
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Participants 
Thirty-seven participants were recruited from mTurk online. All 
participants were native English speakers.  
Materials 
Each experiment consisted of 62 trials, each including a pair of words. 
Word pairs were presented in a random order, while the word order making up 
each pair was counterbalanced between participants. Fifteen word pairs were 
linguistically and perceptually similar, 15 word pairs were only linguistically 
similar, 15 word pairs were only perceptually similar, and 15 word pairs were 
linguistically and perceptually dissimilar. Some word pairs were extracted from 
previous research (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010) and some word pairs were 
newly created. Linguistically related word pairs were determined by latent 
semantic analysis (LSA; Landauer, McNamara, Dennis, & Kintsch, 2007) (high 
semantic association: cos = .42; low semantic relation: cos = .07). In addition, 
the linguistic relatedness between word pairs was determined using the log 
frequency of all word pairs within 3-5 word grams was obtained using the large 
Web 1T 5-gram corpus (Brants & Franz, 2006) (high semantic association: log 
frequency = 11.83; low semantic relation: log frequency = 5.19). All words had 
concreteness and imageability scores greater than 400 (as determined by the 
MRC Psycholinguistic Database, a dictionary containing 150837 words with 
linguistic, psycholinguistic, and psychological measures; Coltheart, 1981) and 
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were between 2-11 letters and all words pairs were rated on the number of 
shared perceptual features (e.g., shape, color, texture, function, size, taste, etc.). 
Perceptually related word pairs all had on average 2.58 (SD = 1.34) overlapping 
perceptual features and perceptually unrelated word pairs had at most one 
overlapping perceptual feature (M = .12, SD = .33). 
Procedure 
Word pairs were presented next to one another in the center of a computer 
screen. Participants were instructed to indicate a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the 
question “Are the words related in meaning?”. They were given examples of 
words that were and were not related in meaning, before starting the 
experiment. Participants were asked to try as best they could to come up with 
any type of relation between the two words and then pressed a designated yes or 
no button on the keyboard. Once a participant responded, the fixation symbol 
‘+’ would appear center-screen for 1000 ms, followed by the next trial. Pairs 
within an experimental session were randomly presented in order to negate 
order effects. To ensure understanding, a session of six practice trials preceded 
the experimental session.  
Results and Discussion 
Three participants were removed from the analysis because they 
explicitly stated that they were relating words based on orthographical and 
lexical features. This resulted in a total of 34 participants where all remaining 
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participants were split evenly between conditions. Because participants were 
asked to generate relationships between unrelated words, there were no 
incorrect answers for unrelated words, as the task was subjective. In order to 
filter participants who may not have been properly performing the task, RT 
outliers were examined. RT outliers were identified as those correct responses to 
related words (or any response to unrelated words) greater than 2.5 standard 
deviations from the mean per participant per item. Outlier removal resulted in a 
loss of 5.8% of the data. 
First, mixed models were conducted to compare RTs, participant and item 
were specified as random factors. RTs significantly varied between word pairs, 
F(1, 2031) = 222.606, p < .001, , η² = .10 (see Table 3). To explore whether RTs 
were faster when processing word pairs sharing a linguistic relationship, or a 
perceptual relationship, a linear mixed model was run whereby perceptual 
relatedness and linguistic relatedness were treated as categorical fixed factors, 
and subject and item were treated as random factors. Whether or not the word
Type of Relationship RT
Unrelated M = 2178 (SD = 1405)
Perceptual M = 1861 (SD = 1054)
Semantic M = 1202 (SD = 599)
Semantic and Perceptual M = 1170 (SD = 594)
Table 3 
Mean RTs and SDs to various stimuli pairs
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 pair was related linguistically significantly impacted RTs, F(1, 2031) = 252.14, 
p < .001, as did whether or not the word pair was related perceptually, F(1, 
2031) = 24.17, p < .001, η² = .018. Furthermore, there was a significant 
interaction between the two, F(1, 2031) = 16.10, p < .001, η² = .008. 
These results demonstrate that word pairs sharing any type of relationship 
were processed faster than those unrelated word pairs, F(1, 2031) = 70.12, p < .
001, η² = .033. However, not only were related word pairs processed faster than 
unrelated word pairs, but those pairs that shared any type of linguistic 
relationship were processed quickly, regardless of their perceptual relation, 
whereas those pairs that only shared a perceptual relationship were processed 
Figure 6. Linguistically and perceptually related and unrelated word pair RTs.
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significantly slower than any linguistically related pairs, F(1, 1510) = 164.87, p 
< .001, η² = .10. This is in line with the prediction that participants would 
respond to linguistically related word pairs with lower RTs than to perceptually 
related word pairs, as linguistic processing precedes perceptual simulation and 
therefore linguistically related word pairs should be processed faster.  
Furthermore, because linguistic relatedness is sufficient to determine the 
relation between word pairs, pairs that only shared a linguistic relationship were 
expectedly processed no faster than pairs that shared a linguistic and perceptual 
relationship, F(1, 1045) = 0.588, p = .449, η² < .001. This suggests a linguistic 
representation might be sufficient to generate a relationship between the 
perceptually and linguistically similar word pairs. In other words, a full 
perceptual simulation might not be necessary when making a judgment about 
the relatedness of word pairs that are both perceptually and linguistically 
related. 
To further explore whether RTs were actually explained by linguistic or 
perceptual information, mixed models were run where linguistic frequency and 
perceptual ratings were entered as fixed factors, and subject and item were 
considered random factors. Perceptual ratings were operationalized as the 
number of perceptual features (e.g., shape, color, texture, function, size, taste, 
etc.) shared between word pairs. The linguistic frequency for word pairs was 
calculated as how frequently word1 and word2 appeared together in a five-word 
window in the large Web 1T 5-gram corpus (Brants & Franz, 2006). The 
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correlation between frequencies and ratings was significant at r(2130) = .54, p < 
.001. Given that language encodes perceptual information, this is not surprising, 
but presents a problem for researchers trying to differentiate between the two 
factors. 
As expected for pairs that were semantically related, linguistic frequency 
moderately predicted RTs, F(1, 538) = 3.03, p = .087, η² = .006, whereas 
perceptual ratings did not predict RTs, F (1, 538) = 1.99, p = .18, η² = .004. For 
pairs that were perceptually related, linguistic frequency predicted RTs, F(1, 
1510) = 38.81, p < .001, η² = .025, as did perceptual ratings to a lesser degree, 
F(1, 1510) = 5.68, p = .02, η² = .004. But importantly, for unrelated pairs, 
linguistic frequency did not predict RTs, F(1, 484) = .009, p = .92, η² < .001. 
However perceptual explained much more variance, F(1, 484) = 4.008, p = .06, 
η² = .008. This suggests that participants generate a full perceptual 
representation when trying to relate dissimilar words, as perceptual relationships 
are independently utilized when generating a relationship while linguistic 
representations are not.  
Conclusion 
In the current chapter, the three objectives were to determine a) if time 
constraints on a semantic judgment task could influence how much a participant 
relied on linguistic and perceptual factors during processing, b) whether 
participants made judgments relative to other words on the screen or relative to 
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their absolute location on the screen, thereby establishing if spatial location of 
stimuli can also impact how much participants rely on perceptual or linguistic 
representations and c) if linguistic and perceptual representations are 
independent of one another. 
In Experiment 1, the Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis predicted that 
linguistic factors are important immediately during processing, preceding a 
deeper perceptual simulation system. Results from a RT study found exactly 
that: participants relied more on a linguistic factor during processing when 
participants given strict time constraints, or when they were told to focus on 
responding quickly. When given more time to respond, both linguistic and 
perceptual factors explained response times. These findings are in line with the 
findings from Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010), Louwerse and Connell (2011), 
and Louwerse and Hutchinson (2012) that suggest the linguistic representations 
are more relevant early on, and that perceptual representations are more relevant 
as time progresses. In a second experiment, three presentation location 
conditions (top and center, bottom and center, or top and bottom) failed to 
replicate a concept-location facilitation effect as found in Šetić and Domijan 
(2007) for inanimate words. However, when considering animate words, words 
matched between the relative presentation location and word category resulted 
in faster RTs than words with a mismatch. This finding suggests that 
participants make judgments about individual words they see on the screen with 
respect to other words they see throughout the duration of an experiment. 
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Together, these experiments suggest that multiple factors can influence how 
reliant we might be on different kinds of mental representations under different 
conditions, while emphasizing that both linguistic and perceptual 
representations are utilized during processing. 
Importantly, the previous findings that have given support to perceptual 
simulation (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; 
Semin & Smith, 2008; Zwaan, 2004) are not invalidated through these findings. 
In those instances, perceptual simulation was more suited for the task and 
presumably temporal and spatial constraints were not studied factors. However, 
the results from the current study show that perceptual simulation does not 
always win the struggle for the most efficient type of processing. The results of 
the current studies show not only that when people need to be accurate, and 
have enough time to do so, they will more often rely on perceptual simulation 
but that comes at a cost. Intuitively, in order to activate and process all those 
connected concepts, processing cannot be completed as quickly and so people 
rely on the linguistic associations when time is less available. These findings are 
compounded by the results of Experiment 2, which indicate that when 
participants make decisions about words presented in isolation they compare 
those words to the group of words included in the experiment. In these 
instances, utilizing distributional semantics from language statistics is a more 
efficient route. The Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis (Louwerse, 2007) 
argues that these symbols have been encoded with the grounded referents, so 
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there is no need to activate all simulations when one symbol can easily and 
directly lead to another symbol. It stands to reason that over the course of a 
person’s life where they make these symbolic connections over and over again, 
they can allow those shortcuts to make the connections for them. These findings 
support the view that language processing is both linguistic and embodied. 
In a third experiment, I aimed to determine if both linguistic and 
perceptual representations are activated when generating relationships between 
word pairs. A RT experiment was designed where participants determined 
whether linguistically and/or perceptually similar or dissimilar word pairs were 
semantically related. As hypothesized, participants responded to linguistically 
related pairs with lower RTs than to pairs lacking such a relationship as a 
linguistic representation was sufficient to garner meaning. In addition, for word 
pairs that only shared a perceptual relation, a linguistic representation was not 
sufficient to determine the relationship between the word pair, and a perceptual 
representation was required. Importantly, unrelated words were processed in a 
similar fashion to words with a perceptual relationship, suggesting that 
participants generate a full perceptual representation when trying to relate 
dissimilar words. 
As previously established in Experiment 1, linguistic features dominate 
early processing and perceptual features become salient later. It is unexpected 
then that participants responded to semantically related pairs with lower RTs 
than to pairs lacking such a relationship. As supported in prior work, such a 
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finding implies that a quick linguistic representation was enough gather 
meaning for words that are frequently found in similar linguistic contexts. 
Furthermore, perceptually and semantically related word pairs were just as easy 
to process as pairs that were only semantically similar. 
If the word pairs only shared a perceptual relation, then a linguistic 
representation was not sufficient in order to determine the relationship due to 
the lack of detailed perceptual information. Instead, in theory, a complete 
perceptual representation needed to be generated for both words to determine 
their perceptual similarities. Words pairs that were as unrelated as strawberry 
and pony were processed in a similar fashion to words a perceptual relationship. 
This finding helps to disentangle whether linguistic and perceptual 
representation are independent by demonstrating that with highly related word 
pairs, linguistic representations are good enough for generating meaning and 
with highly unrelated word pairs both linguistic and perceptual representations 
are necessary for comprehension. 
Finally, linguistic factors predicted performance for semantically related 
pairs, whereas both linguistic factors and perceptual were necessary predict 
performance for perceptually related pairs. As expected for unrelated pairs, 
perceptual factors best predicted RT performance. These findings imply that a 
perceptual representation is necessary when trying to relate dissimilar words, 
but linguistic representations are more or less useless. The opposite is true for 
semantically related pairs, with linguistic factors predicting RTs and perceptual 
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information remaining less than beneficial. Despite the relationship between the 
two factors, in this final chapter, the frequency pattern did not match the 





 Language statistics and 





Research in cognitive linguistics has emphasized the role of embodiment in 
metaphor comprehension, with experimental research showing activation of 
perceptual simulations when processing metaphors. Recent research in conceptual 
processing has demonstrated that findings attributed to embodied cognition can be 
explained through language statistics. The current chapter investigates whether 
language statistics explain processing of primary metaphors and whether this effect is 
modified by the gender of the participant. Participants saw word pairs with valence 
(Experiment 1: good–bad), authority (Experiment 2: doctor–patient), temperature 
(Experiment 3: hot–cold), or gender (Experiment 4: male–female) connotations. The 
pairs were presented in either a vertical configuration (X above Y or Y above X) 
matching the primary metaphors (e.g., HAPPY IS UP, CONTROL IS UP) or a 
horizontal configuration (X left of Y or Y left of X) not matching the primary 
metaphors. Even though previous research has argued that primary metaphor 
processing can best be explained by an embodied cognition account, results 
demonstrate that statistical linguistic frequencies also explain the response times of 
the stimulus pairs both in vertical and horizontal configurations, because language has 
encoded embodied relations. In addition, the effect of the statistical linguistic 
frequencies was modified by participant gender, with female participants being more 
sensitive to statistical linguistic context than male participants.  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Introduction 
Having argued in the previous chapter that the spatial location of stimuli 
affects how words are represented I provided an overview of some of the ways 
that linguistic and perceptual representations might be used differently in 
different situations. In the following pages I will discuss how the degree to 
which linguistic and perceptual information contribute to mental representations 
may even vary based, not only on the relative spatial location of the stimuli, but 
also upon the orientation of the stimuli. I will further discuss how individual 
differences (in this case gender) can impact how much participants rely on each 
type of representation when processing metaphoric language. In order to frame 
how these factors impact mental representations, I will present four experiments 
whereby I focus on how much the linguistic and perceptual factors explain male 
and female participant response times to valence words, authority words, 
temperature words, and gender words. 
The current chapter has three goals, (1) to determine if, in addition to 
embodied mechanisms, language statistics can also account for metaphor 
processing, (2) to explore how individual differences impact conceptual 
processing and (3) to establish how the orientation of word pairs might 
influence processing. 
First, researchers have made the claim that processing metaphors is so 
fundamentally embodied that no other factors are expected to be relevant for 
comprehension. Studies in cognitive linguistics demonstrate that conceptual 
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metaphors emphasize relations between concepts and physical properties. These 
metaphors are thought to be understood through their relationships to physical 
space (Gibbs 1994, 2006; Kövecses 2005; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 1999). For 
instance, expressions like I am feeling up or I am flying high mark the primary 
metaphor HAPPY IS UP, with positive terms being associated with ‘up’ 
properties and negative terms with ‘down’ properties. Similarly, the primary 
metaphor CONTROL IS UP associates concepts related to power and authority 
to high vertical positions. For example, a supervisor might find that in his lofty 
position, he is on top of a situation with everything under control. Accordingly, 
being subordinate is associated with low vertical positions; a new employee is 
on the bottom of the totem pole and must look up to his superiors. The source of 
these spatial properties is embodied: “These spatial orientations arise from the 
fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in 
our physical environment” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14). That is, “human 
conceptual processing is deeply grounded in embodied metaphor” (Gibbs 2006: 
122). 
Although it may seem obvious that frequency-based effects might be 
expected based on the previous chapters, many researchers in cognitive 
linguistics support an embodied view, suggesting that a variety of metaphors are 
understood through perceptual simulations of the body within physical space 
(Gibbs 1994, 2006; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 1999). For instance, Wilson and 
Gibbs (2007) found that when participants performed an action congruent with 
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a metaphorical statement, they were faster to comprehend the statements than 
when statements were incongruent with an action. After performing or 
imagining a grasping motion, a participant would be faster to process the 
metaphorical phrase grasp a concept than when performing or imagining other 
incongruent motions (Wilson and Gibbs 2007). Such findings demonstrate that 
metaphor comprehension can be explained by bodily action. Systematic 
linguistic analyses show that numerous additional metaphors are also grounded 
in bodily mechanisms (e.g., hunger, pressure, temperature, space, and emotion) 
(Gibbs, Lima, & Francozo, 2004; Kövecses 1986; Nayak and Gibbs 1990). For 
instance, abstract metaphors such as those linked to time seem to be processed 
through embodied mechanisms related to space. For example, the past is likely 
to be thought of as being behind us, as evidenced by phrases like back in the 
day or that day is behind us now, whereas the future is thought of as being ahead 
of us with phases like are you looking forward to it ? (Gibbs, 2006; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999.) In a number of studies, Boroditsky and colleagues 
demonstrated that time is indeed grounded in space with participants being 
likely to organize time spatially, such that spatial representations and 
manipulations influence how participants process and conceptualize time 
(Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar 2002). For example, 
participants moving forward in space are likely to think of time in terms of the 
TIME PASSING IS A MOVING OBSERVER metaphor (as opposed to the 
TIME PASSING IS A MOVING OBJECT metaphor) because they themselves 
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are physically moving for ward in space. In addition, participants reading 
sentences describing motion in a particular direction are faster to process such 
sentences after witnessing motion in that same direction than after witnessing 
motion in a different direction (Dils & Boroditsky 2010).  
The association between valence or authority concepts and specific 
physical locations can also be readily explained by embodied cognition. For 
example, evidence for the primary metaphor HAPPY IS UP comes from 
experiments that show that when an image or word representing a positive 
concept is presented on the top of a computer screen, comprehension is 
facilitated (Crawford et al., 2006; Meier & Robinson, 2005). For the primary 
metaphor CONTROL IS UP similar findings have been obtained. Studies have 
shown that when an authority word (e.g., master) was presented on the upper 
part of the screen, response times (RTs) were faster and recall was better than 
when a non-authority word (e.g., servant) was presented in that same position 
(Meier & Robinson, 2004; Meier, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2007; Schnall & Clore 
2004; Schubert, 2005). In other words, comprehending primary metaphors such 
as HAPPY IS UP and CONTROL IS UP seems to be facilitated through the 
perceptual simulation of upward/downward directions, supporting the idea that 
primary metaphors are understood through their relationship to physical space. 
In fact, results similar to the aforementioned primary metaphor 
experiments have been obtained using concepts with literal upward and 
downward locations, such as flying and swimming animals presented in the 
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upper or the lower part of the screen (Pecher et al., 2010; Šetić & Domijan, 
2007). Similarly, when word pairs with a perceptual order such as attic and 
basement are presented to participants, one above the other, iconic presentations 
are processed faster than reverse-iconic presentations (Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003). 
Such iconicity findings have also been obtained with other object words (Estes 
et al., 2008) and motion verbs (Meteyard et al., 2007). Over the last decade 
findings like these have accumulated, lending support to the claim that linguistic 
symbols are grounded in modality specific perceptual and motor systems (de 
Vega et al., 2008; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Semin & Smith, 2008). However, 
although conceptual metaphors are grounded in perception and action, 
perceptual simulations of the external world are not requisite for under standing 
and thinking about these metaphors (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002). 
Contrary to this claim that metaphor comprehension is embodied only, 
Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) and Gibbs (2006) have stated that embodiment 
effects do not account for the entirety of metaphor comprehension, but other 
factors are likely relevant too. One such candidate is language itself. A number 
of theories have cautioned against a unilateral embodied account of cognition. 
For instance, language has encoded up and down relations by typically placing 
the up concept before the down concept, as is the case in many binomials (e.g., 
it is more common to say up and down, head to toe, top and bottom than down 
and up, toe and head, and bottom and top) (Cooper & Ross 1975). That is, 
perceptual cues are encoded linguistically, such that language users can rely on 
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the linguistic system as a shortcut to the perceptual system. Consequently, 
comprehension can be explained both by a statistical linguistic approach and a 
perceptual simulation approach. For instance, Louwerse (2008) demonstrated 
that findings of iconicity attributed to perceptual simulations, such as the 
facilitative iconicity effect when the word attic is placed above basement, could 
also be explained by statistical linguistic frequencies (the word order attic–
basement is more frequent than the order basement–attic). These findings 
demonstrate that individuals rely on perceptual and linguistic information to 
varying degrees, based on a number of factors. 
Following the Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis, if language encodes 
perceptual information, statistical linguistic frequencies should also be able to 
explain conceptual processing (Louwerse, 2008; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). 
In the past chapters, findings could be attributed to perceptual simulation, and 
also to statistical linguistic frequencies. However, all of these studies use stimuli 
found in the physical world, such as animals, numbers, objects (Louwerse, 
2008; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010), or modalities (Louwerse & Connell, 2011). 
Whether the same applies to non-literal relations, such as metaphors, is an open 
question. The experiments explore the possibility that metaphorical and literal 
thoughts are processed similarly enough, such that statistical linguistic 
frequencies are not only important during literal language comprehension but 
also when processing primary metaphors. Findings that have been 
predominantly attributed to perceptual simulations, such as the faster processing 
121
when authority words are positioned above non-authority words compared to 
the reverse, are predicted to also be attributed to statistical linguistic 
frequencies. Therefore, although embodied simulations account for a significant 
portion of metaphor comprehension, perhaps other factors also play an 
important role (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gibbs, 2006; Louwerse, 2007, 
2008, 2011). 
Second, concerning individual differences, the question can be raised to 
what extent different participants are more or less accustomed to relying upon 
statistical linguistic frequencies when processing conceptual metaphors. Studies 
have shown that the relative prominence of statistical linguistic frequencies or 
perceptual simulation is modulated by the stage of conceptual processing 
(Louwerse & Connell, 2011), the cognitive task (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010), 
and the stimulus (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). Yet it is unclear whether 
individual differences also modulate the relative importance of linguistic 
context. For instance, those participants with enhanced language skills may 
show an inclination to process information in a statistical linguistic fashion. 
This possibility can be explored through gender differences. Males tend to show 
greater general spatial ability and females show greater general and spoken 
language ability (Bourke & Adams, 2011; Kimura, 2000; Kramer, Delis, Kaplan 
& O’Donnell, 1997; Linn & Peterson, 1985). A large body of research finds 
gender differences between language and between spatial ability. For example, 
males often outperform females on spatial tasks (Benbow & Stanley, 1983; 
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Casey, Nuttall, & Pezaris, 2001). Similarly, females are likely to have superior 
language skills for a variety of tasks such as verbal fluency tasks, semantic 
categorization tasks, and verbal memory tasks (Andreano & Cahill, 2009; 
Burman, Bitan, & Booth, 2008; Bornstein, Haynes, Painter, & Genevro, 2000), 
as well as language advantages throughout development (Wei, Lu, Zhao, Chen, 
Dong, & Zhou, 2012). In addition, males are more likely to develop language 
disorders (Liederman, Kantrowitz, & Flannery, 2005; Rutter, Caspi, Fergusson, 
Horwood, Goodman, Maughan, Moffitt, Meltzer, & Carroll, 2004). Based on 
the aforementioned tendencies in gender, because females may have a greater 
affinity to encode information linguistically, this affinity is hypothesized to 
generalize to a semantic judgment task such that linguistic factors would be 
hypothesized to better predict female RTs than male RTs. 
Finally, if language statistics can explain conceptual processing of word 
pairs in their vertical configuration it would provide evidence that primary 
metaphors can be explained by language statistics and embodiment together. If 
language statistics also explains processing of word pairs in their horizontal 
configuration — a configuration that provides little support for an embodiment 
account — it will provide further evidence for the importance of language 
statistics during conceptual processing (Louwerse, 2008). 
In four experiments these three questions were answered (i.e., that of the 
role of statistical linguistic context, the effect of gender, and the impact of word 
pair orientation). In each experiment male and female participants responded to 
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word pairs with either valence (positive and negative), authority (superior and 
inferior), temperature (hot and cold), or gender (male and female) connotations 
presented in either a vertical or a horizontal configuration.  
Experiment 1: Valence 
In Experiment 1, participants were presented with word pairs that were 
opposites on a valence dimension (e.g., happy–sad ) either in a vertical 
configuration (happy above/below sad ) or horizontal configuration (happy left/
right of sad). Of interest was the extent to which statistical linguistic 
frequencies explained RTs to the iconic and reverse iconic presentation of 
primary metaphor word pairs. In addition, the interaction between participant 
gender and language statistics was explored.  
Participants 
Seventy-four native English-speaking undergraduates at the University of 
Memphis (53 females) participated for extra credit in a Psychology course. 
Thirty-four participants (24 females) were randomly assigned to the vertical 
presentation condition and forty participants (29 females) were randomly 
assigned to the horizontal presentation condition.  
Materials 
The experiment consisted of 50 pairs of words that were opposites on a 
valence dimension (e.g., happy–sad ). To avoid a response bias towards the 
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iconicity of the word pairs, 100 filler items consisted of word pairs without a 
positive-negative relation (e.g., blade–walnut), with half of the pairs having a 
high semantic association and half having a low semantic association as 
determined by latent semantic analysis (LSA), a computational linguistic 
technique that measures the similarity in meaning between word pairs, but 
ignores an order relation (Landauer et al. 2007) (high semantic association: coos 
= .44; low semantic relation: cos = .18).  
Procedure 
Participants were asked to judge the semantic relatedness of word pairs 
presented on an 800 × 600 computer screen running EPrime software 
(Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). Words were presented one 
above another in the vertical condition, and next to one another in the horizontal 
condition. Upon the presentation of a word pair, participants indicated whether 
the pair was related in meaning by pressing designated yes or no keys. All word 
pairs were randomly ordered for each participant to negate any order effects. To 
ensure participants understood the task, participants completed five practice 
trials before beginning the experimental task.  
Results 
RTs above 2.5 SD from the mean per condition, per participant, were 
removed from the analysis, affecting 4.17% of the RT data.  
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Statistical linguistic frequencies 
As in the previous chapters and previous studies (Louwerse, 2008; 
Louwerse & Connell, 2011; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010) statistical linguistic 
frequencies were operationalized as the log frequency of a–b (e.g., happy–sad ) 
or b–a (e.g., sad–happy) order of word pairs. The order frequency of all word 
pairs within 3–5 word grams was obtained using the large Web 1T 5gram corpus 
(Brants and Franz 2006). 
Statistical linguistic frequencies indeed confirmed the HAPPY IS UP 
metaphor, with positive-negative ordered word pairs having a higher frequency 
than negative-positive word pairs, t(44), 10.81, p < .001, M = 12.15, SD = 2.77 
vs. M = 10.47, SD = 2.66. 
For both vertical and horizontal conditions, a mixed effect regression 
analysis was conducted on RTs with the linguistic frequency as a fixed factor 
and participants and items as random factors . The model was fitted using the 
restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML) for the continuous variable 
(RT). F-test denominator degrees of freedom were estimated using the Kenward 
Roger’s degrees of freedom adjustment to reduce the chances of Type I error 
(Littell et al., 2002). 
For the vertical configuration of word pairs, statistical linguistic 
frequencies explained RTs, F(1, 84.55) = 58.80, p < .001, η²= .41 with higher 
frequencies yielding lower RTs. For the horizontal condition, the statistical 
linguistic frequencies again explained RTs, F(1, 86.21) = 82.44, p < .001, η²= .
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49, again with higher frequencies yielding lower RTs. These findings show that 
the HAPPY IS UP metaphor is encoded in language and that statistical linguistic 
frequencies explain the processing of this primary metaphor, both in vertical and 
horizontal configurations of the word pairs.  
Participant gender effects 
Having demonstrated that statistical linguistic context explained RTs, the 
next question to address was whether the effect was modulated by participant 
gender. To account for the differences in number of males (n = 21) versus 
Figure 1. Male and female t-values from mixed effects analyses on RT from MCMC 
generated values in vertical and horizontal conditions of valence word pairs. Larger t-values 
indicate greater reliance on the linguistic factor. (* denotes significant effects at p < .05, ** 
denotes significant RT effects at p < .001)  
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females (n = 53), Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling generated 100 
datasets with equal numbers of males and females. From this, 100 mixed effects 
analyses were conducted on RT for each gender with the linguistic variable as a 
fixed factor. Then these t-values were compared by gender. For the vertical 
condition, a t-test revealed that the t-values for each gender significantly 
differed, t(198) = −4.80, p < .001, with men having lower t-values than women 
(as linguistic frequency was more likely to predict female RTs than male RTs). 
However, for the horizontal condition, the t-values again were not significantly 
different between genders, t(198) = −0.84, p = .40 (Figure 1). 
These results show the RT effects in both horizontal and vertical 
configuration of word pairs can be explained by statistical linguistic frequencies 
that encode the primary metaphor HAPPY IS UP. The effects are modulated by 
individual differences, with male participants relying less on the linguistic 
frequencies than female participants in the vertical condition, but not in the 
horizontal condition, where the vertical nature of such metaphors is not 
emphasized perceptually. Whether these findings can be extended to other 
metaphors is investigated in the next three experiments.  
Experiment 2: Authority 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that it instead 
investigated whether statistical linguistic context determined processing of word 
pairs related to the Lakoff and Johnson (1999) CONTROL IS UP metaphor.  
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Participants 
Seventy-nine different native English-speaking undergraduate at the 
University of Memphis (55 females) participated for extra credit in a 
Psychology course. Forty-one participants (28 females) were randomly assigned 
to the vertical condition and 38 participants (27 females) were randomly 
assigned to the horizontal condition.  
Materials 
The experiment consisted of 30 pairs of words that were opposites on an 
authoritative dimension (e.g., parent–child) and 60 filler items without an 
authority relation, with half of the pairs having a high semantic association and 
half having a low semantic association as determined by LSA (high semantic 
association: cos = .45; low semantic relation: cos = .20).  
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1.  
Results 
Subjects whose RTs fell more than 2.5 SD from the mean per condition, 
per participant were removed from the analysis, affecting 8.64% of the data.  
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Statistical linguistic frequencies 
Statistical linguistic frequencies were operationalized in the same way as 
for Experiment 1. Again, evidence was found that the primary metaphor was 
encoded in language, with powerful–powerless word pairs being more frequent 
than powerless–powerful word pairs, t(21) = 6.42, p < .001, M = 11.36, SD = 
2.71 vs. M = 9.70, SD = 3.01. 
For both the vertical and horizontal configurations, mixed effect 
regressions were again conducted on RTs with linguistic frequency as the fixed 
factor and participants and items as random factors. 
Figure 2. Male and female t-values from mixed effects analyses on RT from MCMC 
generated values in vertical and horizontal conditions of authority word pairs. Larger t-
values indicate greater reliance on the linguistic factor. (* denotes significant RT effects at p 
< .05, ** denotes significant RT effects at p < .001) 
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As in Experiment 1, for the vertical condition linguistic frequencies 
explained the RTs, F(1, 45.77) = 32.71, p < .001, η² = .42, with higher 
frequencies yielding lower RTs. For the horizontal condition, the linguistic 
factor was also related to the RT, F(1, 45.07) = 16.25, p < .001, η² = .26, with 
higher frequencies yielding lower RTs. These findings again show that primary 
metaphors are encoded in language, and that both the vertical and horizontal 
configuration of conceptual metaphors can be explained by the linguistic 
system, confirming previous findings that statistical linguistic frequencies 
explain conceptual processing.  
Participant gender effects 
MCMC sampling generated 100 datasets with equal numbers of males 
and females. For the vertical configuration, a t-test revealed that the t-values for 
each gender significantly differed, t(198) = 23.54, p < .001, with women having 
higher t-values than men (as linguistic frequency was more likely to predict 
female RTs than male RTs). The same was found for horizontal condition, t(198) 
= 12.41, p < .001 (Figure 2). The findings of Experiment 2 with authority words 
extended those in Experiment 1 with valence words. The linguistic factor again 
explained RTs both in the vertical and horizontal conditions, with effect sizes 
similar to those found in Experiment 1. Furthermore, as expected, female 
participants relied more on the statistical linguistic factor than male participants 
in both vertical and horizontal orientations.  
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Experiment 3: Temperature 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim that heat is affiliated with an upward 
location, whereas cold is affiliated with a downward location by giving the 
example If you’re too hot, turn the heat down. Similarly, IJzerman and Semin 
(2009, 2010) give the example that holding warm feelings toward someone or 
giving someone the cold shoulder can be associated with positive (up) and 
negative (down) social relations, respectively. Furthermore, examples like she 
was boiling with anger suggest that an increase in body temperature is 
physiologically linked to anger and also the associated physical upwards motion 
(Pacini & Barnard, 2011). In Experiment 3 the finding for valence and authority 
was extended to temperature. That is, it was investigated whether hot and cold 
concepts can also be explained by statistical linguistic context, and whether 
these effects are modulated by participant gender.  
Participants 
Seventy-two different undergraduate native English speakers at the 
University of Memphis (53 females) participated for extra credit in a 
Psychology course. Forty-one participants (29 females) were randomly assigned 
to the vertical condition and 31 participants (24 females) were randomly 
assigned to the horizontal condition.  
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Materials 
The experiment consisted of 22 pairs of words that were opposites on an 
temperature dimension (e.g., hot–cold) with 44 filler items without a 
temperature relation, with half of the pairs having a high semantic association 
and half having a low semantic association (high semantic association: cos = .
49; low semantic relation: cos = .20).  
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiments 1 and 2.  
Results 
Subjects whose RTs fell more than 2.5 SD from the mean per condition, 
per participant were removed from the analysis, affecting 4.30% of the data.  
Statistical linguistic frequencies 
The operationalization of statistical linguistic frequencies was the same as 
for Experiments 1 and 2. Following the findings in the previous experiments 
that primary metaphors are encoded in language, hot–cold word pairs were 
significantly more frequent than cold–hot word pairs, t(17) = 6.12, p < .001, M 
= 11.55, SD = 3.40 vs. M = 10.67, SD = 3.37. 
For both conditions, the same mixed effect analysis was conducted on 
RTs. As in Experiment 1 and 2, for the vertical condition the linguistic factor 
explained the RTs, F(1, 33.16) = 31.31, p < .001, η² = .49, with higher 
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frequencies yielding lower RTs. For the horizontal condition, the linguistic 
factor also predicted RTs, F(1, 33.51) = 30.63, p < .001, η² = .48, with higher 
frequencies yielding lower RTs. These findings are similar to those obtained in 
the vertical condition, demonstrating that participants relied on statistical 
frequencies when processing word pairs related to temperature. Specifically, 
those word pairs matching the primary metaphor were processed faster than 
their counterparts, again both in vertical and horizontal configurations.  
Figure 3. Male and female t-values from mixed effects analyses on RT from MCMC 
generated values in vertical and horizontal conditions of temperature word pairs. Larger t-
values indicate greater reliance on the linguistic factor. (** denotes significant RT effects at 
p < .001) 
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Participant gender effects 
As in Experiment 1 and 2, MCMC sampling generated 100 datasets to 
account for differences in number of males and females. A t-test revealed that 
the t-values for each gender significantly differed in the vertical condition, 
t(198) = 11.14, p < .001, with women having higher t-values than men (as 
linguistic frequency was more likely to predict female RTs than male RTs). For 
the horizontal condition, similar results were obtained, t(198) = 7.23, p < .001 
(Figure 3). The findings of Experiment 3 with temperature words replicated 
those in Experiment 1 and 2. The linguistic factor explained RTs for both 
configuration conditions, with effect sizes similar to those found in Experiments 
1 and 2. Again, females relied more on the statistical linguistic factor than males 
in both conditions.  
Experiment 4: Gender 
Meier and Dionne (2009) extended the CONTROL IS UP metaphor to 
gender, whereby males are (stereotypically) considered to be powerful and 
females are (stereotypically) considered to be powerless. The prediction would 
then be that male concepts placed in upward physical location are processed 
faster than female concepts in that location. Meier and Dionne (2009) indeed 
demonstrated that pictures of female faces were thought to be more attractive 
when presented at the bottom of a screen (a location–concept match), whereas 
male faces were thought to be more attractive when presented at the top of a 
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screen. Experiment 4 investigated word pairs such as male–female and female–
male in vertical and horizontal configurations, similar to Experiments 1–3 
investigating valence, authority, and temperature.  
Participants 
Seventy-seven different undergraduate native English speakers at the 
University of Memphis (54 females) participated for extra credit in a 
Psychology course. Thirty-nine participants (27 females) were randomly 
assigned to the vertical condition and 38 participants (27 females) were 
randomly assigned to the horizontal condition.  
Materials 
The experiment consisted of 32 pairs of words that were opposites on a 
gender dimension (e.g., male–female). Sixty-four filler pairs lacked a gender 
relation, with half of the pairs having a high semantic association and half 
having a low semantic, (high semantic association: cos = .48; low semantic 
relation: cos = .22).  
Procedure 
Procedure was identical to that of Experiments 1–3.  
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Results 
RTs that fell more than 2.5 SD from the mean per condition, per 
participant were re moved from the analysis, affecting 2.45% of the data.  
Statistical linguistic frequencies 
Linguistic frequencies were operationalized in the same way as 
Experiments 1–3. Male–female pairs had higher frequencies than female–male 
pairs, t(31) = 7.42, p < .001, M = 10.72, SD = 4.13 vs. M = 9.46, SD = 3.86. 
Figure 4. Male and female t-values from mixed effects analyses on RT from MCMC 
generated values in vertical and horizontal conditions of gender word pairs. Larger t-values 
indicate greater reliance on the linguistic factor. (** denotes significant RT effects at p < .
001) 
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For both conditions, the same mixed effect analysis was conducted on 
RTs as before. For the vertical condition statistical linguistic frequencies 
explained RTs, F(1, 60.64) = 35.43, p < .001, η² = .37, with higher frequencies 
yielding lower RTs. Linguistic frequencies also predicted RTs in the horizontal 
configuration, F(1, 59.37) = 46.55, p < .001, η² = .44, with higher frequencies 
yielding lower RTs. These findings are similar to those obtained in the other 
experiments and support the conclusion that processing of gender concepts in 
vertical and horizontal configurations can be explained by statistical linguistic 
frequencies.  
Participant gender effects 
As before, it was tested whether linguistic factors better predicted RTs for 
females. For the vertical condition, a t-test revealed that the t-values for each 
gender significantly differed in the vertical condition, t(198) = 26.21, p < .001, 
with women having higher t-values than men. For the horizontal condition, 
similar results were obtained, t(198) = 30.51, p < .001 (Figure 4). The findings 
of Experiment 4 with gender words replicate those in the previous Experiments. 
The linguistic factor explained RTs for both configuration conditions, with 
effect sizes similar to those found in Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore, females 
relied more on the statistical linguistic factor than males in both conditions.  
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Conclusion 
In the previous chapter, four experiments made it clear that primary 
metaphor processing can best be explained by both an embodied cognition 
account and a linguistic account. Importantly, whether the stimuli were 
presented in vertical or horizontal configurations modulates how much 
participants rely on linguistic representations, presumably because language has 
encoded embodied relations. Also important, the effect of the statistical 
linguistic frequencies was modified by participant gender, with female 
participants being more sensitive to statistical linguistic context than male 
participants, thereby demonstrating that individual differences as well as stimuli 
orientation can impact whether participants rely more on embodied or linguistic 
representations.  
These four experiments investigated whether valence (e.g., good–bad), 
authority (e.g., doctor — patient), temperature (e.g., hot–cold), and gender (e.g., 
male–female) word pairs with matched iconicity were processed faster than 
mismatching word pairs. This investigated to what extent statistical linguistic 
frequencies and perceptual factors explained RTs of word pairs related to 
valence (Experiment 1), authority (Experiment 2), temperature (Experiment 3), 
or gender (Experiment 4). The findings were not only considered in terms of 
significance, but also in terms of effect size. For example, Meier and Robinson 
(2004) obtained significant results, with positive words being processed faster 
on the top of the screen, and with negative words being processed faster on the 
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bottom of the screen. Although this effect clearly supports an account of 
embodied cognition, the authors do not address the effect sizes associated with 
their results (R2
 
= .16 for Experiment 1, and R2= .23 for Experiment 2). The 
effect sizes for the statistical linguistic frequencies reported in this chapter were 
consistently at least two times larger than effect sizes obtained from previous 
embodied cognition research such as Meier and Robinson (2004). Finally, 
different from most embodied cognition studies RTs were analyzed using a 
mixed effects model with both participant and items as random factors. Variance 
attributed to different participants and, importantly, variance attributed to 
different items was removed from the analysis to avoid the language-as-fixed 
fallacy effect, thereby yielding more reliable results (Clark, 1973; Brysbaert, 
2007). This issue is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Do the results reported here suggest that statistical linguistic frequencies 
should be seen as an explanation for conceptual processing in lieu of perceptual 
simulation? Certainly not, there is no denying that embodiment offers some 
explanatory power during metaphor comprehension, however it is not the only 
important factor at play. There are several reasons embodiment should not be 
overlooked.  
In fact, some metaphors like these (e.g., HAPPY IS UP) seem to be near 
universal, and this makes sense if metaphor comprehension is based on bodily 
perception and action. At the same time, many conceptual metaphors at the 
specific level vary cross culturally and even regionally, suggesting that 
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embodiment cannot entirely account for metaphor comprehension on its own 
(Kövecses, 2005). In point of fact, cultures even vary with how they represent 
spatial information with relationship to their bodies, raising the question of how 
language comprehension can rely only on the body, when different cultures 
think of their bodies as being related to space in different ways. Kövecses 
(2005) argues that the body does not exist in isolation, instead it is molded by 
our environment, our history, and our interests thus introducing variance in how 
language is understood through the body. In addition to these factors, language 
itself influences metaphor comprehension, with statistical linguistic frequencies 
explaining RTs in the current experiments. But these findings beg the question 
of why it is the case that happy–sad (hot–cold, teacher–student, male–female) is 
more frequent than the reverse word pair orders? The answer is that language 
encodes perceptual relations. That is, when speakers formulate utterances, pre 
linguistic conceptual knowledge is translated into linguistic conceptualizations, 
so that as a function of language use, perceptual relations become encoded in 
language (Louwerse, 2008). As shown in the current chapter, antonyms of 
valence, temperature, authority, and gender demonstrate that an embodied 
cognition account is not detached from a linguistic account. On the contrary, a 
statistical linguistic account complements an embodied cognition account 
(Louwerse, 2011). The linguistic system has evolved to encode perceptual 
relations and these linguistic cues are employed by language users during their 
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cognitive processes, as demonstrated in both vertical and horizontal 
configurations of word pairs. 
In addition to investigating the role of statistical linguistic frequencies on 
conceptual processing, this chapter investigated to what extent male and female 
participants were affected by these two factors differently. Prior studies have 
investigated whether stimulus (word or picture), cognitive task (semantic 
judgment or iconicity task), or stage of processing (faster or slower RTs) 
affected the role of statistical linguistic frequencies and perceptual simulation 
differently. The current chapter investigated whether participant gender could be 
added to the series of modulators of statistical linguistic frequencies and 
conceptual processes. The findings in this chapter demonstrate that gender 
should indeed be considered a modulator. These experiments demonstrated that 
female participants typically relied more on statistical linguistic patterns. 
However, it should be noted that although it can be speculated that these 
findings might be due to differences in linguistic and spatial ability between 
genders such constructs were not directly measured. Such a step would be 
useful in future research to ensure such effects are indeed driven by linguistic 
and spatial ability and are not simply due to other factors linked to gender. 
Finally, the orientation of word pairs in an experimental setting further 
suggests that embodied and linguistic representations are both relevant to 
varying extents. While language statistics can explain conceptual processing of 
word pairs in their horizontal configuration therefore providing further evidence 
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for the importance of language statistics during conceptual processing 
(Louwerse, 2008), it is hard to understand how an embodied relationship could 
exist between word pairs presented horizontally. Similarly when presented in a 
vertical condition where the vertical nature of such metaphors is emphasized 
perceptually, statistical linguistic frequencies account for less variance in RTs. 
This is a logical result, assuming that prior work is correct in the conclusion that 
embodied representation account for facilitated responses for pairs presented in 
their expected iconic ordering.  
The findings of these experiments show that even though perceptual 
simulations contribute to RT differences, it is important to consider the extent to 
which other factors, such as language statistics, explain processing. The mind is 
embodied but is also linguistic, while participant gender, and stimuli orientation 




Effect size matters: The role 
of language statistics and 




 The cognitive science literature increasingly demonstrates that perceptual 
representations are activated during conceptual processing. Such findings suggest that 
the debate on whether conceptual processing is predominantly symbolic or perceptual 
has been resolved. However, studies too frequently provide evidence for perceptual 
simulations without addressing whether other factors explain dependent variables as 
well, and if so, to what extent. The current paper examines effect sizes computed from 
126 experiments in 51 published embodied cognition studies to clarify the conditions 
under which perceptual simulations are most important. Results showed that effects of 
language statistics tend to be as large or larger than those of perceptual stimulation. 
Moreover, factors that can be associated with immediate processing (button press, 
word processing) tend to reduce the effect size of perceptual simulation. These 
findings are considered in respect to the Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis, which 
argues that language encodes perceptual information, with language statistics 
explaining quick, good-enough representations and perceptual simulation explaining 
more effortful, detailed representations.  
This chapter is based on: 
Louwerse, M. M., Hutchinson, S., Tillman, R., & Recchia, G. (2014). Effect size matters: the 
 role of language statistics and perceptual simulation in conceptual processing.  
 Language,Cognition, and Neuroscience. 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Introduction 
In the previous chapters I concluded that linguistic and perceptual 
representations are independent but highly related processes that are both relied 
upon in different ways, at different times, to different extents during language 
processing. Although these findings support integrated theories of cognition the 
debate on whether conceptual processing is predominantly symbolic or 
perceptual is still an active area of research. In the following chapter I will 
provide an overview of studies that provide evidence for perceptual simulations 
without addressing other factors. This chapter examines effect sizes computed 
from 126 embodied cognition experiments to establish the conditions under 
which perceptual simulations versus linguistic representations are most 
important.  
The conclusion in most embodied cognition studies that perceptual 
simulation is activated in conceptual processing assumes a one-size-fits-all 
approach. It seems plausible, considering the evidence reported in the previous 
chapters, that the effect of perceptual simulation is modulated by the 
experimental variables being used. The question of whether conceptual 
processing activates perceptual simulations can then be replaced by the question 
of under what conditions perceptual simulations are most active. That question 
seems to be more productive, as it considers the extent various factors, 
including perceptual simulation and language statistics factors, play a role, 
rather than simply asking if these factors play a role. In the previous chapters 
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and in previous work, I have attempted to answer that question, by considering 
factors like the time course of processing, the spatial presentation of stimuli, 
individual differences, and the orientation of stimuli. 
Nature of the stimulus  
Barsalou (1999) argued convincingly that it is unlikely that processing a 
picture will simply generate an amodal symbolic representation. Instead, 
perceptual processes lead to perceptual representations. Others would agree 
with this view. For instance, Kintsch (1998, p. 47) stated that perceptual 
symbols, imagery and actions are among the building blocks of cognition, and 
Landauer and Dumais (1997, p. 235) argued that perceptual world knowledge 
underlies an associative learning theory. The important question, however, is 
whether linguistic symbols must always be transduced into perceptual symbols. 
Barsalou (1999, p. 652) acknowledged the importance of structured 
representations, propositions, frequency effects, and pattern completion in 
conceptual processing. Similarly, Paivio’s (1971, 1986) Dual Coding Theory 
postulated that both visual and verbal information are processed differently and 
along distinct channels. Others strongly argued that linguistic symbols must be 
transduced into perceptual simulations (Pecher & Zwaan, 2005), leaving little 
room for an amodal symbol system (Glenberg & Robertson, 1999).  
In the previous chapters, I demonstrated that we interpret both linguistic 
and non-linguistic stimuli with both linguistic and non-linguistic processes, but 
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the extent to which a particular type of process will dominate processing can be 
expected to depend on the nature of the stimuli (e.g., Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 
2010). That is, pictures also activate linguistic representations and words also 
activate perceptual representations. Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) investigated 
this question by comparing the effect of both language statistics and perceptual 
ratings on the response times in a semantic judgement task of words and 
pictures. Concept pairs such as monitor and keyboard were presented in a 
vertical configuration. In one set of experiments, the concept stimuli were 
words; in the other the concept stimuli were pictures. Participants were asked to 
evaluate the relationship between the two concepts. The results showed that 
language statistics and perceptual simulations both explained the response times 
to both pictorial and linguistic stimuli, but language statistics explained word 
processing better than perceptual ratings did, but for pictures the effect of 
perceptual ratings dominated the effect of language statistics.  
Many embodied cognition studies have shown that an independent 
variable associated with perceptual simulation explains response times. What is 
often unknown is what the effect size is of this association and whether another 
factor (e.g., language statistics) explains the response times equally well or – in 
the case of linguistic stimuli – better.  
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Individual differences  
Do people activate perceptual simulations similarly? A few studies have 
provided insight for this question. Dijkstra et al. (2004) found that the effect of a 
picture mismatching a sentence was stronger for older than for younger adults. 
The authors explained this effect by older adults being involved in deeper 
processing, whereas younger adults focus more on the surface structure of the 
sentence, resulting in a weaker perceptual simulation effect. Holt and Beilock’s 
(2006) finding that comprehenders with experience on a topic yield perceptual 
representations that are more differentiated than comprehenders without 
experience suggests a similar direction. Deeper understanding of the stimuli 
yields (deeper) perceptual simulations.  
In Chapter 4, I showed that gender differences also impact how much 
participants rely on perceptual or linguistic representations in conceptual 
processing as men typically perform better on spatial and perceptual tasks 
(Benbow & Stanley, 1983; Casey, Nuttall, & Pezaris, 2001), whereas females 
typically outperform men on language tasks (Andreano & Cahill, 2009; 
Bornstein, Haynes, Painter, & Genevro, 2000; Burman, Bitan, & Booth, 2008). 
When making semantic judgements on word pairs, female participants relied 
more on statistical linguistic frequency patterns whereas males relied less so on 
linguistic representations. Such findings indicate that factors related to gender 
can also impact the extent to which individuals rely on statistical linguistic 
frequencies during language processing.  
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The effect of perceptual simulations and linguistic representations on 
conceptual processing seems to be modulated by individual differences, such as 
age or expertise. The effect size might even be affected by participant gender, 
making it a relevant factor to take into account in drawing conclusions on the 
nature of conceptual processing.  
Cognitive task  
The Dijkstra et al. (2004) and Holt and Beilock (2006) studies show that 
experience yields larger effect sizes in the relation between perceptual 
simulation and response times. It can thereby be argued that experience seems 
to yield deeper processing, and deeper processing yields perceptual simulations. 
Can deeper processing also be manipulated by the cognitive task participants 
need to perform? There is some evidence from the embodied cognition literature 
that this is the case. Borreggine and Kaschak (2006) asked participants to hold a 
keyboard on their lap in a 90° angle, so that the Q key was located near the 
participant and the P key away from the participant. They then listened to a 
sentence like Joe kicked you the soccer ball or You kicked Joe the soccer ball. 
Participants were asked whether the sentence was sensible. Near-body 
responses yielded faster responses for Joe kicked you the soccer ball with an 
opposite effect for You kicked Joe the soccer ball and reverse for the away-
from-body responses. When the participant was able to prepare and execute the 
motor response, the effect was strongest. Knowing what motor action was 
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required elicited an action–sentence compatibility effect, perhaps because of the 
deep conceptual processing of the stimuli.  
Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) tested the effect of the cognitive task on 
the extent to which language statistics or perceptual ratings predicted RT values. 
Participants were asked to either make semantic judgements or iconic 
judgements regarding words that shared iconic and semantic relationships. That 
is, for semantic judgements participants were asked to determine whether the 
concept pairs had a similar meaning, whereas for the iconicity judgements 
participants were asked whether the concepts had the same relation in the 
perceptual world, as the relation presented on the screen (e.g., monitor above 
keyboard). Cognitive processing in the iconicity judgement task was deeper 
than in the semantic judgement task, because a prerequisite for the iconicity 
judgement was a semantic judgement. Effect sizes for perceptual simulation 
were larger for the deeper cognitive task (iconicity judgement) than the shallow 
cognitive task (semantic judgement) with the opposite result for effect sizes for 
language statistics.  
These findings suggest that when participants form detailed, full-fledged 
representations of the concepts being presented to them, because they have the 
experience to do so, because they plan their response or because the cognitive 
tasks requires them to do so, the effect size of perceptual simulation seems to be 
larger.  
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Time course of cognitive processing  
If language statistics dominate in shallow cognitive tasks and perceptual 
simulation dominates in deeper cognitive tasks, and if deeper cognitive tasks 
imply shallow cognitive tasks, the prediction is that in conceptual processing 
language statistics precede perceptual simulation. This is what the Language 
and Situated Simulation (LASS) theory predicts (Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, 
Hu, & Barsalou, 2008). In conceptual processing, both the linguistic system and 
the simulation system become active initially, but activation in the linguistic 
system peaks first. In an fMRI experiment, Simmons et al. (2008) found that 
activations early in processing overlapped with activations for word 
associations (Broca’s area in the left inferior frontal gyrus), whereas activations 
late in processing overlapped with activations for situation generation (right 
posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus). “When linguistic forms and associated 
statistical information are sufficient for adequate performance, no retrieval of 
conceptual information is necessary. This does not mean that these strategies are 
insignificant, given their obvious heuristic value” (p. 107). The Symbol 
Interdependency Hypothesis (Louwerse, 2007; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008) 
makes the same prediction. Because the linguistic system encodes perceptual 
information, language statistics allows for good-enough representations, 
whereas perceptual simulation allows for deeper conceptual representations. 
Louwerse and Connell (2011) tested this on modality words, in both a 
computational linguistic and an experimental setting. The computational 
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linguistic analysis showed categorizing modality words based on linguistic 
frequency resulted in three categories: visual/haptic, auditory and olfactory/
gustatory. Whereas a perceptual account clearly distinguishes between five 
modalities, the language statistics account only allowed for a less fine-grained 
classification. They predicted that if language statistics dominate early in 
conceptual processing, the effect size of language statistics should be highest for 
fast response times and lowest for slow response times, whereas the opposite 
should hold true for perceptual simulations. In a response time experiment, they 
found that the coarse- grained language statistics variable best explained fast 
response time and fine-grained perceptual simulation variable best explained 
slow response times, with both variables explaining medium response times.  
Louwerse and Hutchinson (2012) extended this conclusion in an 
electroencephalography (EEG) experiment. In a task where subjects made 
semantic or iconic judgements about word pairs, neural activity over the time 
course of each trial was recorded. The objective was to compare activity, over 
the trial’s duration, between regions of the brain either commonly associated 
with linguistic processing or with perceptual processing. They found linguistic 
cortical regions were relatively more active than perceptual cortical regions 
early in a trial. However, the reverse was true later in the trial, supporting the 
notion that language statistics dominate in early processing and perceptual 
representations become more important as a trial progresses.  
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Linguistic forms and associated statistical information allow for heuristic 
processing (Simmons et al., 2008), fast, good-enough representations (Louwerse 
& Connell, 2011; Louwerse & Hutchinson, 2012), whereas perceptual 
simulation allows for a deeper conceptual understanding. Another way to think 
about the relationship between shallow and deep processing is by analogy to the 
distinction between “System 1” and “System 2” (Stanovich & West, 2000) 
popularized by Kahneman (2003).  
Kahneman does not support a modular view of mind and emphasizes the 
two systems are not actual systems but are merely used for illustrative purposes. 
System 1 refers to a set of cognitive processes that occur quickly, automatically, 
in parallel, and below the level of conscious awareness, while System 2 refers to 
more effortful, controlled, sometimes rule-governed processes that generally 
involve the deployment of limited, cognitively expensive resources such as 
attention and willpower. While some embodied processes certainly belong to 
System 1 as well – particularly processes involving associations between words 
and emotions, or words and basic percepts – it is unlikely that language users 
construct a complete mental simulation for every sentence they comprehend 
(Louwerse, 2011). Perceptual simulations that go beyond simple association, 
therefore, are more in the domain of System 2: too resource-intensive to be 
undertaken in circumstances under which associations among words will suffice 
for the completion of the task at hand (Louwerse & Connell, 2011).  
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In conclusion, factors such as stimulus and cognitive task modulate the 
effect of perceptual simulation on conceptual processing. What is unknown, 
however, is to what extent modulators such as stimulus and cognitive task affect 
the results of published embodied cognition studies.  
Effect size matters  
Perceptual Simulation 
Knowing the estimated magnitude of results reported in published 
embodied cognition studies would allow for (1) measuring whether the average 
effect size of perceptual simulation variables is small or large and (2) 
determining factors which influence the effect size. The problem with an 
investigation like this is that the modulators identified earlier are often not 
specified in embodied cognition studies. The following overview of embodied 
cognition studies below should therefore be seen as an exploration.  
Searches for the studies to be included in the analysis were conducted 
between 2010 and 2012. Search terms for PsycInfo and Google Scholar were 
embodiment, embodied cognition and perceptual simulation. Fifty-one studies 
were extracted on the basis of the following criteria: (1) studies had to address 
some component of embodiment (e.g., action compatibility, spatial orientation), 
(2) be published between 1999 and 2012 in a peer-reviewed journal with an 
impact factor >1 (M = 3.6, SD = 1.46), (3) include experiments; theoretical 
papers were not included; (4) include language stimuli; gesture studies or 
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studies using only pictorial or video stimuli but not language were excluded; (5) 
include statistically analyzable and comparable results, such as ANOVAs or 
mixed effects models, and their details, such as F values, df’s, M, and SD.  
From the 126 experiments in these 51 studies, information was extracted 
regarding the type of response (e.g., response time or rating), the method of 
response (e.g., button press or otherwise), stimulus type (e.g., pictures, words), 
and when relevant to the experimental design, information regarding the domain 
of stimuli (e.g., configuration of the stimuli) was also collected.  
For each experiment, df, t, N and F values were collected from critical 
analyses demonstrating embodied effects. Because only 33 out of the 126 
experiments (27%) reported effect sizes, the variance explained (partial η2 or R2 
values) for each experiment was computed using the method in Fritz, Morris, 
and Richler (2012) and Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010). That is, the strength of a 
model association is represented as a weighted ratio of the F statistic. R2 and F 
used in ordinary regression analysis are closely related, since F = (R2/k) / ((1 - 
R2) / (N- k - 1)) where k is the number of model parameters and N is the number 
of cases, such that F has (k, N – k – 1) df. See also Pedhazur (1997, p. 105). 
Thus, partial eta squared (ηp2) can be calculated as (dfeffect × Feffect) / ((dfeffect × 
Feffect) + dferror). This formula represents the sum of squares of the effect of 
interest, divided by the sum of squares of the error plus the sum of squares of 
the effect. This means that for any experiment that reports df and F values, an 
effect size of partial eta squared can be calculated.  
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The average effect size of the 126 experiments was η2 = .185 (SD = .177). 
According to Cohen (1988, p. 287), this can be viewed as a large (η2 > .14) 
effect size, explaining approximately 19% of the variance of the dependent 
variable.  
Next I aimed to determine which factors best explained the effect sizes. 
Four variables occurred frequently in the selected studies: the use of response 
time as the dependent variable, the use of vertical configuration of the stimuli, 
button press as the method of response and the use of single words rather than 
sentences as stimuli (Appendix 1). I dummy-coded (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) 
stimulus type (i.e., single words), type of response (i.e., RT), method of 
response (i.e., button press) and domain of stimuli (i.e., vertical configuration), 
and ran a mixed effects regression model using the four dummy-coded variables 
as independent variables and the effect sizes as dependent variables. Whether or 
not a response time method was used did not affect the η2 effect size, F(4,121) = 
1.82, p = .18, η2 = .057, (M = .194, SD = .134 vs. M = .182, SD = .185) and 
neither did the vertical configuration of the stimuli, F(4, 121) = .536, p = .47, η2 
= .017,(M = .184, SD = .178 vs. M = .184, SD = .176). Whether or not single 
words (as opposed to sentences, paragraphs or pictures) were used as stimuli did 
influence η2, with the use of single words reducing effect size, F(4, 121) = 3.52, 
p = .04, η2 = .104, (M = .162, SD = .144 vs. M = .227, SD = .221). Similarly, 
whether or not participants were asked to respond to stimuli with button presses 
influenced η2 with the use of button presses marginally reduced the effect size, 
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F(4, 121) = 4.29, p = .06, η2 = .124, (M = .140, SD = .111 vs. M = .197, SD = .
190).  
Computing the effect size η2 is useful, because the cognitive science 
community is most familiar with this measure of effect size. However, the use 
of η2 comes at a price. Fritz et al. (2012) caution that η2 as an effect size value 
becomes less meaningful when comparing different studies with different error 
terms. In this chapter, I therefore also calculated the less common but in case of 
different error terms more accurate Hedge’s g effect size. However, some 
experimental designs are not optimal for computing Hedge’s g (e.g., three or 
more groups, unspecified number of subjects), so both measures of effect size 
were included.  
Hedge’s g is a measure of effect that does not rely on df but instead is 
calculated as (t × √((1/n1)+(1/n2)) × (1 - (3/(4 × (n1+n2) - 9))) for between 
subject designs and as ((2 × t)/√n) × (1 - (3/(4 × n - 9))) for within subject 
designs. The average effect size of Hedge’s g was = .965 (SD = .711), 
considered a large effect (Lakens, 2013). The correlation between Hedge’s g 
measure of effect and η2 was strong at r (126) = .857.  
However, performing the same analysis now using Hedge’s g, only the 
use of single words explained the dependent variable of effect size, F(4, 121) = 
10.452, p = .002, η2 = .257, (M = .826, SD = .438 vs. M = 1.224, SD = 1.002). 
Type of response (e.g., RT) F(4, 121) = .384, p = .536, η2 = .013, (M = .898, SD 
= .387 vs. M = .976, SD = .762), stimuli configuration F(4, 121) = 2.31, p = .
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131, η2 = .071, (M = .982, SD = .731 vs. M = .892, SD = .626) and method of 
response (e.g., button press) F(4,121) = 2.35, p = .128, η2 = .072, (M = .795, SD 
= .310 vs. M = 1.011, SD = .781) did not explain the effect sizes, even though 
the patterns were the same as with η2.  
These results suggest that if the stimulus is simple, for instance a word, 
the effect sizes supporting an embodied cognition account are smaller than those 
responses that move beyond button presses or word level stimuli. When 
responses are quick, for instance by means of button presses, there are 
indications that effect sizes may be smaller, but this was not confirmed by a 
Hedge’s g analysis.  
There are a number of explanations for the finding that the use of single 
words reduces the effect size in embodied cognition findings. One explanation 
is that responses to simple stimuli such as words are noisier than responses that 
are more complex, such as sentences. That is, without being constrained by 
context single words exhibit greater variance than responses to sentences, which 
can likely be explained by single words being semantically noisier than context-
specific sentences (see for an identical argument that responses to individual 
sentences are noisier than combinations of sentences Yang, Mo, and Louwerse, 
2012).  
Another explanation is that larger text units such as sentences or 
paragraphs require deeper processing and higher engagement and hence yields 
larger effect sizes. The smaller effect sizes for single word stimuli would then 
160
be explained by the cognitive task. Indeed, Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) have 
demonstrated that a deeper cognitive task, one that implies another task (e.g., an 
iconicity task that implies a semantic judgement task) yields a larger effect size 
for a perceptual simulation factor than for language statistics factor, whereas a 
relatively shallow cognitive task yields a larger effect for a language statistics 
factor than a perceptual simulation factor.  
A third explanation focuses on the time course of processing: single 
words yield quicker processing and quicker processes are better explained by 
language statistics than by perceptual simulation. This explanation is supported 
by Louwerse and Connell (2011) who showed that slower response times are 
best explained not only by perceptual simulation, but also by Louwerse and 
Hutchinson (2012) who showed that perceptual cortical regions compared to 
linguistic cortical regions were more active late in a trial.  
These three explanations are not mutually exclusive. What these findings 
and their explanations demonstrate is that the effect size matters depending on 
constraints placed on the cognitive processes.  
Language statistics  
The effect sizes found for embodied cognition studies are large, 
warranting the conclusion that cognition is embodied, but this conclusion 
should be drawn with caution. Different constraints modulate these effect sizes, 
and throughout this dissertation, I have made the argument that other factors 
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such as language statistics explain cognitive processes. The question needs to be 
answered whether the effect sizes for language statistics are as large as those for 
perceptual simulation.  
Sixteen studies were extracted on the basis of the following criteria: (1) 
studies had to be peer-reviewed in a journal or conference proceedings article; 
(2) include response time experiments; theoretical papers were not included; (3) 
include language stimuli, where word frequencies were used as an independent 
variable; (4) include statistically analyzable and comparable results such as 
ANOVAs or mixed effects models, and their details, such as F values, df’s, M 
and SD. The selected studies are presented in (Appendix 2). These studies 
included a total of 58 experiments. The average η2 of the language statistics 
variables in these studies was large (M = .169, SD = .188). Partial eta squared 
(ηp2) for language statistics analyses did not statistically differ from the effect 
sizes found in the embodied cognition analyses reported earlier, F(1, 182) = .
672, p = .280, η2 = .004, M = .185, SD = .177 vs. M = .169, SD = .188.  
As in the perceptual studies, the use of single words again explained the 
dependent variable of effect size, F(4, 52) = 4.34, p = .042, η2 = .257, (M = .022, 
SD = .030 vs. M = .186, SD = .195). Type of response (e.g., RT) F(4, 52) = .005, 
p = .942, η2 = .013, (M = .245, SD = .186 vs. M = .158, SD = .191), stimuli 
configuration F(4, 52) = .584, p = .448, η2 = .071, (M = .189, SD = .202 vs. M 
= .136, SD = .175) and method of response (e.g., button press) F(4, 52) = 1.952, 
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p = .168, η2 = .072, (M = .446, SD = .031 vs. M = .156, SD = .186) did not 
explain the effect sizes.  
However, as pointed out earlier, η2 is not ideal for computing effect sizes 
from studies with different error terms (Roberts & Monaco, 2006). Particularly, 
because the majority of the language statistics studies used mixed effects 
models with – consequently – larger degrees of freedom than ANOVAs, η2 as 
the measure of effect size underestimates the effect sizes of these studies. 
Hedge’s g was again calculated to allow for comparability of the results 
between studies.  
As with the η2 as the effect size, the average Hedge’s g was high (M = 
1.31, SD = .805), and so was the correlation between the η2 and Hedge’s g, r 
(58) = .79. The same analysis for Hedge’s g resulted in significant differences 
for linguistic and perceptual effect sizes, F(1, 175) = 8.07, p = .005, η2 = .044, 
with embodied factors having weaker effects than linguistic factors, M = .965, 
SD = .711 vs. M = 1.31, SD = .805. This finding is in line with Hutchinson and 
Louwerse (2013a) and Louwerse (2008) who found that when perceptual 
simulation and language statistics are compared ceteris paribus, language 
statistics turns out to be the strongest predictor of cognitive processing.  
General discussion  
Language processing activates the simulation of perceptual experiences. 
This conclusion has been drawn in many studies that have argued that cognition 
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is embodied. With the wealth of evidence in favor of perceptual simulations, 
there can be little doubt that embodiment plays a role in numerous cognitive 
processes. Questions that have been much less closely investigated include 
whether cognitive processes always rely on perceptual processes, whether these 
processes also rely on other factors and to what extent and whether any effects 
are modulated by individual differences, the nature of the cognitive task, the 
nature of the stimulus and the time course of processing. This chapter explores 
these questions.  
In line with the Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis, which argues that 
language has encoded perceptual simulations, language users can rely on 
language statistics, on perceptual simulation or on both factors in conceptual 
processing. Indeed, for various studies that have reported an effect of perceptual 
simulation, a complementary factor, language statistics, explained results 
equally well or better (Louwerse, 2011a). Because linguistic statistical 
frequencies are built on perceptual information, with very limited symbol 
grounding, language users can bootstrap meaning from these statistics, at least 
when forming quick, good-enough representations.  
In the current chapter, I evaluated patterns in the effect sizes of reported 
studies. For a total of 51 studies including 126 experiments, effect sizes were 
computed for a perceptual simulation variable. There have been concerns that 
effect sizes for some embodied cognition studies are small (e.g., Wilson & 
Golonka, 2013) but the overview shows that effect sizes reported for embodied 
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cognition studies overall tend to be large. However, the conclusion that large 
effect sizes demonstrate that perceptual simulation therefore explains cognitive 
processing needs to be put in perspective. A factor that many of our studies have 
shown to be complementary to perceptual simulation, language statistics, has 
also been shown to have large effect sizes.  
The effect sizes also allow for some exploratory analyses on their nature. 
In a regression analysis, when single words are used as stimuli, the effect sizes 
for perceptual simulation are reduced. This is in line with studies that have 
argued that perceptual simulation is relatively slower than statistical linguistic 
results (Hutchinson & Louwerse, 2012; Louwerse & Connell, 2011) and 
dominates in deeper cognitive tasks (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). Moreover, 
when the effect sizes of perceptual simulation and language statistics from 
published studies are compared, the effect sizes for language statistics are 
significantly higher than for perceptual simulation.  
It is important to emphasize that perceptual simulation does still play a 
role early in processing, and perceptual experiences are still activated in shallow 
cognitive tasks. Here, the effect of perceptual simulations in comparison to 
language statistics is less in shallow cognitive tasks that yield faster processing, 
compared to deeper cognitive tasks that yield slower processing (in which cases 
language statistics play a less prominent role).  
The cognitive sciences can be characterized by debates in which the 
proverbial pendulum swings from one extreme view to the other. In the late 
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1990s, the pendulum started to move towards embodied accounts of cognition. 
But it is necessary to caution against extreme views. Barsalou (1999) took a 
more moderate stance. He argues three basic approaches to knowledge can be 
distinguished: classic representational approaches based on amodal symbols, 
statistical and dynamical approaches and embodied approaches. But as is 
evident from this chapter, theories should try “to integrate the positive 
contributions of all three approaches” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 652). 
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Appendix 1. Effect sizes for 126 embodied cognition experiments
Publication Experiment η2 Hedge’s g
Beilock and Goldin-Meadow (2010) 1a 0.174 0.856
Beilock and Holt (2007) 1 0.094 0.648
2 0.109 0.671





Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004) 1ab 0.281 1.164
2abc 0.638 2.289
3ab 0.813 2.496
Borreggine and Kaschak (2006) 1ab 0.152 0.797
4ab 0.034 0.351
Buccino et al. (2005) 1 0.455 1.487
2ab 0.348 1.327
Connell, and Lynott (2009) 1abc 0.056 0.461
Connell, Lynott, and Dreyer (2012) 1ac 0.005 0.918
2ac 0.006 1.005
Dijkstra et al. (2004) 1ab 0.481 1.691
Estes et al. (2008) 1abcd 0.703 2.846
2abcd 0.078 0.562
3abcd 0.465 1.689




Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen, and Johnson-Glenberg (1999) 1 0.409 1.646
2ab 0.056 0.46
3ab 0.378 1.487
Havas et al. (2007) 1ab 0.044 0.425
2ab 0.169 0.555
3aabc 0.019 0.271
Holt and Beilock (2006) 1ab 0.065 0.52
2ab 0.059 0.506








Kaschak et al. (2005) 1ab 0.097 0.611
2ab 0.109 0.644
Kaschak, Zwaan, Aveyard, and Yaxley (2006) 1ab 0.135 0.729
2ab 0.098 0.638
3ab 0.048 0.389
Kaup, Lüdtke, and Maienborn (2010) 1ab 0.565 1.999
2ab 0.238 0.965
Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, and Lüdtke (2007) 1ab 0.193 0.91

































Publication Experiment η2 Hedge’s g
2ab 0.101 0.58
Koch, Holland, Hengstler, and van Knippenberg (2009) 1ac 0.171 0.879








Markman and Brendl (2005) 1ab 0.17 0.845
2ab 0.286 0.845
Matlock (2004) 1ab 0.409 1.632




Meier et al. (2007) 1abcd 0.156 0.828
2ab 0.23 1.042













Meteyard, Bahrami, and Vigliocco (2007) 1abc 0.292 1.2
Meteyard et al. (2008) 1ab 0.03 0.622
2-4ab 0.079 0.924
Myung et al. (2006) 1ab 0.129 0.741
Nuthmann and Van Der Meer (2005) 1c 0.317 1.305
Pecher et al. (2010) 1abcd 0.021 0.286
Pecher, van Dantzig, Zwaan, and Zeelenberg (2009) 1b 0.074 0.553
Rapp and Horton (2003) 1ab 0.241 1.078
2ab 0.198 0.947
Richardson and Matlock (2007) 1a 0.174 0.897
Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, and McRae (2003) 1abd 0.07 0.538
2abd 0.063 0.513
Richter and Zwaan (2009) 1abc 0.525 2.01
2abc 0.214 1.011
Santana and de Vega (2011) 1ab 0.284 1.171
2ab 0.446 1.73
3ab 0.136 0.762




































Appendix 2. Effect sizes for 58 language statistics experiments
(Continued)
Publication Experiment η2 Hedge’s g
Sell and Kaschak (2010) 1ab 0.074 0.396
2ab 0.031 0.35
Šetic and Domijan (2007) 1abcd 0.27 1.156
2abcd 0.307 1.294
Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) 1ab 0.15 0.782
Taylor, Lev-Ari, and Zwaan (2008) 1a 0.051 0.457
van Dantzig et al. (2008) 1a 0.068 .514
van Dantzig, Zeelenberg, and Pecher (2009) 1ac 0.069 .517
2ac 0.071 .526
3ac 0.145 .766
Vermeulen, Mermillod, Godefroid, and Corneille (2009) 1abc 0.868 4.791
Yaxley and Zwaan (2006) 1ab 0.135 0.763
1abcd 0.145 0.783
3abc 0.089 0.575
Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, and Aveyard (2004) 1ab 0.081 0.572
Zwaan et al. (2002) 1ab 0.25 1.079
2a 0.076 0.531





aResponse time; bButton press; cWord; dVertical configuration.
Publication Experiment η2 Hedge’s g
Connell and Lynott (2013) 1 0.014 1.096
2 0.013 1.033
Estes (2003) 1 0.153 0.781
2 0.274 1.162
Gagné (2002) 1 0.238 1.431
2 0.308 1.814












Hutchinson and Louwerse (2013b) 1 ~ 0 0.026
1 0.001 0.53
1 ~ 0 0.111
1 0.004 0.97
































Publication Experiment η2 Hedge’s g
1 0.001 0.47
1 0.002 0.492












Louwerse and Hutchinson (2012) 1 0.005 1.007








Louwerse (2011b) 1 0.203 NA
Santiago, Lupáñez, Perez, and Funes (2007) 1 0.272 1.172
1 0.048 0.828
2 0.58 2.936
Solomon and Barsalou (2004) 1 0.273 2.466
Tagalakis and Keane (2006) 1 0.325 1.273
2 0.019 0.245




Wu and Barsalou (2009) 1 0.425 1.071
2 0.468 1.257
1 = error rate; 2 = response times.



































The language-as-fixed fallacy is the failure to include items as a random factor 
in statistical analyses, yielding unsuccessful generalization past those items in an 
experiment. The problem was outlined five decades ago, and different solutions to this 
problem have been applied by researchers in the psychological sciences, such as 
separate by-subject (F1) and by-item (F2) analyses and combined MinF’ analyses. This 
chapter aims to shed light on the conditions under which results that are obviously 
significant for a linear mixed model might beget insignificant results for F1 and F2 
analyses, and vice versa, by manipulating the effect of treatment in a variety of 
simulated datasets. The second aim is to estimate the number of publications in the 
current literature that might be reporting incorrect results simply from using an F1 and 
F2 analysis. Based on simulations of datasets, a regression formula was estimated that 
allows for predicting the significance of a linear mixed model from F1 and F2 values. 
Results suggested that approximately 34% of the studies using F1 and F2 analyses 
might be subject to a Type I error, with an unknown number of unpublished studies 
being subject to a Type II error. 
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This chapter is based on: 
Hutchinson, S., & Louwerse, M. M. (2015). Publish or Perish: Consequences of 
 Considering Sampling Errors. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
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Introduction 
In the previous chapter I clarified the conditions under which perceptual 
simulations are most important, showing that effect sizes of language statistic 
factors tend to be as large or larger than those of perceptual stimulation factors. 
Continuing in the vein of statistics, this chapter also examines results from a 
number of embodied cognition studies by explaining and justifying the 
methodological choices that I made in the research presented here, arguing that 
linear mixed models provide the most suitable analytical approach to provide 
answers to the questions posed in this manuscript. This chapter is not intended 
to address varying random effect structures, or random slopes by treatment, but 
instead focuses on very simple models. In this final quantitative chapter, I will 
focus on presenting several statistical simulations and argue that the analyses 
used in this manuscript provide more accurate and reliable results than the 
standard models used in the literature. 
Considering the large number of investigations in the literature that have 
used a test that ignored the sampling error of the materials, the laws of 
probability ensure that a percentage of the significant results were due to such 
chance variance. Or in other words, a percentage of these results could not be 
replicated using a different sample of language materials (Coleman, 1964, p. 
226). Coleman (1964) recognized that researchers in the psychological sciences 
properly specified participants as random factors in their analyses, yet variance 
in experimental items (e.g., word stimuli, sentence stimuli, picture stimuli, etc.) 
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was all but ignored. The consequence was that experimental results were 
published for which the statistical results did not correctly account for all 
random error in the data, potentially leading to erroneous conclusions in the 
literature. The failure to indicate items as a random factor, yielding unsuccessful 
generalization past specific items included in a particular experiment, is known 
as the “language-as-fixed-effect fallacy” (Clark, 1973). Coleman (1964) and 
Clark (1973) argued that both participants and items should be treated as 
random factors. Just as participants in an experiment do not represent an entire 
population, items in an experiment are by no means representative of the entire 
population of possible stimuli (Baayen, Davison, & Bates, 2008; Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Clark (1973) proposed a simple solution to the 
language-as-fixed-effect fallacy, recommending a calculation of a mixed F 
value that included a model with a random participant factor (F1) and one with a 
random item factor (F2). This estimate of a combined F value is referred to as 
minF’. 
Since the pleas by Coleman and Clark, conclusions from much 
experimental work in cognitive science, especially regarding embodied 
cognition has relied on the use of separate subject and item (F1 and F2) 
regression analyses. Even though this seems to solve the language-as-fixed 
fallacy, the solution of reporting F1 and F2 analyses separately is rather 
surprising, considering Clark (1973) never proposed F1 and F2 analyses should 
be reported separately. Instead, he argued for the use of a combined minF’ 
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score. The fact that F1 and F2 were intended as intermediate steps used to 
calculate minF’ and not as a replacement for minF’ is what researchers seem to 
have neglected, perhaps because minF’ is often (erroneously) thought of as an 
overly conservative estimate of the combined F value it approximates 
(Raaijmakers, Schrijnemakers, & Gremmen, 1999). Moreover, when separate F1 
and F2 values are reported, ambiguous situations can emerge in which F1 
reaches the specified alpha level (e.g., p < .05), but F2 does not, or vice versa 
(Locker, Hoffman, and Bovaird, 2007), making it difficult to draw meaningful 
conclusions. It is not uncommon to see emphasis placed on those F values that 
are significant, while insignificant F values tend to be ignored. In short, whereas 
Coleman (1964) cautioned against the language-as-fixed-effect fallacy, and 
Clark (1973) reiterated this warning and proposed a solution with minF’, 
experimental studies tend to only report F1 and F2 values - two components 
used to calculate minF’. 
In the meantime, a solution to the separate F1 and F2 values and to the 
language-as-a-fixed-effect fallacy has been readily available in linear mixed 
models. Linear mixed models (LMM), first having seen widespread use in in 
biomedical research in the 1950s, are also known as multilevel models, 
hierarchical linear models, mixed effects models, or variance component models 
and have recently been advocated in the psychological sciences (Baayen, 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Brysbaert, 2007; Locker, Hoffman, & Bovaird, 2007; 
Pinherio & Bates, 2000; Richter, 2006). 
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With different measures such as F1, F2, minF’ and LMM available to 
address sampling errors in experimental studies, it remains unclear what the 
impact is on the psychological sciences. Conclusions drawn from significant 
results should in hindsight not have been published, because their findings 
should have been attributed to chance and — equally importantly — 
unpublished studies should in hindsight have been published because their 
findings did reach the specified alpha level and should be considered 
significant. This chapter aims to give insight in the probability of significant 
results in one type of analysis (F1, F2, and minF’, or LMM), based on the 
findings from another analysis in order understand under what conditions results 
that are significant for one model might beget significant results for other 
models. 
It is critical to point out here that I do not want to emphasize the 
importance of the set alpha level. Reported effects extensively rely on p values 
in order to quantify the relevancy of an effect (Cohen, 1994). Convention 
dictates that p values are deemed significant when p < .05 and are sometimes 
considered marginally significant at p values of p < .10. Given this tradition that 
the alpha level is set at p = .05, and given that findings that exceed this 
threshold are typically considered not significant and oftentimes therefore not 
publishable, this chapter will discuss the notion of significant and insignificant 
results. 
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Insights in estimates of the results when the analyses had included both 
participants and items as random factors would provide researchers in 
psychological sciences with a rule-of-thumb whether their conclusions would 
hold if their data were properly reanalyzed. Moreover, such a rule-of-thumb 
allows for measuring the impact of different statistical analyses on the field of 
psychological sciences. Before introducing this rule-of-thumb and investigating 
the impact of the effect of different statistical methods on studies in the 
psychological sciences, I will first turn to a more detailed description of the 
different measures addressing sampling error. 
minF' 
MinF' is an F value that is calculated from the familiar F1 and F2 values 
and is computed as (F1 * F2) / (F1 + F2), where F1 is the F value of the by-
participant ANOVA analysis and F2 is the F value of the by-item ANOVA 
analysis. However, the minF' value suggested by Clark (1973) is only an 
approximation of another value, F'. F’ is derived from the formula (MST + 
MSS*I*T) + (MST*S + MSI*T), whereby MST is the mean square of the treatment 
effect, MSS is the error term of the participants, and MSI is the error term of the 
items. However, F' is difficult to calculate when dealing with a large dataset or 
missing data (Raaijmakers, Schrijnemakers, & Gremmen, 1999) which is why 
minF’ is calculated instead. 
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What makes this even more complex, is the fact that F’ is also an 
approximation of a combined F value, and like F’, the combined F it 
approximates is also difficult to compute when data are missing. minF’ is an 
approximation of an approximate value, and is a conservative (minimum lower 
bound) approximation of F’. F’, in turn, is also a conservative approximation of 
the combined F it approximates. Therefore, the significance for minF’ values 
must be calculated independently from F1 and F2 values. Simply put, minF’ 
does not automatically inherit significance just because F1 and F2 are 
independently significant. 
F1 and F2 
In much of the psychological science literature, particularly in the field of 
psycholinguistics, it has become convention, to report only the seemingly less 
conservative (and therefore more often significant) F1 and F2 values instead of 
the combined minF' values, despite the fact that the chances of making a Type I 
error increase. There are two reasons that may explain this practice of reporting 
F1 and F2. First, as speculated by Raaijmakers, Schrijnemakers, and Gremmen 
(1999), there might be a lack of understanding on the part of the researcher, in 
that researchers simply may have misunderstood that they are supposed to 
report minF’ and not only the components used to calculate minF’. Second, and 
equally problematic, is the fact that researchers regard minF' as too conservative 
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and rather than reporting an insignificant minF' value, they rather report 
significant F1 and F2 values, or worse, a single significant F1 or F2 value. 
The correct minF' value since introduced has steadily declined in use. 
Nowadays it is virtually unseen in published articles, being replaced by the 
separate F1 and F2 analyses. Raaijmakers, et al. (1999) reported that out of 220 
articles from 1993-1997 in the Journal of Memory and Language that mention 
F1 and F2 a total of 120 papers report F1 and F2 values, ignoring minF’ 
altogether. 
Linear mixed models 
Linear mixed models are more powerful than linear regressions because 
they solve the language-as-fixed fallacy by allowing researchers to consider 
both participant and item error simultaneously in one model. In doing so, 
researchers increase model fit by driving down random error. In essence, linear 
mixed models do not treat items (or participants) as a fixed effect, thereby 
offering an alternative to the infrequently used minF'. 
In addition to offering a solution to the language-as-fixed-effect fallacy, 
these models also have several additional advantages compared to traditional 
models. First, linear mixed models can accommodate more complicated nested 
and crossed designs (Quené & van den Bergh, 2008). Furthermore, linear mixed 
models allow for missing data at random and do not need to perform listwise 
deletion. They can be further extended to allow for time-varying covariates and 
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they accurately present the relationships between variables over time. Mixed 
models also easily allow for clustering, longitudinal or repeated measures as 
well as specific covariate structures. Finally, they are able to generalize non-
normal data and do not assume independent observations, thereby being more 
applicable to a wide range of datasets. 
Recent work by Baayen, Davidson, and Bates (2008) encouraged 
researchers to utilize linear mixed models by clearly demonstrating the 
differences in the results of different models that were applied to the same 
datasets. West, Welch, and Gałecki (2006) take a similar approach by 
demonstrating how to run linear mixed models in various software packages. 
But despite software and tutorials for running linear mixed models being readily 
(and sometimes freely) available in R, SPSS, SAS, MLwiN and other packages, 
and despite the convincing arguments favoring the benefits of linear mixed 
models (Baayen, 2008a; Brysbaert, 2007; Richter, 2006; West, Welch, & 
Gałecki, 2006; Winter, 2013), the use of mixed models is still not widespread. 
In fact, nearly fifteen years after Raaijmakers, Schrijnemakers, and Gremmen 
(1999) reported that most published articles in the Journal of Memory and 
Language failed to report minF’ values, in the same journal between 
2012-2013, out of 56 published articles mentioning F1, F2, minF, or mixed 
models, more than half (n = 30) still report F1 and F2 values, three of which also 
report minF'. At the same time, 26 papers correctly report results from linear 
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mixed models, suggesting that at least some progress is being made with 
correctly addressing sampling error. 
The advice from Coleman (1964), Clark (1973), Raaijmakers, et al. 
(1999) and Baayen et al. (2008) to researchers still reporting F1 and F2 values to 
correctly reanalyze data with LMM will likely not be received enthusiastically, 
as it is unclear whether the previous conclusions drawn from the results would 
in fact still hold. Ideally, it would be desirable to estimate, on the basis of F1 and 
F2 values, whether mixed effect models would generate significant results and 
vice versa. Such an estimate would clearly not replace a reanalysis of the data 
with mixed models, but could serve as an estimate of the effect of a proper 
statistical method on the findings, advising researchers and allowing them a 
measure of the impact of F1 and F2 analyses has had on the field of 
psychological science. This might subsequently motivate a mixed model 
analysis of the original data, or a replication of the experiment with new data 
using the proper statistical model. 
This chapter has two goals. First, by manipulating the effect of treatment 
in a variety of simulated datasets, it aims to shed light on the conditions under 
which results that are obviously significant for a linear mixed model might 
beget insignificant results for F1 and F2 analyses, and vice versa. Second, this 
chapter estimates the number of publications in the current literature that might 
be reporting incorrect results simply from using an F1 and F2 analysis. It is well 
discussed that in the cognitive science literature, researchers extensively rely on 
182
p-values in order to quantify if an effect is relevant (Cohen, 1994; 
Wagenmakers, 2007). In this chapter, I calculate F and p values from simulated 
datasets using a linear mixed model and using more traditional analyses to 
generate formulas for estimation (F1 and F2, minF’). These formulas are then 
used to determine if results from linear mixed models can indeed be estimated 
from traditional analyses. Next, I estimated how many results of articles 
published in Psychological Science between 2004-2014 might be impacted from 
using linear mixed models.  
Simulations 
The first step was to simulate datasets in order to calculate formulas from 
which mixed model F and p values can be estimated. Simulations took place 
using three experimental designs that imitated semantic judgments of words in 
which response times from participants served as dependent variable. If p and F 
values can be estimated across models, then they are most likely best estimated 
with a simple model and, following the principle of parsimony, therefore a 
design was selected with only one independent variable and one dependent 
variable. Two within-participant designs and one between-participant design 
were included in order to remain consistent with the most common 
experimental designs (Howitt & Cramer, 2011). To match standard designs in 
the current literature, for within-participant (n = 20) and between-participant 
designs (n = 40) different items were used in each treatment condition. The 
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second within-participant design (n = 10) had the same items in each treatment 
condition. The number of participants for each condition ranged from 10 – 40, 
with 40 participants in the between participants design and 10 and 20 
participants in the two within subject designs. This was to ensure that the 
number of participants in each condition resulted in the same number of data 
points for all designs. 
Data for each of the three designs above was simulated 100 times to 
generate 300 simulated datasets (100 simulations * 3 different designs = 300 
total simulations). Data was also simulated for each of the three designs with 
normally distributed errors (an ideal scenario for parametric tests), positively 
skewed errors, negatively skewed errors, and random errors (that is, 100 
simulations * 3 different designs * 4 error distributions = 1,200 total 
simulations). In addition, to these complete datasets, simulations were run for 
data with missing values of up to 10% (100 simulations * 3 different designs * 4 
error distributions * 2 missing data scenarios = 2,400 total simulations) (Finch, 
2010). Missing data and non-normal errors were included in order to increase 
the generalizability of the simulations, and their applicability to the real word, 
as imperfect distributions are sometimes found in real datasets. Finally, these 
2,400 simulations were simulated ten times (2,400 simulations * 10 effect of 
treatment manipulations = 26,400 total simulations), because manipulating the 
effect of treatment (ET) from no effect (p > .10) to a strong effect (p < .01) 
required 10 iterations. 
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Each dataset had the same initial values from which to generate a 
simulated dependent variable. A linear model has the following structure: Y = Y0 
+ET+ES+EI+E, where Y is the dependent variable (e.g., response time), Y0 is the 
expected mean response time with no treatment, ET is the strength of the effect, 
ES is the by-participant error, EI is the by-item error, and E is the by-observation 
error. Y0 was set to 400 ms for each response, a recognized response latency for 
Figure 1. Percentage of significant cases out of the total 14784 significant simulations 
across F1, F2, LMM, and minF’ models. The percentages in the grey areas represent shared 
significance between models. Overall, F1 and F2 were significant 56% of the time, LMM 
were significant 53% of the time, and minF’ was only significant 29% of the time.
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semantic judgments of words (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). All normally distributed 
errors (by-participant error (ES), by-item error (EI), and by-observation error 
(E)) were set to be randomly generated numbers centered at 0, where the SD of 
the error was a random number ranging between 0 and 20. Recall the 
distribution of the errors was determined in advance to be either normal, 
positively skewed, negatively skewed, or random. The strength of the effect (ET) 
was manipulated so that each design was used 10 times, ranging from no effect 
of the independent variable, to all 100 cases resulting in highly significant 
effects at p < .01. 
F1, F2, minF’, and linear mixed models were all computed using lme4 in 
the languageR package (Bates & Sarkarin, 2007). Significance was estimated 
for both the two tailed MCMC probability as calculated from the pvals.fnc 
function in the languageR package (Baayen, 2008b) and for the t-test using 
Satterthwaite’s approximation for the degrees of freedom found in the lmerTest 
package (Kuznetsova et al., 2013). Both methods generated the same results. 
Four models, an F1 model, an F2 model, a minF’ model and a LMM were 
conducted on the data for each of the simulations. The number of significant 
cases out of the 26,400 total simulations for each model is represented in Figure 
1. As Figure 1 shows, minF’ values were the most conservative, with 
significance at p < .05 in 28.54% of the data. In fact, in these simulations, minF’ 
values were never significant when the other measures were also not significant. 
Such findings are in line with the fact that minF’ has been argued to have 
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reduced power compared to all other models (Wickens & Keppel, 1983). F1 and 
F2  models were least conservative, resulting in significant p values of p < .05 
for 55.97% of the time for F1 models and for 56.01% of the time for F2 models. 
Results from both F1 and F2 models had a large overlap, with each only being 
independently significant from the other less than 1% of the time. Linear mixed 
models were equally conservative, with significant p values set at p < .05 being 
found in 53.23% of the cases out of 26,400 simulations. A large overlap was 
found between linear mixed models and F1 and F2 models. Linear mixed 
models were independently significant less than 2% of the time. In other words, 
linear mixed models and F1/F2 results were the most similar in terms of 
identifying significant results. 
Although F1/F2 models always detected more significant results than did 
other models, it is important to note that when ET was small linear mixed 
models detected more significant effects than did F1, F2, or minF’ (see Figure 
2). These findings suggest that findings reported with significant F1 and F2 
results, are likely significant when data is analyzed with linear mixed models, 
but this is not the case for minF’. These reported results are for all simulated 
models, with random and skewed data. 
Next, I investigated whether the results from linear mixed models could 
be estimated from the output of the other models. There are several possible 
factors impacting whether significance can be estimated in one model based on 

















































































































effect, the number of factors, and the degrees of freedom. However, I tried to 
estimate the outcome of linear mixed models (in these simple models) from 
respectively very little information (i.e., p and F values).  
First, to determine whether F1, F2, and minF’ F values estimated F values 
in linear mixed models, I entered F1, F2, and minF’ F values in a linear 
regression model. When estimating F and p values, it is likely that researchers 
only have one type of F value (either F1/F2 or minF’, not both). Since F1/F2 or 
minF' is normally used to estimate the likely output of a linear mixed model I 
decided to run analyses where F1/F2 and minF' were entered into separate 
analyses. F1 and F2 models significantly estimated mixed effect F values for F1, 
F (1, 26397) = 2622.46, p < .001, η2= .09, r = .30, and for F2, F (1, 26397) = 
2341.59, p < .001, η2= .08, r = .28, resulting in Equation 1. Effect sizes (both η2 
and r reported here) were moderate. 
F = (2.8494 * F1) + (0.5273 * F2) - 4.2842 
To see if the same factors were able to estimate significance, as degrees 
of freedom were calculated differently in linear mixed models than for standard 
regressions, all 26,400 p values were entered into a regression model and found 
that F1 and F2 p values significantly estimated LMM p values in linear mixed 
models for F1 p values, F (1, 26397) = 2622.46, p < .001, η2= .09, r = .30, and 
for F2 p values, F (1, 26397) = 2341.59, p < .001, η2= .08, r = .28, resulting 
from Equation 2. 
p = (0.51654 * F1p) + (0.48786 * F2p) + 0.01324. 
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For minF’, F values were also significantly predicted, F (1, 26397) = 
303986.8, p < .001, η2= .92, r = .96, as were p values, F (1, 26397) = 43827.42, 
p < .001, η2= .62, r = .79, resulting in Equations 3 and 4.  
F = (6.54332 * minF’) - 3.49908 
p = (0.62379 * minF’) - 0.08438. 
Entering F1/F2 and minF’ together in the model also resulted in 
significant predictions of F values (for F1 F(1, 26396) = 1824.14, p < .001, η2= .
06, r = .25, F2 F (1, 26396) = 599.27, p < .001, η2= .02, r = .14, and minF’ F(1, 
26396) = 346.70, p < .001, η2= .01, r = .10) and p values (for F1, F(1, 26396) = 
2578.61, p < .001, η2= .09, r = .30, F2, F(1, 26396) = 2332.89, p < .001, η2= .08, 
r = .28, and minF’, F(1, 26396) = 6692.88, p < .001, η2= .20, r = .45). 
Despite the fact that many factors contribute to whether or not F and p 
values can be estimated from other F and p values, including design, the size of 
the effect, the number of factors, and the degrees of freedom, for simple models, 
estimates for mixed model results can be made from other models (F1, F2, 
minF’). 
Estimates 
The predictive power of the formulas derived from the simulated data 
presented in the previous section were next tested on a different dataset, the 
splitplot dataset previously used by Baayen, Davidson, and Bates (2008) and 
freely available in the languageR package (Baayen, 2008b). The experimental 
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design for this dataset involved two counterbalanced lists of words, each with 
40 words. Each list consisted of related prime words and unrelated prime words. 
Twenty participants were tested on one list, or the other.  
Because this is only one dataset, RT values for the splitplot dataset were 
simulated 1000 times using the parameters of the original data such that all 
simulated data were generated from the distribution of the original mean and SD 
for each parameter. The effect of the IV (ET) was set randomly so that models 
would vary from a no effect of treatment at p > .10 to a strong effect of 
treatment at p < .01. One thousand simulations of linear mixed models 
predicting RT with the priming condition as a fixed factor and participant and 
item as random factors were conducted on the splitplot dataset. Regressions 
were also conducted for actual F1 and F2 values. 
Values of significance for each dataset were estimated from the previous 
formulas and compared these values to the actual output from 1,000 simulations 
of the dataset provided in splitplot. As can be seen from Figure 3, predicting F 
and p values for linear mixed models from the F1/F2 analyses is almost perfect 
for simple designs with one independent variable, one dependent variable, and 
normally distributed errors. This demonstrates that the formulas generated from 
the simulated data above are able to successfully predict F and p values for real 
world datasets. 
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Current Literature Analysis 
Knowing that significance can be reliably estimated from simulations in 
the splitplot dataset, next I estimated how many findings in publications in the 
psychological sciences would be affected by a different statistical analysis. That 
is, should the results from reported F1 and F2 analyses with marginally 
significant results actually be attributed to Type I errors when considering linear 
mixed models? And are results reported with highly significant effects (p < .05), 
marginally significant effects (.10 < p > .05), or insignificant effects (p < .10) 
equally vulnerable to having dramatically different results when analyzed used 
linear mixed models?  
A total of 2,394 articles published between 2004-2014 in Psychological 
Science were collected. Of the 2,394 papers only 109 papers (5%) reported F1 
and F2 analyses, and none used minF’. Of those 109 papers, only 34% of the 
articles report all F1 and F2 actual values (many report incomplete rounded 
values, such as F < 1). Because these 109 articles often reported multiple 
experiments, 195 total experiments reported F1 values and 195 reported F2 
values. Interestingly, of those 195 values, 20% of the pairs of F1 and F2 values 
resulted in ambiguous scenarios in which one F (F1 / F2) value was significant, 
while the other F value (F2 / F1) was not, not allowing definitive conclusions to 
be drawn regarding an effect.  
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For all 101 pairs of F1 and F2 values, F and p values were estimated for a 
linear mixed model. All significant effects at p < .01 remained significant at p 
< .01 when a linear mixed model was used instead of F1 and F2 analyses. 
For 57 pairs of F1 and F2 values significant at .01< p < .05, 11% (n = 13) 
previously reported as significant at p < .05 were no longer significant in linear 
mixed models. 
However, when examining the pairs of F1 and F2 values where one F 
(F1 / F2) value was significant at p < .05 while the other (F2 / F1) was not 
significant, 95% (n = 108) of the p values no longer yielded significant results 
Figures 3A-3D. F and p values estimated from F1/F2 (left) and minF’ (right) plotted against 




































































in linear mixed models. 
In conclusion, 5% of the articles published over the last decade in 
Psychological Science include studies potentially incorrectly reporting by-item 
and by-subject analyses. Even though 5% might seem low, this percentage does 
not reflect the importance of the issue, but rather the representation of studies in 
Psychological Science for which by-participants and by-item variance applies. 
For instance, the issue discussed here likely applies to 100% of the 
psycholinguistic studies. 
For the studies that have reported conclusions in Psychological Science 
based on the results of experiments, the validity of the findings in 34% of the 
cases can be questioned. That is, in a third of the cases in which significant 
findings have been reported, the suspicion of a Type I error can be raised. 
It is unclear how many studies that have not been published might be 
subject to a Type II error, because we simply have no record of those studies 
and because there is likely a practical bias to report studies that are marginally 
significant than to not report them. However, what the prediction of Type I error 
suggests is that Type II errors should certainly not be ruled out. That is, results 
that have currently not been published because they were not deemed 
significant in F1 and F2 analyses should perhaps have been published according 
to a LMM analysis. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, researchers are recommended to analyze their current data 
and reanalyze past data that was originally reported as F1, F2 or minF’ using 
linear mixed models. This suggestion is not only relevant for work on embodied 
cognition, but for the cognitive science community in general. Obviously such a 
suggestion might not be eagerly considered, for instance because it is assumed 
that the results would be similar regardless of the model, or because of the 
unease that results might not reach the set alpha threshold that was reached in 
the previously reported analyses. Moreover, studies previously not published 
because results seemed to be attributed to chance, should perhaps have been 
reported because the results were in fact significant. On the basis of F1 and F2 
values and minF’ values it was therefore estimated whether linear mixed effect 
models would generate significant results. Indeed not only were F values 
estimated, but also p values. These estimates are not intended to replace a 
reanalysis of the data, but rather they are intended to motivate researchers to 
analyze and properly reanalyze data using linear mixed models. 
The findings show that for simplistic models an F or p value from a linear 
mixed model can be accurately estimated from the same values from more 
traditional analyses. It is important to recognize that this chapter only 
demonstrates this for the most simple of designs, and that with more 
complexity, it is likely that it becomes more difficult to accurately estimate F 
and p values for linear mixed models. Nevertheless, the strength of the 
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relationship between F1 / F2 or minF’ and the F value from a linear mixed 
model is not unexpected, as all of these F values are calculated from the same 
dataset in a similar way. The same logic stands for the p values. This at least 
suggests that it might be possible to estimate F and p values of linear mixed 
models from more complex designs.  
This chapter has also elaborated upon some of the benefits of linear 
mixed models, and suggested its use over alternative traditional methodologies 
such as F1 and F2 analyses. Sometimes F1 is the proper analysis to use, for 
instance when items are nested in participants and participants are nested in 
treatments (Clark, 2008, p. 348), or when items are properly counterbalanced or 
matched. It is nevertheless important for researchers to understand when 
particular analyses are appropriate to use and when they are not. Even more 
practically, linear mixed models provide some benefits to researchers with 
regard to the flexibility and robust nature of the analysis. 
The issues discussed in this chapter impact the current literature. Based 
on a sample of articles published between 2004-2014 in Psychological Science 
to which F1 and F2 apply, the results demonstrated that approximately a third of 
the reported F1 and F2 analyses, when reanalyzed using linear mixed models 
might result in alternative conclusions. 
Reported effects usually rely on p values in order to quantify if an effect 
is relevant for publication (Cohen, 1994; Wagenmakers, 2007). Despite the 
problems with null hypothesis significance testing, researchers continue to place 
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emphasis on the significance of p values. Usually p values are deemed 
significant when p < .05 and findings that exceed this threshold are considered 
marginally or not significant and therefore are much less likely to make it in 
print. That is, undesirably the consequences of considering sampling errors can 





In the previous chapters I have brought to light some of the complex 
issues currently relevant to the debate on symbolic versus embodied cognition. 
In this final chapter I will summarize the findings and conclusions presented in 
this dissertation with the goal of demonstrating that the question of whether 
cognition is symbolic or embodied is a moot point. Instead I hope to emphasize 
that both linguistic and perceptual representations are always employed during 
language processing, and like in this dissertation, future research should also 
continue to explore what additional factors impact the relative importance of 
linguistic or perceptual representations.  
I began by asking under what conditions symbolic and embodied 
accounts of cognition explain how words attain meaning. From the work 
presented here, it should become clear that mental representations are neither 
exclusively embodied nor exclusively linguistic but rather that mental 
representations are both embodied and linguistic, but under different conditions. 
The specific focus of this dissertation investigated how word meaning is 
established by both symbolic and embodied accounts working together in 
concert. In particular, the previous chapters examined how different modulators 
impact how much we rely on linguistic and embodied representations. In 
particular, I asked if both linguistic and perceptual representations impacted by 
1) the time course of processing 2) the spatial presentation of stimuli 3) 
individual differences or 4) the orientation of stimuli. I also aimed to determine 
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whether linguistic and perceptual representations are independent processes that 
work together to establish word meaning. 
Chapter 2 illustrated how both linguistic and perceptual factors can 
explain experimental results. This chapter demonstrated that symbolic 
representations explain results that are generally attributed to effects of 
embodied cognition. In three experiments, participants participated in SNARC 
tasks for numerical stimuli and high and low frequency words. Although the 
SNARC effect was replicated, providing support for a fundamentally embodied 
account, for all three experiments, linguistic factors were able to explain subject 
RTs. These findings not only demonstrated that linguistic symbolic 
representations can account for human RTs on embodied tasks but also showed 
that integrated theories of cognition can more easily account for effects together 
than each theory can on its own. 
Chapter 3 addressed how temporal constraints and spatial presentation 
impact processing. I did this by exploring whether the time course and spatial 
presentation of stimuli impacted how much participants relied on embodied or 
linguistic factors. First, the time course of an experimental trial was constrained. 
Results supported integrated theories of cognition with participants relying 
more on a linguistic factor when given strict time constraints, but when given 
more time to respond, both linguistic and perceptual factors explained RTs. 
Furthermore, when participants were told to focus on responding quickly, 
linguistic factors explained RTs, suggest that task instructions also impact 
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mental representations. In a second experiment, the spatial presentation of 
stimuli on the screen was modified, and for animate words, decisions were 
based on the relationship between one word relative to the other words in the 
experiment. This is in contrast to an explanation where word meaning is based 
on the relationship between one word and the embodied physical and spatial 
properties of that simulated word. Together, these experiments implied that both 
time and space might influence how reliant we are upon both linguistic and 
perceptual representations during processing. Relying on these findings, I 
sought to tease apart these two kinds of processing, which are seen as working 
in parallel. In a third experiment, I demonstrated that both linguistic and 
perceptual representations, although intertwined are indeed independent 
processes with linguistic factors predicting performance for semantically related 
pairs, and only perceptual factors predicting RT performance for unrelated word 
pairs. 
In Chapter 4, I was able to demonstrate that not only is the relative spatial 
location of stimuli important, but that the orientation of the stimuli is also 
important. I also demonstrated that gender differences impacted how much 
participants relied upon linguistic versus perceptual representations. Four 
experiments demonstrated that primary metaphor processing was best explained 
by both an embodied cognition and a linguistic account. Further, whether words 
are presented in a vertical or horizontal configurations modulates how much 
participants rely on linguistic representations. Finally, female participants were 
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found to be more sensitive to statistical linguistic context than male participants, 
demonstrating that individual differences also impact whether mental 
representations.  
Chapters 5 and 6 examined prior research by both assessing effect sizes to 
clarify the conditions under which perceptual simulations are most important 
and by establishing the number of publications in the current literature that 
might be reporting incorrect results simply from using an F1 and F2 analysis. 
Chapter 5 determined that effect sizes of language statistics were as large or 
larger than those of perceptual stimulation with factors associated with 
immediate processing (button press, word processing) reducing the effect size of 
perceptual simulation. Chapter 6 established the conditions under which results 
that are obviously significant for a linear mixed model beget insignificant 
results for F1 and F2 analyses. The results suggested that approximately 34% of 
the studies using F1 and F2 analyses might be subject to a Type I error, with an 
unknown number of unpublished studies being subject to a Type II error. 
The implications of these results are fully in the line with the Symbol 
Interdependency Hypothesis (Louwerse, 2007) and are highly relevant for the 
cognitive sciences, as meaning is fundamental to cognitive psychology, 
linguistics, and computer science, among other fields. In line with theories 
supporting representational pluralism (Barsalou, et al., 2008; Dove, 2009; 
Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010; Paivio, 1986; Zwaan, 2014) in which conceptual 
processing blends linguistic and embodied representations, these results 
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similarly suggest that language processing and language grounding is neither 
exclusively embodied nor exclusively linguistic. Instead mental representations 
can be both embodied and linguistic, but under different conditions.  
The experiments presented in this dissertation explore the intersections of 
symbolic and embodied theories of language comprehension by examining 
various factors that determine the extent to which a reader employs symbolic 
and/or embodied processes during comprehension. In particular, these 
theoretical perspectives are not presented in contrast against one another, 
instead, the motivation for these studies was to pursue a unified account of the 
usefulness of both symbolic and embodied processes.  
Adding to the ample evidence that language processing involves the 
activation of non-linguistic representations, it is also clear from this dissertation 
that embodiment is not necessarily ubiquitous. Emerging from these results, 
linguistic predictor variables can explain the very same data that is cited as 
evidence for embodied cognition. As explicitly stated in Chapter 1, this 
dissertation does not address an exhaustive set of factors or paradigms that 
impact mental representations, the goal instead was to provide a clear 
demonstration that linguistic and embodied factors both play a role in language 
comprehension. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether linguistic frequency 
and perceptual ratings are an accurate operationalization of symbolic and 
embodied representations? Although I demonstrated that perceptual ratings and 
word frequency can be used to estimate the relevance of both symbolic and 
204
embodied relations, it is not unreasonable to urge future researchers to expand 
upon the linguistic and perceptual factors specified here. For example, the 
experiments presented here focus on embodied representations in the visual 
modality, it might well be the case that embodied cues from other modalities are 
more or less relevant to varying extents. Another question that is touched on in 
this dissertation is what other manipulations might influence language 
processing. Perhaps additional modulators, tasks, task goals, individual 
differences, semantic associations, knowledge constraints, expertise, age, etc., 
impact processing in ways that are yet unknown. For instance, it might be more 
likely that children would rely less on linguistic cues, as children may lack the 
necessary language expertise to more efficiently utilize linguistic information 
than perceptual cues. Although this dissertation asks when linguistic and 
perceptual representations are more or less relevant during language processing 
the variables identified here are by no means exhaustive. There are a wide 
variety of factors that may explain RTs for embodiment experiments, as there 
are a wide variety of factors that may be manipulated in these experiments. 
In line with the symbol interdependency hypothesis (Louwerse, 2007) 
and the LASS theory (Barsalou, et al., 2008), Chapter 3 also finds that symbolic 
cognition controls the early stages of comprehension to create a superficial level 
of representation. Whereas each word could potentially be grounded in the 
perceptual world, it is not necessary to do so when semantic information can be 
used to make approximations of meaning. These semantic approximations are 
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able to generate good-enough mental representations. Although linguistic 
representations are used as early and shallow representations, embodied 
representations are then employed to process the information more deeply and 
therefore take longer to generate. For precise mental representations, perceptual 
simulations of words are necessary. This account implies that linguistic 
information is important during temporally early processing, and perceptual 
simulation systems are used later. These findings confirm and replicate the 
results from Louwerse and Connell (2011) as well of that of Louwerse and 
Hutchinson (2012). They further extend simple RT findings to hint at task and 
time constraints that influence when symbolic versus embodied representations 
are more or less likely to be employed to generate word meaning.  
The experiments presented here examine the variables and conditions that 
impact language processing (with the exception of Chapter 6) and are mostly 
empirical questions instead of theoretical questions, but they cover a variety of 
factors (the time course of processing, the spatial presentation of stimuli, 
individual differences in gender, the orientation of stimuli, task constraints for 
the participants, differences in stimuli category and type), and show that 
processing can be shifted towards one type of mental representation or the other, 
suggesting that under particular conditions, each account alone might have 
difficult explaining how meaning is assigned to a word. 
In conclusion, it is less relevant to consider whether conceptual 
processing is symbolic or embodied. Instead it is important to determine when, 
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why, and to what extent linguistic and perceptual representations are employed 
during language processing and under what conditions it is likely that 
participants will rely more on one type of representation than another. This 
unified explanation not only predicts a bias towards linguistic factors for 
linguistic tasks, perceptual factors in perceptual tasks, a bias towards linguistic 
factors for linguistic stimuli and perceptual factors for perceptual stimuli as 
previously shown and replicated in Chapter 2, but it also predicts a bias towards 
linguistic factors in quick tasks, perceptual factors in slow tasks (Chapter 3), 
linguistic factors in speeded tasks, perceptual factors in accuracy tasks (Chapter 
3), linguistic factors in vertical presentation orientations, perceptual factors in 
horizontal presentation orientations (Chapter 4), linguistic factors for female 
participants, perceptual factors for male participants (Chapter 4), linguistic 
factors for related stimuli, and finally perceptual factors for unrelated stimuli 
(Chapter 3). In sum, a more elegant theory incorporates both linguistic and 
perceptual factors as opposite sides of the same continuum. 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Summary 
The cognitive science literature increasingly demonstrates that perceptual 
representations are activated during conceptual processing. Such findings 
suggest that the debate on whether conceptual processing is predominantly 
symbolic or perceptual has been resolved. However, the experiments presented 
in this dissertation explore the intersections of symbolic and embodied theories 
of language comprehension by examining various factors that determine the 
extent to which readers employ symbolic and/or embodied processes during 
comprehension. In particular, these theoretical perspectives are not presented in 
contrast to one another, instead, the motivation for these studies was to pursue a 
unified account of the usefulness of both symbolic and embodied processes. 
Instead of asking if processing relies upon symbolic or embodied 
representations, the question is posed when linguistic and perceptual 
representations are more or less relevant during language processing, and under 
what conditions it is likely that participants will rely more on one type of 
representation than another. More specifically, the question will be addressed to 
what extent linguistic and perceptual representations are impacted by 1) the 
time course of processing 2) the spatial presentation of stimuli 3) individual 
differences or 4) the orientation of stimuli.  
Chapter 2 demonstrated that experimental results can be explained by 
both linguistic and embodied factors. The spatial–numerical association of 
response codes (SNARC) has shown that parity judgments with participants’ 
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left hands yield faster response times (RTs) for smaller numbers than for larger 
numbers, with the opposite result for right-hand responses. In three 
experiments, I replicated the SNARC effect. This effect is traditionally 
explained in terms of embodied cognition with participants perceptually 
simulating number magnitude on a mental number line with numbers arranged 
from small to large. However, this is not the only explanation; in three RT 
experiments, I showed that the SNARC effect could also be explained by 
language statistics. Participants made parity judgments of number words (Exp. 
1) and Arabic numerals (Exp. 2). Linguistic frequencies of the number words 
and numbers mirrored the SNARC effect, explaining aspects of processing that 
a perceptual simulation account could not. Experiment 3 investigated whether 
high- and low-frequency nonnumeric words would also elicit a SNARC-like 
effect. Again, RTs were faster for high-frequency words for left-hand responses, 
with the opposite result for right-hand responses. These results demonstrated 
that those effects explained solely in terms of perceptual simulation can also be 
explained by language statistics.  
In Chapter 3 this finding was extended by exploring the time, space, and 
independence in three experiments. Experiment 1 investigated how the use of 
linguistic and perceptual representations was impacted when the time course of 
an experimental trial was constrained. Under time constraints, linguistic 
frequencies best accounted for participant RTs, but both linguistic and 
perceptual explanations accounted for slower RTs. Experiment 2 explored how 
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the spatial presentation of stimuli on the screen might also impact how and 
when participants are more or less likely to rely on linguistic versus perceptual 
representations. In a RT experiment participants viewed physical-location words 
at various locations on the screen. For words presented at the top or bottom of 
the screen, word meaning influenced RTs. But for words appearing in the center 
of the screen, word frequency played a more important role. In other words, 
judgments about words were made relative to other words on the screen and not 
relative to their absolute location on the screen. In a third Experiment I 
demonstrated that both linguistic and perceptual representations, although 
intertwined, are relied upon to differing extents based on the nature of the 
relationship shared between word pairs. In a single RT experiment where 
participants determined whether linguistically and/or perceptually similar or 
dissimilar word pairs were semantically related, linguistically related pairs were 
processed faster than pairs lacking a linguistic relationship whereas perceptually 
related and unrelated word pairs took longer to process, implying perceptual 
representation. Furthermore, word frequency predicted RTs for semantically 
related pairs, whereas both word frequency and perceptual factors were 
necessary to predict performance for perceptually related pairs. Importantly, for 
unrelated word pairs, perceptual factors alone predicted RT performance, 
suggesting that a full perceptual representation is independently utilized when 
generating a relationship for unrelated word pairs. 
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Research in cognitive linguistics has emphasized the role of embodiment 
in metaphor comprehension, with experimental research showing activation of 
perceptual simulations when processing metaphors. In Chapter 4, I discussed 
how the degree to which linguistic and perceptual information contribute to 
mental representations varies based on the orientation of the stimuli and on 
individual differences. In four experiments I showed that language statistics 
explain the processing of primary metaphors that share an embodied vertical 
relationship (e.g., X above Y or Y above X). Participants saw word pairs with 
valence, authority, temperature, or gender connotations. The pairs were 
presented in either a vertical configuration (X above Y or Y above X) matching 
the primary metaphors (e.g., HAPPY IS UP, CONTROL IS UP) or a horizontal 
configuration (X left of Y or Y left of X) not matching the primary metaphors. 
Results demonstrated that statistical linguistic frequencies explain the response 
times of the stimulus pairs both in vertical and horizontal configurations, 
because language has encoded embodied relations. In addition, the effect of the 
statistical linguistic frequencies was modified by participant gender, with female 
participants being more sensitive to statistical linguistic context than male 
participants. 
Finally, Chapter 5 examined effect sizes computed from 126 
experiments in 51 previously published embodied cognition studies to clarify 
the conditions under which perceptual simulations are most important. The 
effects of language statistics tended to be as large or larger than those of 
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perceptual stimulation and factors associated with immediate processing (button 
press, word processing) reduced the effect size of perceptual simulation. In 
Chapter 6, I presented a brief discussion with several mathematical simulations 
to justify my methodological analyses by arguing that linear mixed models 
provide the most suitable analytical approach to provide answers to the 
questions posed in this manuscript. I focused on presenting several statistical 
simulations and explored conditions under which results that are obviously 
significant for a linear mixed model beget insignificant results for F1 and F2 
analyses, and vice versa. The second aim of Chapter 6 was to estimate the 
number of publications in the current literature that might be reporting incorrect 
results simply from using an F1 and F2 analysis. 
These chapters demonstrate that research on mental representations can 
benefit from an integrated viewpoint. I concluded by suggesting that it is less 
relevant for the cognitive sciences to consider whether conceptual processing is 
symbolic or embodied and it is instead important to determine when, why, and 
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